Narrative:

On many of my training and line flights; probably more than 50%; I observe pilots delaying takeoff rotation for more than 3 seconds after pilot monitoring (pm) calls for rotation. This late rotation leads to the aircraft departing the runway significantly farther down the runway than planned; and at times this leads to less than optimal crossing height at the departure end of the runway. During debriefing I hear the following: 'we were scared to death in training about tail strikes; the simulator doesn't really approximate what the airplane really does; I'm using a constant back pressure on the yoke; so it should work; right?; I was told never takeoff with more than about 5.5 degrees pitch on a 900ER'; etc. A review of the [manual] confirms that there is minimal practical guidance on the details of a proper takeoff rotation; including specific guidance on 900ER versus 800 or 700; or F1 on hot day with high assumed temp/low takeoff power (below climb thrust setting) for example. I believe this lack of proper standardized training from training and standards departments including lack of agreed upon written material on this important maneuver is resulting in our crews making it to the line with an incomplete level of competence on the proper takeoff on the 737NG. When I have brought up the issue of deep reduced takeoffs; I've been told by standards that we do this in order to extend engine life. When I suggest that a climb thrust power takeoff is still a reduced thrust takeoff; I'm met with blank stares. I have also been surprised by the lack of crosstalk among lcas during standards meetings on having an open; collegial discussion on how best to train this maneuver. Again; I attribute this to certain personalities within management that are not entirely open to open dialog or questioning of the status quo. I believe the above problems are compromising our safety margins during the takeoff phase of flight. If this is not corrected it is only a matter of time before we will have an airplane fail to reach minimum takeoff height at the end of the runway; leading to an accident with potentially catastrophic consequences.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737NG Check Airman reported observing a high rate of delayed rotation during takeoff; which he feels is due to inadequate training.

Narrative: On many of my training and line flights; probably more than 50%; I observe pilots delaying takeoff rotation for more than 3 seconds after Pilot Monitoring (PM) calls for rotation. This late rotation leads to the aircraft departing the runway significantly farther down the runway than planned; and at times this leads to less than optimal crossing height at the departure end of the runway. During debriefing I hear the following: 'we were scared to death in training about tail strikes; the simulator doesn't really approximate what the airplane really does; I'm using a constant back pressure on the yoke; so it should work; right?; I was told never takeoff with more than about 5.5 degrees pitch on a 900ER'; etc. A review of the [Manual] confirms that there is minimal practical guidance on the details of a proper takeoff rotation; including specific guidance on 900ER versus 800 or 700; or F1 on hot day with high assumed temp/low takeoff power (below climb thrust setting) for example. I believe this lack of proper standardized training from training and standards departments including lack of agreed upon written material on this important maneuver is resulting in our crews making it to the line with an incomplete level of competence on the proper takeoff on the 737NG. When I have brought up the issue of deep reduced takeoffs; I've been told by standards that we do this in order to extend engine life. When I suggest that a climb thrust power takeoff is still a reduced thrust takeoff; I'm met with blank stares. I have also been surprised by the lack of crosstalk among LCAs during standards meetings on having an open; collegial discussion on how best to train this maneuver. Again; I attribute this to certain personalities within management that are not entirely open to open dialog or questioning of the status quo. I believe the above problems are compromising our safety margins during the takeoff phase of flight. If this is not corrected it is only a matter of time before we will have an airplane fail to reach minimum takeoff height at the end of the runway; leading to an accident with potentially catastrophic consequences.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.