Narrative:

We are a commuter flight. Atl-anb-tcl-anb-atl. 2ND day of 2 day trip, 2ND leg of day atl-anb. It was my leg and we were close to our destination (approximately 20 NM east anb) in cruise (12000', 270 KT ground speed). We had begun descent and approach checklist items in preparation for a time compressed approach. Cleared to the tdg VOR for localizer 5 approach, radar service terminated, report anb in sight. (We were IMC and had anticipated vectors to localizer 5 to descend to visibility conditions). The first officer has finished on communication 2 at approximately 15 DME tdg/7 NM to anb I tell him to do the descent and approach checks and I'll brief an entry to the approach. Our desire is to get into the VFR pattern for 23 with other VFR traffic and maintain great vigil (reference company midair 2 days prior). As we speak we break out into a large 'binovc', the field should be on the first officer's side I believe 3 to 5 O'clock. He spots the (an) airport and we request a visibility for runway 23. Anb FSS advises local WX and wind favoring runway 23, army helicopter reported 4 mi east landing, small aircraft intending to depart location unknown. We enter downwind very concerned over the helicopter. On very short final the first officer comments on the runway number something to the effect 'that's runway 21 and I've been calling runway 23'. His concern causes a conflict in me so I look at the instruments again and call out 'I've got a localizer frequency 111.5 and a centered needle, right direction - we'll continue (I didn't notice the radio selector box, left side of the screen had gone from green to red). Now in the flare I pulled off the power and land. On rollout I noticed the error, the airports are similar reversed floor plans (long northeast/southwest runway with parallel taxiway, small 1950ISH terminal on edge of square ramp) only this one said talladega on the terminal and was so dead I could recall tumbleweed blowing across closed fields out west. The first officer is visibly shaken and I need a plan to keep things together, so 'after landing check...contact bhm (we tried more than 1 frequency)... Contact FSS' (no answer), meanwhile I'm taxiing down the parallel considering options. 'Try bhm again', no luck. My thoughts at this time are clear and urgent, if the crew is to remain effective we need an objective. First officer not doing well, no one knows where we are and we need to get in contact with someone quickly. There are no facs for 27 passenger and the company will have a very tough time doing anything here and the publicity visibility is very bad for the company here and now... If we shut down I don't think the first officer will be useful again. We are part 135, its good VFR, plenty of runway, no terrain problems. Bhm is available once airborne, we're 3 min from our destination, plenty of fuel and company policy is once landed do not takeoff. I considered it wise and safe to depart into the loop again. I asked the first officer questions regarding safety for takeoff to get an unbiased decision like how long is the runway? Can we accelerate and stop? He confirmed my thoughts, no problem. Though we had no data for this airport I had worked problems in ground school that said we could do this easily. I made the decision to proceed. We did ground checks, before takeoff check and briefed: static takeoff, 085 degree heading, 7 mi, 2000' to anb. Contact bhm and tell them where we were, what happened and intentions as soon as possible. Then the local traffic issue, we found someone on 122.8. 'No reported traffic' looked around, stated our intentions and departed as planned. Raised bhm as planned and with no further incident landed at anb and called the company in atl. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Both flight crew members have been fired by the company. The FAA has not informed the individuals that they intend to take certificate action. A grievance has been filed by association to get the captain and the first officer? South reinstated. Both are working for the same charter operator at this time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF PART 135 COMMUTER HEADED FOR ANB DESCENDS THROUGH OVERCAST, REQUESTS VISUAL APCH, AND LANDS AT THE WRONG ARPT, ALL DUE TO SCHEDULE PRESSURE.

Narrative: WE ARE A COMMUTER FLT. ATL-ANB-TCL-ANB-ATL. 2ND DAY OF 2 DAY TRIP, 2ND LEG OF DAY ATL-ANB. IT WAS MY LEG AND WE WERE CLOSE TO OUR DEST (APPROX 20 NM EAST ANB) IN CRUISE (12000', 270 KT GND SPD). WE HAD BEGUN DSNT AND APCH CHKLIST ITEMS IN PREPARATION FOR A TIME COMPRESSED APCH. CLRED TO THE TDG VOR FOR LOC 5 APCH, RADAR SVC TERMINATED, RPT ANB IN SIGHT. (WE WERE IMC AND HAD ANTICIPATED VECTORS TO LOC 5 TO DSND TO VIS CONDITIONS). THE FO HAS FINISHED ON COM 2 AT APPROX 15 DME TDG/7 NM TO ANB I TELL HIM TO DO THE DSNT AND APCH CHKS AND I'LL BRIEF AN ENTRY TO THE APCH. OUR DESIRE IS TO GET INTO THE VFR PATTERN FOR 23 WITH OTHER VFR TFC AND MAINTAIN GREAT VIGIL (REFERENCE COMPANY MIDAIR 2 DAYS PRIOR). AS WE SPEAK WE BREAK OUT INTO A LARGE 'BINOVC', THE FIELD SHOULD BE ON THE FO'S SIDE I BELIEVE 3 TO 5 O'CLOCK. HE SPOTS THE (AN) ARPT AND WE REQUEST A VIS FOR RWY 23. ANB FSS ADVISES LCL WX AND WIND FAVORING RWY 23, ARMY HELI RPTED 4 MI E LNDG, SMA INTENDING TO DEPART LOCATION UNKNOWN. WE ENTER DOWNWIND VERY CONCERNED OVER THE HELI. ON VERY SHORT FINAL THE FO COMMENTS ON THE RWY NUMBER SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT 'THAT'S RWY 21 AND I'VE BEEN CALLING RWY 23'. HIS CONCERN CAUSES A CONFLICT IN ME SO I LOOK AT THE INSTRUMENTS AGAIN AND CALL OUT 'I'VE GOT A LOC FREQ 111.5 AND A CENTERED NEEDLE, R DIRECTION - WE'LL CONTINUE (I DIDN'T NOTICE THE RADIO SELECTOR BOX, L SIDE OF THE SCREEN HAD GONE FROM GREEN TO RED). NOW IN THE FLARE I PULLED OFF THE PWR AND LAND. ON ROLLOUT I NOTICED THE ERROR, THE ARPTS ARE SIMILAR REVERSED FLOOR PLANS (LONG NE/SW RWY WITH PARALLEL TXWY, SMALL 1950ISH TERMINAL ON EDGE OF SQUARE RAMP) ONLY THIS ONE SAID TALLADEGA ON THE TERMINAL AND WAS SO DEAD I COULD RECALL TUMBLEWEED BLOWING ACROSS CLOSED FIELDS OUT W. THE FO IS VISIBLY SHAKEN AND I NEED A PLAN TO KEEP THINGS TOGETHER, SO 'AFTER LNDG CHK...CONTACT BHM (WE TRIED MORE THAN 1 FREQ)... CONTACT FSS' (NO ANSWER), MEANWHILE I'M TAXIING DOWN THE PARALLEL CONSIDERING OPTIONS. 'TRY BHM AGAIN', NO LUCK. MY THOUGHTS AT THIS TIME ARE CLR AND URGENT, IF THE CREW IS TO REMAIN EFFECTIVE WE NEED AN OBJECTIVE. FO NOT DOING WELL, NO ONE KNOWS WHERE WE ARE AND WE NEED TO GET IN CONTACT WITH SOMEONE QUICKLY. THERE ARE NO FACS FOR 27 PAX AND THE COMPANY WILL HAVE A VERY TOUGH TIME DOING ANYTHING HERE AND THE PUBLICITY VISIBILITY IS VERY BAD FOR THE COMPANY HERE AND NOW... IF WE SHUT DOWN I DON'T THINK THE FO WILL BE USEFUL AGAIN. WE ARE PART 135, ITS GOOD VFR, PLENTY OF RWY, NO TERRAIN PROBS. BHM IS AVAILABLE ONCE AIRBORNE, WE'RE 3 MIN FROM OUR DEST, PLENTY OF FUEL AND COMPANY POLICY IS ONCE LANDED DO NOT TKOF. I CONSIDERED IT WISE AND SAFE TO DEPART INTO THE LOOP AGAIN. I ASKED THE FO QUESTIONS REGARDING SAFETY FOR TKOF TO GET AN UNBIASED DECISION LIKE HOW LONG IS THE RWY? CAN WE ACCELERATE AND STOP? HE CONFIRMED MY THOUGHTS, NO PROB. THOUGH WE HAD NO DATA FOR THIS ARPT I HAD WORKED PROBS IN GND SCHOOL THAT SAID WE COULD DO THIS EASILY. I MADE THE DECISION TO PROCEED. WE DID GND CHKS, BEFORE TKOF CHK AND BRIEFED: STATIC TKOF, 085 DEG HDG, 7 MI, 2000' TO ANB. CONTACT BHM AND TELL THEM WHERE WE WERE, WHAT HAPPENED AND INTENTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEN THE LCL TFC ISSUE, WE FOUND SOMEONE ON 122.8. 'NO RPTED TFC' LOOKED AROUND, STATED OUR INTENTIONS AND DEPARTED AS PLANNED. RAISED BHM AS PLANNED AND WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT LANDED AT ANB AND CALLED THE COMPANY IN ATL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. BOTH FLT CREW MEMBERS HAVE BEEN FIRED BY THE COMPANY. THE FAA HAS NOT INFORMED THE INDIVIDUALS THAT THEY INTEND TO TAKE CERTIFICATE ACTION. A GRIEVANCE HAS BEEN FILED BY ASSOCIATION TO GET THE CAPT AND THE FO? S REINSTATED. BOTH ARE WORKING FOR THE SAME CHARTER OPERATOR AT THIS TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.