Narrative:

We were notified of a complete flight management guidance computer (FMGC) dump by the flight crew and that they were working on a fix. We notified them to let us know if there was anything we can do to help on our end. While flight following; dispatch noticed that they had a missed approach. Shortly after we received a call from the crew and they wanted us patched in with maintenance (mx) control. On the call they advised them of the FMGC issue; and also of other problems that they were having associated with said issue. When the crew spoke to dispatch; we agreed due to weather at destination being an issue and because their assigned alternate weather looked much better and that we would divert to [that alternate]. At the time we made this decision they had close to 11;000 pounds of fuel on board. At the time they were holding at FL100 but planned on flying at FL200. They also said that the gear was down. That part was lost in communication with the dispatcher; as the diversion was calculated normally showing that the flight was projected to land with 6;600 pounds of fuel. After sending the new flight plan to the crew via ACARS and confirming that they were projecting the same numbers they decided to continue to the new planned destination. Dispatch and the [operations] manager did not know until after the plane landed safely that the crew called for an emergency while landing. They landed with 3;200 pounds and were in the gate with 2;900 pounds. After the fact this was discussed among the other dispatchers on shift. We agreed although there was a lack of communication about the gear being down; and there was not an option for us within sabre's diversion calculator to calculate the proper fuel burns with the gear down while the aircraft is already enroute.once we learned that the FMGC was down; I as the dispatcher could have called either the dispatch manager or the chief pilot on duty to discuss what proper action should have been taken. After the pilot and I agreed on the new fuel burn numbers while they were heading to [the alternate]; the flight crew could have notified dispatch that they were burning a lot more fuel than they were supposed to be; giving us time to look for another suitable alternate while considering the landing gear being down. I will also be in contact with the dispatch manager to see if that we as a dispatch team have another effective method to calculate enroute fuel burns using the diversion calculator with the landing gear down. Overall; better communication between the flight crew and dispatch may have prevented the aircraft from landing with 3200 pounds of fuel at our alternate destination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Dispatcher working an A319 flight reported the aircraft landed with 3200 LBS of fuel on board when the crew diverted in a gear-down condition to an alternate. Dispatcher cited poor communication with the flight crew as contributing.

Narrative: We were notified of a complete Flight Management Guidance Computer (FMGC) dump by the flight crew and that they were working on a fix. We notified them to let us know if there was anything we can do to help on our end. While flight following; dispatch noticed that they had a missed approach. Shortly after we received a call from the crew and they wanted us patched in with Maintenance (MX) control. On the call they advised them of the FMGC issue; and also of other problems that they were having associated with said issue. When the crew spoke to dispatch; we agreed due to weather at destination being an issue and because their assigned alternate weather looked much better and that we would divert to [that alternate]. At the time we made this decision they had close to 11;000 LBS of fuel on board. At the time they were holding at FL100 but planned on flying at FL200. They also said that the gear was down. That part was lost in communication with the dispatcher; as the diversion was calculated normally showing that the flight was projected to land with 6;600 LBS of fuel. After sending the new flight plan to the crew via ACARS and confirming that they were projecting the same numbers they decided to continue to the new planned destination. Dispatch and the [Operations] manager did not know until after the plane landed safely that the crew called for an emergency while landing. They landed with 3;200 LBS and were in the gate with 2;900 LBS. After the fact this was discussed among the other dispatchers on shift. We agreed although there was a lack of communication about the gear being down; and there was not an option for us within SABRE's diversion calculator to calculate the proper fuel burns with the gear down while the aircraft is already enroute.Once we learned that the FMGC was down; I as the dispatcher could have called either the dispatch manager or the chief pilot on duty to discuss what proper action should have been taken. After the pilot and I agreed on the new fuel burn numbers while they were heading to [the alternate]; the flight crew could have notified dispatch that they were burning a lot more fuel than they were supposed to be; giving us time to look for another suitable alternate while considering the landing gear being down. I will also be in contact with the dispatch manager to see if that we as a dispatch team have another effective method to calculate enroute fuel burns using the diversion calculator with the landing gear down. Overall; better communication between the flight crew and dispatch may have prevented the aircraft from landing with 3200 LBS of fuel at our alternate destination.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.