Narrative:

Traffic was light on my sector. I noticed a limited data block heading south-east on a licke tag. I brought up the data block and noticed the requested altitude of 17;500. Since the pilot was climbing out of 8;000 I checked the point-out history and noticed the licke controller was in the process of getting point-out with boulder and toga sectors. I noticed the pilot approaching 13;000 and there was no coordination with me. I called the morgan sector; who now had the tag and advised a point-out had not been coordinated and that it was now approved with me. The licke controller it appears did not know that quake airspace is above boulder airspace and the morgan controller had no idea that coordination had not occurred with quake either.was there a loss of separation with another aircraft? No. However; airspace violations occur at the facility each and every day. Sometimes a serious loss of separation does occur. My concern is that the general attitude in the facility is 'who cares?' people either don't appear to know their own sector airspace or the confines of adjacent airspace or they don't care. Since the introduction of the reporting program; concern over what used to be termed operational errors and deviations has become non-existent. I have actually heard some of my fellow controllers happily say after a loss of separation; 'that's what [the reporting system is] for!'it appears to me that the lack of accountability with the reporting program has created this environment; unintentionally I'm sure. This attitude has also spread to operational supervisors as well. Supervisors used to be actively engaged and would conduct spot corrections immediately and would on occasion also talk to the controller about performance concerns off of position. That does not really happen anymore. Everything is left to reporting.hold people accountable for their performance. I absolutely include myself here too. We are in a safety environment. It should not take dozens of occurrences by the same person in order for the review committee to decide if actions is required. I think the program takes lack of accountability too far in the other direction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NCT TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation resulting from poor interfacility coordination.

Narrative: Traffic was light on my sector. I noticed a limited data block heading south-east on a Licke tag. I brought up the data block and noticed the requested altitude of 17;500. Since the pilot was climbing out of 8;000 I checked the point-out history and noticed the Licke controller was in the process of getting point-out with Boulder and Toga sectors. I noticed the pilot approaching 13;000 and there was no coordination with me. I called the Morgan sector; who now had the tag and advised a point-out had not been coordinated and that it was now approved with me. The Licke controller it appears did not know that Quake airspace is above Boulder airspace and the Morgan controller had no idea that coordination had not occurred with Quake either.Was there a loss of separation with another aircraft? No. However; airspace violations occur at the facility each and every day. Sometimes a serious loss of separation does occur. My concern is that the general attitude in the facility is 'who cares?' People either don't appear to know their own sector airspace or the confines of adjacent airspace or they don't care. Since the introduction of the reporting program; concern over what used to be termed operational errors and deviations has become non-existent. I have actually heard some of my fellow controllers happily say after a loss of separation; 'That's what [the reporting system is] for!'It appears to me that the lack of accountability with the reporting program has created this environment; unintentionally I'm sure. This attitude has also spread to operational supervisors as well. Supervisors used to be actively engaged and would conduct spot corrections immediately and would on occasion also talk to the controller about performance concerns off of position. That does not really happen anymore. Everything is left to reporting.Hold people accountable for their performance. I absolutely include myself here too. We are in a safety environment. It should not take dozens of occurrences by the same person in order for the review committee to decide if actions is required. I think the program takes lack of accountability too far in the other direction.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.