Narrative:

I was scheduled to deadhead on the flight in question; but scheduling called me while I was still in the gate area and told me I would now be operating the flight since the other captain was 'high mins.'when I got on the aircraft; the other captain and first officer communicated their concern over the intended operation. The weather at pvd on this day was particularly nasty. I had just sat for 3 hours of airport appreciation after conducting a CAT 3 ILS to 23 with a tailwind to a contaminated runway because the runway with favorable winds 5; has had the approach lights out for quite a while. When we landed; we had reported it as 'medium' 3 braking action. The ramp was a different story; mostly poor; and pvd airport ops couldn't even see fit to plow the taxiway centerline so we could see where it was. But that's another story.so heavy snow had been falling all afternoon; the crosswind for 5 and 23 was about 15kts; and in [this aircraft] the max takeoff crosswind is listed as 7 with rcc 2; which is what I believed the runway to be med-poor; based on my assessment of what I was seeing around the terminal for the last 3 hours. The pilots were concerned about whether the runway could actually be the '3/3/3' the tower was reporting on ATIS and via NOTAM; since the weather outside was so terrible.evidently the first captain had communicated his concerns to dispatch; and they had told scheduling to see if I would do it. After looking at all the factors; I told the dispatcher that I wasn't sure the operation could be safely conducted; and that I doubted the 3/3/3 as well; since airport ops had stated over the radio that they were merely sweeping the runway to a 1/8 depth and calling it medium. At this point; no air carriers had landed for several hours. Airport ops also said they didn't have equipment to actually measure the braking action. They were sweeping it to the required depth; and just calling it 3/3/3. We wondered if there was ice underneath all that snow on the runway by now; which would render it unusable. There was ice on the ramp under the snow.the conditions were so bad; we were going to have to do a fuel stop in ZZZ1 before proceeding to [destination]; since we wouldn't be able to take the full load of people and enough fuel. However; when we told dispatch the aircraft had already been fueled; contrary to their wishes; to 19.9; they put the nix on that plan; since we would be 12;000 over ATOG.so after I had told them of my concerns about the crosswind exceeding the limit of 7 knots for rcc 2; the next thing I know I get a call from scheduling telling me I am no longer operating the flight. I will be deadheading again. And now they have called a 3rd captain to operate the flight. So when he showed up; and assessed the conditions; he also concluded conditions to be too poor to conduct a takeoff. The flight was finally cancelled; and the subsequent ferry flight also cancelled. Of course this all took 2 hours; during which the heavy snow continued to fall; and the wind continued to blow. My concern is this... I have around 20;000 hours of mostly part 121 flight time; operating all over the us; in all types of situations (I used to fly [turboprops] into [northern] michigan in winter blizzards) and would consider myself an expert in aviation safety. The captain before me also had similar qualifications. Yet dispatch blatantly was shopping for a captain to conduct this flight; in the face of us both expressing our strongly felt reservations about the safety of it.we are repeatedly told; as pilots; that safety is the number one issue here. Yet when we try to stand up for safety; dispatch seeks to subvert us; (at least in this instance); to accomplish what they want accomplished; without considering the merit of what the pilots are saying. The crosswind limitation on the [aircraft] of 7 knots with rcc 2 is there for a reason. Every year it seems air carriers slide off runways. All it takes is one accident to put us out of business (and to hurt a lot of people). Operating at the ragged edge of safety is a recipe for disaster. Fortunately; at least in this case; no aircraft went off the runway; and no one was injured; but what if next time dispatch is able to find a 4th pilot who says 'yes?' maybe a new captain off probation? Is that really what we want?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported being assigned to replace a Captain on a flight with weather at the departure airport reporting heavy snow and crosswinds exceeding the aircraft's capability. The Captain expressed his concern regarding the weather; to which Dispatch then attempted to enlist a third Captain before the flight was cancelled.

Narrative: I was scheduled to deadhead on the flight in question; but Scheduling called me while I was still in the gate area and told me I would now be operating the flight since the other Captain was 'high mins.'When I got on the aircraft; the other Captain and First Officer communicated their concern over the intended operation. The weather at PVD on this day was particularly nasty. I had just sat for 3 hours of airport appreciation after conducting a CAT 3 ILS to 23 with a tailwind to a contaminated runway because the runway with favorable winds 5; has had the approach lights out for quite a while. When we landed; we had reported it as 'MEDIUM' 3 braking action. The ramp was a different story; mostly POOR; and PVD Airport Ops couldn't even see fit to plow the taxiway centerline so we could see where it was. But that's another story.So heavy snow had been falling all afternoon; the crosswind for 5 and 23 was about 15kts; and in [this aircraft] the max takeoff crosswind is listed as 7 with RCC 2; which is what I believed the runway to be MED-POOR; based on my assessment of what I was seeing around the terminal for the last 3 hours. The Pilots were concerned about whether the runway could actually be the '3/3/3' the Tower was reporting on ATIS and via NOTAM; since the weather outside was so terrible.Evidently the first Captain had communicated his concerns to Dispatch; and they had told scheduling to see if I would do it. After looking at all the factors; I told the Dispatcher that I wasn't sure the operation could be safely conducted; and that I doubted the 3/3/3 as well; since Airport Ops had stated over the radio that they were merely sweeping the runway to a 1/8 depth and calling it MEDIUM. At this point; NO AIR CARRIERS HAD LANDED FOR SEVERAL HOURS. Airport Ops also said they didn't have equipment to actually measure the braking action. They were sweeping it to the required depth; and just calling it 3/3/3. We wondered if there was ice underneath all that snow on the runway by now; which would render it unusable. There was ice on the ramp under the snow.The conditions were so bad; we were going to have to do a fuel stop in ZZZ1 before proceeding to [destination]; since we wouldn't be able to take the full load of people and enough fuel. However; when we told Dispatch the aircraft had already been fueled; contrary to their wishes; to 19.9; they put the nix on that plan; since we would be 12;000 over ATOG.So after I had told them of my concerns about the crosswind exceeding the limit of 7 knots for RCC 2; the next thing I know I get a call from Scheduling telling me I am no longer operating the flight. I will be deadheading again. And now they have called a 3rd Captain to operate the flight. So when he showed up; and assessed the conditions; he also concluded conditions to be too poor to conduct a takeoff. The flight was finally cancelled; and the subsequent ferry flight also cancelled. Of course this all took 2 hours; during which the heavy snow continued to fall; and the wind continued to blow. My concern is this... I have around 20;000 hours of mostly part 121 flight time; operating all over the US; in all types of situations (I used to fly [turboprops] into [Northern] Michigan in winter blizzards) and would consider myself an expert in aviation Safety. The Captain before me also had similar qualifications. Yet Dispatch blatantly was shopping for a Captain to conduct this flight; in the face of us both expressing our strongly felt reservations about the Safety of it.We are repeatedly told; as Pilots; that Safety is the number one issue here. Yet when we try to stand up for Safety; Dispatch seeks to subvert us; (at least in this instance); to accomplish what they want accomplished; without considering the merit of what the Pilots are saying. The crosswind limitation on the [aircraft] of 7 knots with RCC 2 is there for a reason. Every year it seems air carriers slide off runways. All it takes is one accident to put us out of business (and to hurt a lot of people). Operating at the ragged edge of Safety is a recipe for disaster. Fortunately; at least in this case; no aircraft went off the runway; and no one was injured; but what if next time Dispatch is able to find a 4th Pilot who says 'yes?' Maybe a new Captain off probation? Is that really what we want?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.