Narrative:

[In] the morning; inbound to the sort; we experienced a challenging unstable approach and go-around that culminated in what I suspected was a flap overspeed. The flap overspeed was confirmed when I received a call from the [union] lawyer. Numerous external factors were involved; most notably extreme precipitation and a strong quartering left-to-right tailwind (greater than 60 knots) at initial approach altitude that shifted to a gentle right-to-left crosswind at the runway elevation. Other factors included degraded cockpit communications (very loud ambient noise; poor timing between ATC calls and cockpit interaction); confusion regarding proper flight director guidance; incorrect placement of the gear handle on initial go around; and task saturation. I think it all started in our descent to ZZZ when we began to encounter heavy precipitation. We agreed that the radar didn't seem to be accurately reflecting the extreme precipitation that we were experiencing; but we disagreed to some extent about the proper tilt angle of the radar. Things were starting to get busy; so we never really had a chance to explore this concern any further; but the tension was beginning to build. The weather was IMC with intermittent extreme precipitation and an increasingly strong quartering tailwind. I recall seeing 60+ knots from the southwest (our vector was to the north); increasing as we descended; to a peak velocity occurring between 4000 and 3000 feet. I verbally acknowledged the tailwind; the fact that we were in a 757 and that it would be difficult to slow the aircraft on final and thus we should configure early. I think that shortly after we discussed the early configuration; the vector we were on to final took us through the localizer; overshooting as we captured the localizer. The aircraft was still on autopilot and struggled to get back onto localizer. Our anxiety level had been building steadily (since encountering the heavy precipitation); and the overshoot of the localizer added to that anxiety. I suspect that the winds had shifted a bit and or the crosswind was simply pushing the limits of the autopilot's capability to fix it; and there was some discussion between the captain and myself as to what exactly the aircraft was doing and what I should be doing to fix it. However; I felt that it was slowly but steadily correcting back over to the localizer; so I left the automation engaged. There was some confusion or perhaps disagreement as to who was controlling the mode control panel; with the captain reaching up to make adjustments to the panel even though I was flying with the autopilot engaged. (This has been a common issue with the majority of captains I have flown with since the new MCP altitude procedures were introduced; but I think that there was some added anxiety on both our parts that contributed to more of this as we descended.) as previously briefed (that we should configure early because of the strong tail wind) I called for flaps 15 and selected approach mode. We were level at 4000 feet and cleared for the approach; on the localizer with a very significant crab to the left; with the autopilot engaged and approximately 180 knots. It was my intention to get the gear down and flaps to 20 at glideslope capture. However; as the flaps extended beyond 5 degrees and the aircraft began to pitch over for a flaps 15 attitude; there was the feeling of 'ballooning up' that is quite common at that moment; except that the flight director had captured the glideslope from about a dot below and was in fact beginning a gentle climb up to the glideslope. It was an uncomfortable feeling; but I felt as though the shallow upward vsi would only be momentary as we were nearly on the glideslope. I was aware of that the aircraft was climbing slightly; but it was consistent with other flights I've had where the jet momentarily pitched up due to a slightly early capture of the glide slope; and considering our tailwind; I didn't feel that overriding theautopilot at that moment was prudent or beneficial. However; my captain seemed very concerned about the situation and began emphatically telling me to watch the altitude; to level off; and to take command of the aircraft. At approximately 4200 feet; with a small but positive vsi and feeling pressured; I disconnected the autopilot and began to push the nose over just as we captured the glideslope and subsequently flew through it. (I speculate that if I had left the autopilot on; the nose would have aggressively pitched over and; because of the intense tailwind; we still would have been high on glideslope and struggled to get back down and slow down; but been in command of the situation better than what happened next. This is only speculation.) the anxiety level ratcheted up another notch as I disengaged the automation and we simultaneously flew up and through the glideslope. My captain was now providing emphatic verbal instructions to get back down on glideslope. At first; I was attempting to fly the flight director command bars; but this was not helping me get down onto glideslope. I continued to push the nose over further below the flight director command bars and adjusted my scan to include vsi. We were almost 2 dots high and I was correcting aggressively and; at some point; was asking for the vsi to be set at 2000 FPM because the command bars were detracting from my situational awareness. There was some more emphatic verbal communication within the cockpit. We got down onto glideslope and were unable to slow the aircraft any further than 180 knots. When the aircraft's auto-callout of 'one thousand feet' rang out; I initiated the go around procedure. I called for go around thrust and flaps 20. In hindsight; I don't think we had ever gotten the flaps extended beyond 15. When I called for the gear up; the captain must've inadvertently raised the gear handle to the off position (not up). In my opinion; we [were] pushing the boundaries of task saturation by this point; and the stress level in the cockpit had ratcheted up considerably between us. Nearly simultaneously; there was a high amount of radio transmissions (fly runway heading; maintain 4000 feet); a considerable struggle on my behalf with the lateral navigation as we climbed back up into the strong crosswinds; climb performance confusion that resulted from the gear handle being in the off position (not up) coupled with the decrement in performance from the rapid onset of the tailwind at the missed approach altitude; confusion and a breakdown in communication as to whether we were cleaning up or continuing our climb to a higher altitude (note: I am not certain; but I think that we had momentarily gotten an altitude cap for 3000 feet; our initial missed approach altitude; and I was transitioning to a level-off-and-clean-up mindset but ATC had then given us 4000 feet; the captain may have been in a continue-the-climb mindset and selected a new vertical mode while I was still struggling with the crosswinds and maintaining runway centerline; our rapid acceleration as we got the gear up and failure to set the bug at clean maneuvering and select speed (again; I think because I was in clean up mindset and ATC had directed us higher but I had not processed that information); and subsequent clearance to 5000 feet which further conflicted with my goal of cleaning up while getting input and guidance to climb higher. The airspeed rapidly accelerated while I momentarily took my eyes off the instruments to confirm the altitude in the MCP altitude window; and I failed to take manual control of the throttles in time to avoid an overspeed situation. I saw the flashing amber fast indication as I was retarding the throttles; calling for flaps; and regaining command of the situation. We leveled off at 5000 feet; reengaged automation; and calmed ourselves. We turned downwind; re-briefed the approach with emphasis on early configuration and speed management; informed ATC of our approach speed; andexecuted a relatively uneventful 2nd approach. On this 2nd approach; I think there was some misunderstanding on ATC's part about our approach speed; so I announced our speed on final for the benefit of the aircraft behind us (they landed without incident). Upon landing; I pointed out that we had over sped the flaps. We disagreed about the amount of the overspeed; but I think we were both very shook up over the entire incident and agreed that if the overspeed merited a logbook entry; then the data would show it and he would write it up. I mentioned it to the mechanic as we left the aircraft. Inside the [service center]; I wrote an event report and suggested we speak to an assistant chief pilot; and my captain said that he already had. Lessons learned: the stabilized approach / GA criteria are invaluable. Don't change that. Strong quartering tailwind at initial approach altitude; to a minor opposite crosswind at field elevation: even though I had briefed the strong tail wind; I had not sufficiently anticipated the affect that the crosswind at altitude would have on the localizer intercept or difficulty the autopilot might have in maintaining the localizer. I had briefed the need to get configured early; but the tailwind was even more intense than I had thought; and our early capture of the glideslope interrupted our flow and contributed to the need for the go around. The winds became a major factor during the subsequent go around; affecting both lateral navigation and climb performance and contributing to my task saturation. I take responsibility here; but would have preferred to land south. >60 knots quartering tailwind in a 757 at 4000 feet exceeded my expectations to say the least. Go around procedures: aviate; navigate; then communicate. Basics. Get the gear up; and verify! Call altitude cap and or new altitude settings and verify! ATC's request for why we went around can wait until after we go around.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 flight crew reported that on approach they encountered heavy turbulence with a quartering tailwind and they were unable to descend so had to go-around.

Narrative: [In] the morning; inbound to the sort; we experienced a challenging unstable approach and go-around that culminated in what I suspected was a flap overspeed. The flap overspeed was confirmed when I received a call from the [union] lawyer. Numerous external factors were involved; most notably extreme precipitation and a strong quartering left-to-right tailwind (greater than 60 knots) at initial approach altitude that shifted to a gentle right-to-left crosswind at the runway elevation. Other factors included degraded cockpit communications (very loud ambient noise; poor timing between ATC calls and cockpit interaction); confusion regarding proper flight director guidance; incorrect placement of the gear handle on initial Go Around; and task saturation. I think it all started in our descent to ZZZ when we began to encounter heavy precipitation. We agreed that the radar didn't seem to be accurately reflecting the extreme precipitation that we were experiencing; but we disagreed to some extent about the proper tilt angle of the radar. Things were starting to get busy; so we never really had a chance to explore this concern any further; but the tension was beginning to build. The weather was IMC with intermittent extreme precipitation and an increasingly strong quartering tailwind. I recall seeing 60+ knots from the southwest (our vector was to the north); increasing as we descended; to a peak velocity occurring between 4000 and 3000 feet. I verbally acknowledged the tailwind; the fact that we were in a 757 and that it would be difficult to slow the aircraft on final and thus we should configure early. I think that shortly after we discussed the early configuration; the vector we were on to final took us through the localizer; overshooting as we captured the localizer. The aircraft was still on autopilot and struggled to get back onto localizer. Our anxiety level had been building steadily (since encountering the heavy precipitation); and the overshoot of the localizer added to that anxiety. I suspect that the winds had shifted a bit and or the crosswind was simply pushing the limits of the autopilot's capability to fix it; and there was some discussion between the captain and myself as to what exactly the aircraft was doing and what I should be doing to fix it. However; I felt that it was slowly but steadily correcting back over to the localizer; so I left the automation engaged. There was some confusion or perhaps disagreement as to who was controlling the Mode Control Panel; with the captain reaching up to make adjustments to the panel even though I was flying with the autopilot engaged. (This has been a common issue with the majority of captains I have flown with since the new MCP altitude procedures were introduced; but I think that there was some added anxiety on both our parts that contributed to more of this as we descended.) As previously briefed (that we should configure early because of the strong tail wind) I called for flaps 15 and selected approach mode. We were level at 4000 feet and cleared for the approach; on the localizer with a very significant crab to the left; with the autopilot engaged and approximately 180 knots. It was my intention to get the gear down and flaps to 20 at glideslope capture. However; as the flaps extended beyond 5 degrees and the aircraft began to pitch over for a flaps 15 attitude; there was the feeling of 'ballooning up' that is quite common at that moment; except that the Flight Director had captured the glideslope from about a dot below and was in fact beginning a gentle climb up to the glideslope. It was an uncomfortable feeling; but I felt as though the shallow upward VSI would only be momentary as we were nearly on the glideslope. I was aware of that the aircraft was climbing slightly; but it was consistent with other flights I've had where the jet momentarily pitched up due to a slightly early capture of the glide slope; and considering our tailwind; I didn't feel that overriding theautopilot at that moment was prudent or beneficial. However; my captain seemed very concerned about the situation and began emphatically telling me to watch the altitude; to level off; and to take command of the aircraft. At approximately 4200 feet; with a small but positive VSI and feeling pressured; I disconnected the autopilot and began to push the nose over just as we captured the glideslope and subsequently flew through it. (I speculate that if I had left the autopilot on; the nose would have aggressively pitched over and; because of the intense tailwind; we still would have been high on glideslope and struggled to get back down and slow down; but been in command of the situation better than what happened next. This is only speculation.) The anxiety level ratcheted up another notch as I disengaged the automation and we simultaneously flew up and through the glideslope. My captain was now providing emphatic verbal instructions to get back down on glideslope. At first; I was attempting to fly the Flight Director Command Bars; but this was not helping me get down onto glideslope. I continued to push the nose over further below the flight director command bars and adjusted my scan to include VSI. We were almost 2 dots high and I was correcting aggressively and; at some point; was asking for the VSI to be set at 2000 FPM because the command bars were detracting from my situational awareness. There was some more emphatic verbal communication within the cockpit. We got down onto glideslope and were unable to slow the aircraft any further than 180 knots. When the aircraft's auto-callout of 'one thousand feet' rang out; I initiated the Go Around procedure. I called for Go Around Thrust and Flaps 20. In hindsight; I don't think we had ever gotten the flaps extended beyond 15. When I called for the gear up; the Captain must've inadvertently raised the gear handle to the OFF position (not up). In my opinion; we [were] pushing the boundaries of task saturation by this point; and the stress level in the cockpit had ratcheted up considerably between us. Nearly simultaneously; there was a high amount of radio transmissions (fly runway heading; maintain 4000 feet); a considerable struggle on my behalf with the lateral navigation as we climbed back up into the strong crosswinds; climb performance confusion that resulted from the gear handle being in the off position (not up) coupled with the decrement in performance from the rapid onset of the tailwind at the missed approach altitude; confusion and a breakdown in communication as to whether we were cleaning up or continuing our climb to a higher altitude (note: I am not certain; but I think that we had momentarily gotten an ALT CAP for 3000 feet; our initial missed approach altitude; and I was transitioning to a level-off-and-clean-up mindset but ATC had then given us 4000 feet; the captain may have been in a continue-the-climb mindset and selected a new vertical mode while I was still struggling with the crosswinds and maintaining runway centerline; our rapid acceleration as we got the gear up and failure to set the bug at clean maneuvering and select speed (again; I think because I was in clean up mindset and ATC had directed us higher but I had not processed that information); and subsequent clearance to 5000 feet which further conflicted with my goal of cleaning up while getting input and guidance to climb higher. The airspeed rapidly accelerated while I momentarily took my eyes off the instruments to confirm the altitude in the MCP altitude window; and I failed to take manual control of the throttles in time to avoid an overspeed situation. I saw the flashing amber FAST indication as I was retarding the throttles; calling for flaps; and regaining command of the situation. We leveled off at 5000 feet; reengaged automation; and calmed ourselves. We turned downwind; re-briefed the approach with emphasis on early configuration and speed management; informed ATC of our approach speed; andexecuted a relatively uneventful 2nd approach. On this 2nd approach; I think there was some misunderstanding on ATC's part about our approach speed; so I announced our speed on final for the benefit of the aircraft behind us (they landed without incident). Upon landing; I pointed out that we had over sped the flaps. We disagreed about the amount of the overspeed; but I think we were both very shook up over the entire incident and agreed that if the overspeed merited a logbook entry; then the data would show it and he would write it up. I mentioned it to the mechanic as we left the aircraft. Inside the [service center]; I wrote an event report and suggested we speak to an Assistant Chief Pilot; and my Captain said that he already had. Lessons Learned: The stabilized approach / GA criteria are invaluable. Don't change that. Strong quartering tailwind at initial approach altitude; to a minor opposite crosswind at field elevation: Even though I had briefed the strong tail wind; I had not sufficiently anticipated the affect that the crosswind at altitude would have on the localizer intercept or difficulty the autopilot might have in maintaining the localizer. I had briefed the need to get configured early; but the tailwind was even more intense than I had thought; and our early capture of the glideslope interrupted our flow and contributed to the need for the Go Around. The winds became a major factor during the subsequent Go Around; affecting both lateral navigation and climb performance and contributing to my task saturation. I take responsibility here; but would have preferred to land south. >60 knots quartering tailwind in a 757 at 4000 feet exceeded my expectations to say the least. Go Around Procedures: Aviate; navigate; then communicate. Basics. Get the gear up; and verify! Call ALT CAP and or new altitude settings and verify! ATC's request for why we went around can wait until after we go around.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.