Narrative:

Shortly after turning off the gate we were notified by ATC that the current weather had dropped to 1/4sm visibility; freezing fog; and -1 celsius. Not knowing how long the aircraft had sat after being brought out of the maintenance hangar (cold soaked wing); it still being before sunrise; and the abundance of clear ice on cars in the employee parking lot; I requested type 1 fluid from the station. I was told that a marshaler would guide me the rest of the way to the deice pad. I said I would standby on frequency until the truck was ready to spray. The #1 engine was shut down APU off. The truck approached and began to spray but nothing was said on the radio. The truck moved out of my view behind the aircraft for a short time and then returned ahead and to my left. The marshaler began to signal me to shut down the #2 engine. I called up the truck on [operations frequency] to tell the deice crew I needed to start #1 before shutting down #2 . There was no response. Eventually personnel in ops returned my radio call. I asked if I had communications with the truck driver and I was told the deice truck radios don't work. I had to relay communications via [operations frequency] to ops. Ops calls the truck driver on a walkie talkie. The truck driver calls up to the boom operator wearing a headset. This is how the [a bad] incident happened. Also; the marshaler constantly had to turn around so she could hear the walkie talkie over our engine noise. At other airports the commands to alternate engines is given via direct communications with the deice truck. The marshaler only needs to be there to get me into and out of the deice pad. The truck driver wouldn't answer my radio calls.the following is a direct cut and paste from the NTSB synopsis of the ZZZ1 airport event. Im trying to show we are still using the same outdated and unsafe procedures at our company headquarters.'the deice truck was not equipped for radio communication; therefore; the team's movement and position could not be coordinated with the other ground personnel or flight crew.''the ramp agent working the radio could not see the airplane from the radio location...'continued the relaying of necessary messages via a chain of aircraft radio to ops to walkie talkie to boom operators headset.every year I have to take a written test on deice procedures; and every year the preamble of that document notes that all stations have been properly trained on the deice procedures and radio phraseology in reference to the dash 8. This is not the case at the sby station. Please fix the radios and train the staff before the snow storms start.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The Captain of a Bombardier Dash 8 reported that when the aircraft was being dei-ced; he did not have any communication with the de-ice truck.

Narrative: Shortly after turning off the gate we were notified by ATC that the current weather had dropped to 1/4sm visibility; freezing fog; and -1 Celsius. Not knowing how long the aircraft had sat after being brought out of the Maintenance hangar (cold soaked wing); it still being before sunrise; and the abundance of clear ice on cars in the employee parking lot; I requested Type 1 fluid from the station. I was told that a marshaler would guide me the rest of the way to the deice pad. I said I would standby on frequency until the truck was ready to spray. The #1 engine was shut down APU off. The truck approached and began to spray but nothing was said on the radio. The truck moved out of my view behind the aircraft for a short time and then returned ahead and to my left. The marshaler began to signal me to shut down the #2 engine. I called up the truck on [Operations frequency] to tell the deice crew I needed to start #1 before shutting down #2 . There was no response. Eventually personnel in ops returned my radio call. I asked if I had communications with the truck driver and I was told the deice truck radios don't work. I had to relay communications via [Operations frequency] to ops. Ops calls the truck driver on a walkie talkie. The truck driver calls up to the boom operator wearing a headset. THIS IS HOW THE [A BAD] INCIDENT HAPPENED. Also; the marshaler constantly had to turn around so she could hear the walkie talkie over our engine noise. At other airports the commands to alternate engines is given via direct communications with the deice truck. The marshaler only needs to be there to get me into and out of the deice pad. The truck driver wouldn't answer my radio calls.The following is a direct cut and paste from the NTSB synopsis of the ZZZ1 Airport event. Im trying to show we are still using the same outdated and unsafe procedures at our company headquarters.'The deice truck was not equipped for radio communication; therefore; the team's movement and position could not be coordinated with the other ground personnel or flight crew.''The ramp agent working the radio could not see the airplane from the radio location...'Continued the relaying of necessary messages via a chain of aircraft radio to ops to walkie talkie to boom operators headset.Every year I have to take a written test on deice procedures; and every year the preamble of that document notes that all stations have been properly trained on the deice procedures and radio phraseology in reference to the DASH 8. This is not the case at the SBY station. Please fix the radios and train the staff before the snow storms start.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.