Narrative:

While climbing out; passing through 1;400 ft; there was a sudden engine stoppage. I had been talking to approach for VFR flight following; but immediately switched to tower; declared an emergency and landed safely without any problems.the cause of the engine stoppage was fuel starvation. On takeoff; the fuel selector was switched to a nearly empty fuel tank; and a couple of minutes into the flight the fuel in that tank was exhausted. My high wing experimental aircraft has 4 tanks. Each of the outboard tanks feeds into an inboard main tank; and the main tanks are controlled with a fuel selector having 'left;' 'right;' and 'both' positions. There are fuel sensors on each of the inboard main tanks. The fuel sensor on the right main tank had been intermittently malfunctioning during the last few flights; reading '0' when it was full; and then starting to work when the fuel had drained to about a half full tank. During preflight; I noted that one of the fuel tank sensors was reading '0;' and in my mind assumed that this was the right tank; and that this meant the tank was nearly full. However; in reality; the left tank was nearly empty (which the indicator correctly showed); and I had the fuel selector selecting the left tank. During preflight I checked the fuel level in the two outboard tanks; both of which were full; and therefore knew that I had enough fuel for my flight. I typically check the fuel level by dipping my finger into the tank. Since the fuel level in the main tanks was below where I could feel; I did not check the main tanks by hand; and failed to check them with a dipstick. This event was due to a cognitive failure arising from a chain of events including the intermittent failed fuel sensor; confusion that I had come to think of an empty indication as meaning the tank was full; and misreading the left tank indicator as identifying the right tank. In addition; there was a failure on preflight to determine the actual fuel levels in the main tanks. Lessons learned: 1) always positively identify the fuel level in each tank before flying; and 2) repair or replace malfunctioning indicators. In addition; this incident could have been mitigated if I had either selected 'both' tanks for take-off; or had I moved the fuel selector to the 'both' position as soon as engine stoppage occurred.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GlaStar pilot experienced a sudden engine failure climbing through 1;400 FT on departure due to fuel starvation.

Narrative: While climbing out; passing through 1;400 FT; there was a sudden engine stoppage. I had been talking to Approach for VFR flight following; but immediately switched to Tower; declared an emergency and landed safely without any problems.The cause of the engine stoppage was fuel starvation. On takeoff; the fuel selector was switched to a nearly empty fuel tank; and a couple of minutes into the flight the fuel in that tank was exhausted. My high wing experimental aircraft has 4 tanks. Each of the outboard tanks feeds into an inboard main tank; and the main tanks are controlled with a fuel selector having 'LEFT;' 'RIGHT;' and 'BOTH' positions. There are fuel sensors on each of the inboard main tanks. The fuel sensor on the right main tank had been intermittently malfunctioning during the last few flights; reading '0' when it was full; and then starting to work when the fuel had drained to about a half full tank. During preflight; I noted that one of the fuel tank sensors was reading '0;' and in my mind assumed that this was the right tank; and that this meant the tank was nearly full. However; in reality; the left tank was nearly empty (which the indicator correctly showed); and I had the fuel selector selecting the left tank. During preflight I checked the fuel level in the two outboard tanks; both of which were full; and therefore knew that I had enough fuel for my flight. I typically check the fuel level by dipping my finger into the tank. Since the fuel level in the main tanks was below where I could feel; I did not check the main tanks by hand; and failed to check them with a dipstick. This event was due to a cognitive failure arising from a chain of events including the intermittent failed fuel sensor; confusion that I had come to think of an empty indication as meaning the tank was full; and misreading the left tank indicator as identifying the right tank. In addition; there was a failure on preflight to determine the actual fuel levels in the main tanks. Lessons learned: 1) always positively identify the fuel level in each tank before flying; and 2) repair or replace malfunctioning indicators. In addition; this incident could have been mitigated if I had either selected 'BOTH' tanks for take-off; or had I moved the fuel selector to the 'BOTH' position as soon as engine stoppage occurred.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.