Narrative:

I was to ferry a new light sport airplane to its new owner. Since the departure conditions were gusty; and the crosswind component was near the maximum demonstrated for the airplane; I considered my choices carefully - whether to leave at all; which runway to use; etc. Among the considerations was takeoff flap. The manufacturer recommends either no flap; or 15 degrees. For a while; I was 'on the fence' - no flap would minimize my initial drift while I was low; but 15 degrees (first 'notch') would have me climbing faster; putting space between me and the ground more rapidly. At one point; I decided that my previous decision to use no flap was not the best choice. I moved the flap selection lever to select 15 degrees...more than the 15 I had already put in; and forgotten. I intended to select 15 degrees; but I failed to verify the setting by looking. Had I done so; I would certainly have seen that the selection lever was pointing at 30 degrees. At takeoff; I found that the airplane was climbing very poorly - and I found myself drifting off center-line over flat airport property; in a matter of seconds. I realized the error immediately; and elected to land on the flat ground; into the wind; rather than attempt to remove any flap while I was low and relatively slow. The landing itself was normal; and no damage resulted. I advised tower that all was well; and I prepared for another departure attempt. A friend; who was seeing me off; sent me a text message pointing out that I didn't have to leave. I had a chance to reconsider. Incredibly; the thought of postponing hadn't even crossed my mind. That message loosened up whichever mental cog was stuck. A decision to leave the next day seemed obvious; especially when I thought about how this would read in an NTSB report (pilot attempted to take off; landed off runway after aborting; crashed on second attempt!) I'm writing this just hours after the event; in the comfort of my home. That no damage or injury was sustained is largely a matter of luck. It is a fact that nobody will be the least inconvenienced or concerned if this ferry flight takes place a day later. What was I thinking? I'll do the flight tomorrow; when conditions are forecast to be significantly better. Factors: false urgency 'get-there-itis' felt for the ferry flight; failure to fully appreciate just how vulnerable low-power; low-wing-loading aircraft are to strong crosswinds; failure to look to confirm settings; getting mentally stuck in a groove (i.e. Not considering postponing the departure; even with 'in my face' evidence of the unsuitability of the prevailing conditions. I instruct regularly and emphasize safety. I'm humbled that I could have suffered such errors in judgment and execution.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Light sport aircraft pilot on a ferry flight with strong departure crosswinds aborted the first takeoff attempt and returned for a second; only to be stopped by the realization that delaying the departure would be the safest alternative and inconvenience nobody.

Narrative: I was to ferry a new light sport airplane to its new owner. Since the departure conditions were gusty; and the crosswind component was near the maximum demonstrated for the airplane; I considered my choices carefully - whether to leave at all; which runway to use; etc. Among the considerations was takeoff flap. The manufacturer recommends either no flap; or 15 degrees. For a while; I was 'on the fence' - no flap would minimize my initial drift while I was low; but 15 degrees (first 'notch') would have me climbing faster; putting space between me and the ground more rapidly. At one point; I decided that my previous decision to use no flap was not the best choice. I moved the flap selection lever to select 15 degrees...more than the 15 I had already put in; and forgotten. I intended to select 15 degrees; but I failed to verify the setting by looking. Had I done so; I would certainly have seen that the selection lever was pointing at 30 degrees. At takeoff; I found that the airplane was climbing very poorly - and I found myself drifting off center-line over flat airport property; in a matter of seconds. I realized the error immediately; and elected to land on the flat ground; into the wind; rather than attempt to remove any flap while I was low and relatively slow. The landing itself was normal; and no damage resulted. I advised Tower that all was well; and I prepared for another departure attempt. A friend; who was seeing me off; sent me a text message pointing out that I didn't have to leave. I had a chance to reconsider. Incredibly; the thought of postponing hadn't even crossed my mind. That message loosened up whichever mental cog was stuck. A decision to leave the next day seemed obvious; especially when I thought about how this would read in an NTSB report (Pilot attempted to take off; landed off runway after aborting; crashed on second attempt!) I'm writing this just hours after the event; in the comfort of my home. That no damage or injury was sustained is largely a matter of luck. It is a fact that nobody will be the least inconvenienced or concerned if this ferry flight takes place a day later. What was I thinking? I'll do the flight tomorrow; when conditions are forecast to be significantly better. Factors: false urgency 'get-there-itis' felt for the ferry flight; failure to fully appreciate just how vulnerable low-power; low-wing-loading aircraft are to strong crosswinds; failure to look to confirm settings; getting mentally stuck in a groove (i.e. not considering postponing the departure; even with 'in my face' evidence of the unsuitability of the prevailing conditions. I instruct regularly and emphasize safety. I'm humbled that I could have suffered such errors in judgment and execution.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.