Narrative:

During rotation I started to smell a burning odor; similar to burnt plastic. At 1500 ft we got a call from our flight attendant. My first officer answered the call and started to signal that we have to return to the field. As he got back on comm 1 he said that the flight attendant and the passengers said there was a severe burning odor present in the cabin. My plan was to break off the departure and get some additional information from the back. At this time the workload in the cockpit rapidly escalated which resulted in a misunderstanding between me and my first officer regarding the decision to do so. We [advised ATC] and got vectors for a visual approach to runway xxr. When the work load decreased I called back to get more information from the flight attendants. I was told that everyone in the back could smell the odor including a nonrevenue captain in in first class; at this time the smell was not as strong but still present. The smell dissipated in the flight deck as we were setting up for our visual approach.after landing; we stopped and assessed the situation. The fire department was asked to make an external assessment along with verifying with both the flight attendant if there was any positive indication of a fire in the cabin area. At this point of time both the fire department and flight attendant came back negative with their findings. To exercise more precaution we requested one of the fire units escort us to the gate. While taxiing to the gate my first officer informed me he was experiencing a burning sensation in his eyes. As a result he was evaluated by the paramedics. I spoke with all five passengers after the ordeal who were seemingly in good spirits considering the circumstances. Looking back on the event there are a few things that could have been dealt with in a better manner. Once we got the call from the back we had not retracted the flaps as yet. When my first officer said 'I'm off one' I should have been quicker in expressing that I wanted him to stay on comm 1 until we had the airplane in a clean configuration. Failure to do so caused the workload to increase even more. At this time my focus was on flying the airplane; but I should have been clearer with my intentions. My first officer [advised ATC] and asked for a return to the field. It was a lot to be done in a short period of time and my first officer did a phenomenal job in getting the airplane set up for return and landing in the departure airport. There was no visual indication of any smoke in the cockpit so I did not ask for use of the oxygen masks. This was a mistake on my part. Even though the smell had no effect on me; calling for the oxygen masks would have been the right thing to do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 flight crew and Flight Attendant reported returning to the airport immediately after departure after smelling a burning odor throughout the aircraft.

Narrative: During rotation I started to smell a burning odor; similar to burnt plastic. At 1500 ft we got a call from our flight attendant. My FO answered the call and started to signal that we have to return to the field. As he got back on Comm 1 he said that the FA and the passengers said there was a severe burning odor present in the cabin. My plan was to break off the departure and get some additional information from the back. At this time the workload in the cockpit rapidly escalated which resulted in a misunderstanding between me and my FO regarding the decision to do so. We [advised ATC] and got vectors for a visual approach to Runway XXR. When the work load decreased I called back to get more information from the flight attendants. I was told that everyone in the back could smell the odor including a nonrevenue captain in in first class; at this time the smell was not as strong but still present. The smell dissipated in the flight deck as we were setting up for our visual approach.After landing; we stopped and assessed the situation. The fire department was asked to make an external assessment along with verifying with both the FA if there was any positive indication of a fire in the cabin area. At this point of time both the fire department and FA came back negative with their findings. To exercise more precaution we requested one of the fire units escort us to the gate. While taxiing to the gate my FO informed me he was experiencing a burning sensation in his eyes. As a result he was evaluated by the paramedics. I spoke with all five passengers after the ordeal who were seemingly in good spirits considering the circumstances. Looking back on the event there are a few things that could have been dealt with in a better manner. Once we got the call from the back we had not retracted the flaps as yet. When my FO said 'I'm off one' I should have been quicker in expressing that I wanted him to stay on Comm 1 until we had the airplane in a clean configuration. Failure to do so caused the workload to increase even more. At this time my focus was on flying the airplane; but I should have been clearer with my intentions. My FO [advised ATC] and asked for a return to the field. It was a lot to be done in a short period of time and my FO did a phenomenal job in getting the airplane set up for return and landing in the departure airport. There was no visual indication of any smoke in the cockpit so I did not ask for use of the oxygen masks. This was a mistake on my part. Even though the smell had no effect on me; calling for the oxygen masks would have been the right thing to do.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.