Narrative:

Missing the checklist for rejected takeoff was entirely because of workload at the time of the incident. After a short delay of being held at the gate for flow; we pushed back from the gate and taxied to [the runway] for a full length takeoff. The current weather at the field was reported by the metar as 'metar 18006KT 10SM FEW055 BKN250 24/17 A2993'. Using flex thrust we began our takeoff roll with me as the pilot monitoring. Everything up until V1 progressed as a normal takeoff. At V1 everything happened extremely quickly; we heard a loud bang and N1 on the right engine began rolling back. Several EICAS messages started appearing including right fadec degraded; right engine flameout; and right thrust rev deployed. With the amount of runway remaining and after hearing the audible noise heard from the cockpit; the captain opted to abort the takeoff; which I agree with completely.at the time; I wasn't sure what was going on with the condition of the airplane. I told tower we were aborting. In hindsight; we realized that the abort takeoff [checklist] was not completed after pulling off the runway. Upon exiting the runway we smelled something; we never learned exactly what it was; but it dissipated quickly. While the captain was coordinating with emergency services; I called the flight attendants and queried if they smelled anything. They said they did but it quickly left. Since there was no evidence of any immediate threat we didn't evacuate. To be safe however; we agreed to have the firetrucks come out and they made a visual inspection of the exterior of the aircraft and there was no evidence of danger there either. Because of this we decided to head back the gate to deplane using stairs. Once there we deplaned and had fans placed on the brakes just in case.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 First Officer reported the Captain rejected the takeoff after receiving EICAS messages for R ENGINE FLAMEOUT and R THRUST REV DEPLOYED.

Narrative: Missing the checklist for rejected takeoff was entirely because of workload at the time of the incident. After a short delay of being held at the gate for flow; we pushed back from the gate and taxied to [the runway] for a full length takeoff. The current weather at the field was reported by the METAR as 'METAR 18006KT 10SM FEW055 BKN250 24/17 A2993'. Using FLEX thrust we began our takeoff roll with me as the pilot monitoring. Everything up until V1 progressed as a normal takeoff. At V1 everything happened extremely quickly; we heard a loud bang and N1 on the right engine began rolling back. Several EICAS messages started appearing including R FADEC DEGRADED; R ENG FLAMEOUT; and R THRUST REV DEPLOYED. With the amount of runway remaining and after hearing the audible noise heard from the cockpit; the Captain opted to abort the takeoff; which I agree with completely.At the time; I wasn't sure what was going on with the condition of the airplane. I told Tower we were aborting. In hindsight; we realized that the abort takeoff [checklist] was not completed after pulling off the runway. Upon exiting the runway we smelled something; we never learned exactly what it was; but it dissipated quickly. While the Captain was coordinating with emergency services; I called the flight attendants and queried if they smelled anything. They said they did but it quickly left. Since there was no evidence of any immediate threat we didn't evacuate. To be safe however; we agreed to have the firetrucks come out and they made a visual inspection of the exterior of the aircraft and there was no evidence of danger there either. Because of this we decided to head back the gate to deplane using stairs. Once there we deplaned and had fans placed on the brakes just in case.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.