Narrative:

After approved for pushback we started engine one. Immediately after engine start and right as captain was going to call for engine 2 start ramp called us to amend our push. Now instead of pushing abeam gate; he wanted us to pull to the top. We attempted to get a hold of the ground personnel promptly before he disconnected and after a few attempts we were successful. He pulled us up and we continued with checklists; immediately called for taxi; got our taxi instructions and because of the quick taxi after pulling forward and clearing our path because there was a lot of ground vehicles in the area we began the rest of our checklists. As I was finishing [the before takeoff checklist] we were cleared to line up and wait and cleared for takeoff. The captain advanced the throttles and we both noticed something was off immediately and aborted the takeoff; called tower and promptly taxied off. It was then that we had realized we had forgotten to turn engine 2 on during our pushback.there were a lot of contributing factors. It began during the course of our pushback; after a normal start as I was making that call ramp called and asked us to amend our push we then spent the next minute or so coordinating with our ground crew whom was about to disconnect. We finally got across that we needed to pull forward and I began to verify the wing walkers who had walked off came back because there was a lot of ground vehicles around at this time. With both our heads up and coordinating our flow of starting our engines was interrupted and we never started it. We continued on as if it was already on. Normally this would easily be caught during taxi out but it was an extremely brief taxi and due to high ground vehicle taxi we kept our heads up; and right after pulling out we began our before takeoff checklist; we were number one for takeoff and as I was finishing the checklist we were cleared to taxi on to the runway and cleared for takeoff; leaving no time to evaluate our situation; especially since there is no parameter in our checklist or in our takeoff configuration check for both engines to be running. I believe the fix is to always verify that both engines are on prior to beginning before takeoff checklist and including a check for engine parameters during our EICAS check.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ-170 First Officer reported an aborted takeoff when it was realized they had forgotten to start the #2 engine.

Narrative: After approved for pushback we started engine one. Immediately after engine start and right as captain was going to call for engine 2 start ramp called us to amend our push. Now instead of pushing abeam gate; he wanted us to pull to the top. We attempted to get a hold of the ground personnel promptly before he disconnected and after a few attempts we were successful. He pulled us up and we continued with checklists; immediately called for taxi; got our taxi instructions and because of the quick taxi after pulling forward and clearing our path because there was a lot of ground vehicles in the area we began the rest of our checklists. As I was finishing [the before takeoff checklist] we were cleared to line up and wait and cleared for takeoff. The captain advanced the throttles and we both noticed something was off immediately and aborted the takeoff; called tower and promptly taxied off. It was then that we had realized we had forgotten to turn engine 2 on during our pushback.There were a lot of contributing factors. It began during the course of our pushback; after a normal start as I was making that call ramp called and asked us to amend our push we then spent the next minute or so coordinating with our ground crew whom was about to disconnect. We finally got across that we needed to pull forward and I began to verify the wing walkers who had walked off came back because there was a lot of ground vehicles around at this time. With both our heads up and coordinating our flow of starting our engines was interrupted and we never started it. We continued on as if it was already on. Normally this would easily be caught during taxi out but it was an extremely brief taxi and due to high ground vehicle taxi we kept our heads up; and right after pulling out we began our before takeoff checklist; we were number one for takeoff and as I was finishing the checklist we were cleared to taxi on to the runway and cleared for takeoff; leaving no time to evaluate our situation; especially since there is no parameter in our checklist or in our takeoff configuration check for both engines to be running. I believe the fix is to always verify that both engines are on prior to beginning before takeoff checklist and including a check for engine parameters during our EICAS check.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.