37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 142673 |
Time | |
Date | 199004 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : zzz |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zzz |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Widebody, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Route In Use | enroute airway : zzz |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 16000 flight time type : 2500 |
ASRS Report | 142673 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : unable |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
A FAA inspector was scheduled to ride with us but did not show up in operations at our scheduled report. We proceeded to the aircraft at xa:15. The inspector arrived at the airplane around xa:25 and introduced himself and checked our licenses and medicals. He then questioned whether our takeoff data was computed correctly and set according to our operations specifications. I told him that I thought it was correctly done, but we could check the book to verify if he wanted. The inspector then went into the back of the airplane and was questioning the agent when he was closing the door 5 mins after scheduled departure. The takeoff and climb was uneventful with normal procedures being observed. Shortly after reaching cruise altitude, the inspector began discussing with the engineer, company procedures for verifying the correct amount of fuel on board. I explained to him, that these were the procedures that my boss asked us to use, and if he had a problem with them, he should talk to my boss. He then discussed the inadequacies of our maintenance records and I again said that we were following the company's directives and he should discuss his views with my boss. Approximately 45 mins prior to landing, during a general discussion of the industry, the subject of another airline's survival surfaced. The inspector expressed his desire to see the other airline make it. This brought vigorous protestations from both the captain and F/east (who spent four yrs at the other airline). The subject was soon dropped and the inspector went back to the cabin for 15 mins. In retrospect, there were a series of events that occurred during this flight, that I should have and could have stopped. I did not, and therefore, the degradation of safety occurred. The inspector's conduct was a contributing factor but was the responsibility of the PIC.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR FLT CREW OF WDB WITH AIR CARRIER INSPECTOR ABOARD ALLOWS AN UNSPECIFIED DEGRADATION IN SAFETY TO OCCUR DUE TO THE CHARACTER AND OPINIONS OF THE INSPECTOR.
Narrative: A FAA INSPECTOR WAS SCHEDULED TO RIDE WITH US BUT DID NOT SHOW UP IN OPS AT OUR SCHEDULED RPT. WE PROCEEDED TO THE ACFT AT XA:15. THE INSPECTOR ARRIVED AT THE AIRPLANE AROUND XA:25 AND INTRODUCED HIMSELF AND CHKED OUR LICENSES AND MEDICALS. HE THEN QUESTIONED WHETHER OUR TKOF DATA WAS COMPUTED CORRECTLY AND SET ACCORDING TO OUR OPS SPECS. I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS CORRECTLY DONE, BUT WE COULD CHK THE BOOK TO VERIFY IF HE WANTED. THE INSPECTOR THEN WENT INTO THE BACK OF THE AIRPLANE AND WAS QUESTIONING THE AGENT WHEN HE WAS CLOSING THE DOOR 5 MINS AFTER SCHEDULED DEP. THE TKOF AND CLB WAS UNEVENTFUL WITH NORMAL PROCS BEING OBSERVED. SHORTLY AFTER REACHING CRUISE ALT, THE INSPECTOR BEGAN DISCUSSING WITH THE ENGINEER, COMPANY PROCS FOR VERIFYING THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF FUEL ON BOARD. I EXPLAINED TO HIM, THAT THESE WERE THE PROCS THAT MY BOSS ASKED US TO USE, AND IF HE HAD A PROB WITH THEM, HE SHOULD TALK TO MY BOSS. HE THEN DISCUSSED THE INADEQUACIES OF OUR MAINT RECORDS AND I AGAIN SAID THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING THE COMPANY'S DIRECTIVES AND HE SHOULD DISCUSS HIS VIEWS WITH MY BOSS. APPROX 45 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG, DURING A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE INDUSTRY, THE SUBJECT OF ANOTHER AIRLINE'S SURVIVAL SURFACED. THE INSPECTOR EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE TO SEE THE OTHER AIRLINE MAKE IT. THIS BROUGHT VIGOROUS PROTESTATIONS FROM BOTH THE CAPT AND F/E (WHO SPENT FOUR YRS AT THE OTHER AIRLINE). THE SUBJECT WAS SOON DROPPED AND THE INSPECTOR WENT BACK TO THE CABIN FOR 15 MINS. IN RETROSPECT, THERE WERE A SERIES OF EVENTS THAT OCCURRED DURING THIS FLT, THAT I SHOULD HAVE AND COULD HAVE STOPPED. I DID NOT, AND THEREFORE, THE DEGRADATION OF SAFETY OCCURRED. THE INSPECTOR'S CONDUCT WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR BUT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PIC.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.