Narrative:

I had never experienced conditions [like this] in my life. It was cavu but due to the snowfall the night prior and gusty winds of 30+ knots; the blowing snow created visibility problems but only while on the surface (I flew in that morning and had a perfect view of the runway until 50 feet above the surface. Descending below that; visibility became challenging but I landed safely and taxied to the ramp). When requesting taxi for departure I was directed out to runway xy. As I lined up; I was told the RVR at both the departure end (I recall something around 2;400) and the runout area (4;000). I asked how far down the runway I needed to obtain the better RVR and was told - all the way to the end. Runway xy is 6;500; feels long and I only need 3;000; plus with the strong wind; I probably would be airborne in less than 1;500. So my idea [was] to taxi to the mid-point of [the runway] but ATC did not seem to encourage that option. I then asked for RVR on [another runway] and asked if I should head over there but was told that it was not much better. However planes were departing from [the other runway].by this time I was holding in position on the runway and was cleared for takeoff but I decided to delay takeoff due to the visibility and told the tower (visibility was so poor on the ground that they had zero ability to tell where I was). I was told that I could hold in place but that there was a learjet on a 5-mile final - indicating that there was some urgency for my departure. I [then] had a 'break' in the weather and decided to give it a shot. As I accelerated; I lost visual contact due to snow on the runway; [and] also lost my bearings. I could tell that I had slid off the side of the runway but had not hit anything and at that point; I cut power and contacted the tower. I asked for a tug from the FBO and - after inspection of my plane in the hangar - it was confirmed that I had not hit anything nor had I done any damage to my propeller; landing gear; or airplane. In hindsight; I allowed the fact that planes were departing from another runway to influence my decision to attempt a departure and allowed ATC comments about an approaching learjet to rush me. I should have recognized that [it] was not safe to depart and requested a taxi to the midpoint of [the runway] or even over to [the other runway] to see for myself what the conditions were. I should have ignored the approaching learjet. This was clearly my error as PIC however contributing factors were ATC's inability to appreciate how bad things were at the takeoff end of [the runway] and lack of an offer to allow me to taxi to mid-point or to [the other runway] where the conditions might have been better. Also; communicating that a learjet was approaching helped create an environment where there was a 'call-to-action'.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA46T pilot reported rejecting the takeoff attempt after losing visual references and directional control on the takeoff roll in blowing snow conditions.

Narrative: I had never experienced conditions [like this] in my life. It was CAVU but due to the snowfall the night prior and gusty winds of 30+ knots; the blowing snow created visibility problems but only while on the surface (I flew in that morning and had a perfect view of the runway until 50 feet above the surface. Descending below that; visibility became challenging but I landed safely and taxied to the ramp). When requesting taxi for departure I was directed out to runway XY. As I lined up; I was told the RVR at both the departure end (I recall something around 2;400) and the runout area (4;000). I asked how far down the runway I needed to obtain the better RVR and was told - all the way to the end. Runway XY is 6;500; feels long and I only need 3;000; plus with the strong wind; I probably would be airborne in less than 1;500. So my idea [was] to taxi to the mid-point of [the runway] but ATC did not seem to encourage that option. I then asked for RVR on [another runway] and asked if I should head over there but was told that it was not much better. However planes were departing from [the other runway].By this time I was holding in position on the runway and was cleared for takeoff but I decided to delay takeoff due to the visibility and told the tower (visibility was so poor on the ground that they had zero ability to tell where I was). I was told that I could hold in place but that there was a Learjet on a 5-mile final - indicating that there was some urgency for my departure. I [then] had a 'break' in the weather and decided to give it a shot. As I accelerated; I lost visual contact due to snow on the runway; [and] also lost my bearings. I could tell that I had slid off the side of the runway but had not hit anything and at that point; I cut power and contacted the tower. I asked for a tug from the FBO and - after inspection of my plane in the hangar - it was confirmed that I had not hit anything nor had I done any damage to my propeller; landing gear; or airplane. In hindsight; I allowed the fact that planes were departing from another runway to influence my decision to attempt a departure and allowed ATC comments about an approaching Learjet to rush me. I should have recognized that [it] was not safe to depart and requested a taxi to the midpoint of [the runway] or even over to [the other runway] to see for myself what the conditions were. I should have ignored the approaching Learjet. This was clearly my error as PIC however contributing factors were ATC's inability to appreciate how bad things were at the takeoff end of [the runway] and lack of an offer to allow me to taxi to mid-point or to [the other runway] where the conditions might have been better. Also; communicating that a Learjet was approaching helped create an environment where there was a 'call-to-action'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.