Narrative:

On arrival into anchorage; ILS 7R; visibility was reported as 6000 RVR. However; upon arrival at minimums; the approach lights were in sight but the entire threshold and threshold and centerline lights were obscured by fog so a go-around was initiated. On the go-around; my efb popped up multiple (5 or more) updates since it connected to cellular data when near the surface. This blocked the view of the missed approach procedure. I quickly cleared them; while flying the FMC missed and I elected to remain at flaps 1. Return vectors were quickly issued. I missed calling for the after takeoff checklist; and when vectored back around for an approach to 7L which was reportedly VFR; upon calling for 'gear down; flaps 20' the pilot monitoring (pm) placed the gear to 'off' rather than 'down.' subsequently; the gear warning illuminated when landing flaps were selected. I again called for gear extension which completed extending and the landing checklist was finished slightly after passing 1000 feet AGL. However; it was decided that continuing to land rather than executing a second go-around while fatigued with rapidly changing visibility conditions along with having visual contact with the runway was the safest option. Fatigue: leading up to the event; we had flown 13 hours block the previous day followed by near minimum legal rest. Although we all felt rested; this must have accumulated some level of fatigue. We then arrived at the aircraft to experience an hour passenger boarding delay. While airborne; due to in-seat entertainment audio failure; the movie was played over the PA system which delayed the start of crew rest breaks. While on my crew rest break for approximately one hour; I was called back to the cockpit to review an unfamiliar FMC message regarding the inertial reference systems.early in the approach; the autoland status annunciator also annunciated 'no land 3' this diverted some attention but I do not believe it to be the cause of the event. Distraction: while flying the missed approach; I was distracted by the offering of updates while attempting to glance at the approach plate. My election to remain at flaps 1 after which the 'flaps up' call would have stated 'after takeoff checklist'the pm's action of moving the gear lever 1 notch rather than to down.as soon as I recognized the gear position (still above 1000 feet AGL); I made an immediate call for gear down landing checklist; and assessed the safety of waiting for the gear vs executing a second go-around.while many factors played into the culmination of events; I believe the most prevalent were fatigue and distraction. However; calling for the after takeoff checklist would have prevented the occurrence entirely as the gear handle would have been in a position that would only require one action. As such; my recommendation would be to emphasize the importance of completing the after takeoff checklist following a go-around procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported fatigue and distractions led to some errors on a go-around from a low visibility approach.

Narrative: On arrival into Anchorage; ILS 7R; visibility was reported as 6000 RVR. However; upon arrival at minimums; the approach lights were in sight but the entire threshold and threshold and centerline lights were obscured by fog so a go-around was initiated. On the go-around; my EFB popped up multiple (5 or more) updates since it connected to cellular data when near the surface. This blocked the view of the missed approach procedure. I quickly cleared them; while flying the FMC missed and I elected to remain at Flaps 1. Return vectors were quickly issued. I missed calling for the after takeoff checklist; and when vectored back around for an approach to 7L which was reportedly VFR; upon calling for 'Gear Down; Flaps 20' the Pilot Monitoring (PM) placed the gear to 'OFF' rather than 'Down.' Subsequently; the gear warning illuminated when landing flaps were selected. I again called for gear extension which completed extending and the landing checklist was finished slightly after passing 1000 feet AGL. However; it was decided that continuing to land rather than executing a second go-around while fatigued with rapidly changing visibility conditions along with having visual contact with the runway was the safest option. Fatigue: Leading up to the event; we had flown 13 hours block the previous day followed by near minimum legal rest. Although we all felt rested; this must have accumulated some level of fatigue. We then arrived at the aircraft to experience an hour passenger boarding delay. While airborne; due to in-seat entertainment audio failure; the movie was played over the PA system which delayed the start of crew rest breaks. While on my crew rest break for approximately one hour; I was called back to the cockpit to review an unfamiliar FMC message regarding the Inertial Reference Systems.Early in the approach; the Autoland Status Annunciator also annunciated 'No Land 3' this diverted some attention but I do not believe it to be the cause of the event. Distraction: While flying the missed approach; I was distracted by the offering of updates while attempting to glance at the approach plate. My election to remain at flaps 1 after which the 'Flaps Up' call would have stated 'After takeoff checklist'The PM's action of moving the gear lever 1 notch rather than to Down.As soon as I recognized the gear position (still above 1000 feet AGL); I made an immediate call for gear down landing checklist; and assessed the safety of waiting for the gear vs executing a second go-around.While many factors played into the culmination of events; I believe the most prevalent were fatigue and distraction. However; calling for the after takeoff checklist would have prevented the occurrence entirely as the gear handle would have been in a position that would only require one action. As such; my recommendation would be to emphasize the importance of completing the after takeoff checklist following a go-around procedure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.