Narrative:

I relieved the local controller. There were already three aircraft in the pattern for runway xx and numerous inbounds. We were in tracab configuration; although we had the personnel to have the TRACON open. I was working the local/ground control and FD combined; although we had the personnel to split out ground control. It got complicated in that I had to keep asking arrival radar to increase the range so I could issue instructions to pattern traffic and monitor the situation. The aircraft types are difficult to monitor visually when they are more than 1 mile from the tower. I issued the sequence to aircraft X to follow the aircraft he was already following; aircraft Y. He acknowledged and then later acknowledged again. Then aircraft X reported an aircraft off his wing and was taking avoidance action (a right 360). I did not have the aircraft visually and was unable to use the BRITE. The BRITE was on a 60 mile range and there was data block overlap such that nothing could be determined with a 10 mile radius. The aircraft all landed without further incident. I came in today and played back a falcon replay and then listened to a dalr (digital audio legal recorder) recording of the incident and determined there has been a near miss of .16 miles and 0 feet. Aircraft X must have been following the wrong aircraft or lost sight and turned base anyway. This facility is dangerous. We work tracab all the time whether we have the personnel or not. Sometimes we work tracab in order to get training done. But mostly we work tracab so people can get longer breaks or a flm can take himself out of the rotation. The same goes for splitting out ground.if I had had control of the BRITE and been at the local positions I would have easily detected the errant aircraft X. If I had had a ground control; they could have been helping me spot aircraft. I observe more unsafe operations on a monthly basis due to a culture of recklessness; denial and management unaccountably than all of my previous years in different ATC facilities put together. Just today; and any shift I work with [name removed] when the atm is absent; we are training in a tracab configuration while [name removed] hides out in the flm office. Whenever possible he avoids the operations area even when it introduces risk into the NAS. Same for my co-workers. We combine and work tracab even when we have the personnel to do otherwise. I used to request that the TRACON be open or to split out ground control as appropriate but have received nothing but grief and ill will until I no longer say anything. Shame on me. It was on this day that I was almost involved in a near midair collision fatal accident that management and my co-workers set us up for. Other areas where we are woefully inadequate: departure flow versus apreq (approval request); OJT and so much more.nothing short of a tiger team or some other sort total sweep will correct the wild west culture at this facility. The incompetence; denial and recklessness is rampant throughout. It has been that way for at least 4 years.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower Controller reported of a NMAC while working three combined positions; the radar being on the 60 mile range; and not being able to see traffic close in.

Narrative: I relieved the LCL controller. There were already three aircraft in the pattern for RWY XX and numerous inbounds. We were in TRACAB configuration; although we had the personnel to have the TRACON open. I was working the LCL/GC and FD combined; although we had the personnel to split out GC. It got complicated in that I had to keep asking Arrival Radar to increase the range so I could issue instructions to pattern traffic and monitor the situation. The aircraft types are difficult to monitor visually when they are more than 1 mile from the tower. I issued the sequence to Aircraft X to follow the aircraft he was already following; Aircraft Y. He acknowledged and then later acknowledged again. Then Aircraft X reported an aircraft off his wing and was taking avoidance action (a right 360). I did not have the aircraft visually and was unable to use the BRITE. The BRITE was on a 60 mile range and there was data block overlap such that nothing could be determined with a 10 mile radius. The aircraft all landed without further incident. I came in today and played back a FALCON replay and then listened to a DALR (Digital Audio Legal Recorder) recording of the incident and determined there has been a near miss of .16 miles and 0 feet. Aircraft X must have been following the wrong aircraft or lost sight and turned base anyway. This facility is dangerous. We work TRACAB all the time whether we have the personnel or not. Sometimes we work TRACAB in order to get training done. But mostly we work TRACAB so people can get longer breaks or a FLM can take himself out of the rotation. The same goes for splitting out ground.If I had had control of the BRITE and been at the LCL positions I would have easily detected the errant Aircraft X. If I had had a GC; they could have been helping me spot aircraft. I observe more unsafe operations on a monthly basis due to a culture of recklessness; denial and management unaccountably than all of my previous years in different ATC facilities put together. Just today; and any shift I work with [name removed] when the ATM is absent; we are training in a TRACAB configuration while [name removed] hides out in the FLM office. Whenever possible he avoids the operations area even when it introduces risk into the NAS. Same for my co-workers. We combine and work TRACAB even when we have the personnel to do otherwise. I used to request that the TRACON be open or to split out GC as appropriate but have received nothing but grief and ill will until I no longer say anything. Shame on me. It was on this day that I was almost involved in a NMAC fatal accident that management and my co-workers set us up for. Other areas where we are woefully inadequate: departure flow versus apreq (Approval Request); OJT and so much more.Nothing short of a Tiger Team or some other sort total sweep will correct the Wild West culture at this facility. The incompetence; denial and recklessness is rampant throughout. It has been that way for at least 4 years.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.