Narrative:

Inbound for oma at 2800' MSL. The engine began to run rough, then smooth out. I contacted approach and informed them of possible problems. The decision was made to divert about 7 mi to cbf. When engine became rough again I set up for best glide. After continued loss of altitude I informed approach I could not make it to cbf, and was informed of highway nearby. I followed the highway and prepared to land. (Now at 200' AGL). At this time, no cars were headed west (same as plane), but there were two oncoming cars. As I continued to lose altitude, I did not lower landing gear, concentrating on avoiding the cars by stretching the glide. Soon after clearing the second car, the plane landed gear up in the right lane of us highway 6. It skidded 195 yds coming to a stop on the shoulder. Afterwards, an inspection of the gas tanks revealed no fuel. In retrospect, there are several factors leading up to this incident. First, inaccuracy of fuel on board at departure, an uncalibrated dip stick was used to determine 36 gal on board. This is now felt to be in error. Second. Book fuel burn rate was used which is inaccurate for a 14 yr old plane. Third. Winds were stronger than expected causing flight to be extended. Even though this was slight and was known in flight, actions were not taken to land early when 45 min reserve would not exist when landing at oma. Fourth. The flight was extended due to diversion by ATC at cid to avoid airport traffic. Fifth. Fuel gauges on board are notoriously inaccurate and unusable. There was no good reason why fuel was not added before departure from 06C. Each factor alone was not sufficient to cause fuel starvation, but in combination, it can be seen that landing with 45 min reserve is made to accommodate these inaccuracies and variables and should have had me landing earlier, before problems arose.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA FORCED LNDG ON HIGHWAY AT NIGHT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION.

Narrative: INBND FOR OMA AT 2800' MSL. THE ENG BEGAN TO RUN ROUGH, THEN SMOOTH OUT. I CONTACTED APCH AND INFORMED THEM OF POSSIBLE PROBS. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO DIVERT ABOUT 7 MI TO CBF. WHEN ENG BECAME ROUGH AGAIN I SET UP FOR BEST GLIDE. AFTER CONTINUED LOSS OF ALT I INFORMED APCH I COULD NOT MAKE IT TO CBF, AND WAS INFORMED OF HWY NEARBY. I FOLLOWED THE HWY AND PREPARED TO LAND. (NOW AT 200' AGL). AT THIS TIME, NO CARS WERE HEADED W (SAME AS PLANE), BUT THERE WERE TWO ONCOMING CARS. AS I CONTINUED TO LOSE ALT, I DID NOT LOWER LNDG GEAR, CONCENTRATING ON AVOIDING THE CARS BY STRETCHING THE GLIDE. SOON AFTER CLRING THE SECOND CAR, THE PLANE LANDED GEAR UP IN THE R LANE OF US HWY 6. IT SKIDDED 195 YDS COMING TO A STOP ON THE SHOULDER. AFTERWARDS, AN INSPECTION OF THE GAS TANKS REVEALED NO FUEL. IN RETROSPECT, THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS LEADING UP TO THIS INCIDENT. FIRST, INACCURACY OF FUEL ON BOARD AT DEP, AN UNCALIBRATED DIP STICK WAS USED TO DETERMINE 36 GAL ON BOARD. THIS IS NOW FELT TO BE IN ERROR. SECOND. BOOK FUEL BURN RATE WAS USED WHICH IS INACCURATE FOR A 14 YR OLD PLANE. THIRD. WINDS WERE STRONGER THAN EXPECTED CAUSING FLT TO BE EXTENDED. EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS SLIGHT AND WAS KNOWN IN FLT, ACTIONS WERE NOT TAKEN TO LAND EARLY WHEN 45 MIN RESERVE WOULD NOT EXIST WHEN LNDG AT OMA. FOURTH. THE FLT WAS EXTENDED DUE TO DIVERSION BY ATC AT CID TO AVOID ARPT TFC. FIFTH. FUEL GAUGES ON BOARD ARE NOTORIOUSLY INACCURATE AND UNUSABLE. THERE WAS NO GOOD REASON WHY FUEL WAS NOT ADDED BEFORE DEP FROM 06C. EACH FACTOR ALONE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE FUEL STARVATION, BUT IN COMBINATION, IT CAN BE SEEN THAT LNDG WITH 45 MIN RESERVE IS MADE TO ACCOMMODATE THESE INACCURACIES AND VARIABLES AND SHOULD HAVE HAD ME LNDG EARLIER, BEFORE PROBS AROSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.