37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1429389 |
Time | |
Date | 201703 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZDC.ARTCC |
State Reference | VA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Route In Use | STAR CAVLR3 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Flight Instructor |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270 Flight Crew Total 12500 Flight Crew Type 6000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
[The flight] was on arrival cavlr three landing north into washington dulles. We were given [descent clearance] for the cavlr three arrival. As I was the non-flying pilot getting the landing information; inputting the FMS; briefing the passengers; as well as monitoring the radio. While doing all of this I overheard my first officer [being] given the instruction to [descend] via the cavlr three. I finished putting in the information into the FMS. As I looked up to and the landing speed I noticed my first officer was 3000 feet below the assigned altitude of 22;000 at the initial fix of the star. I immediately took action to regain the original altitude of 22;000 feet. At this point we were too close to the fix to regain the altitude. We continued with the descent into dulles. No conflict happened. Finished flight as normal and nothing was ever said. I inquired to my first officer why he did that; what made him descend; and his response was he was looking at the FMS while I was inputting information and misread it. This was completely and utterly unintentional. The contributing factor to this is that new hires at this airline are coming from flying cessna aircraft to a 70;000 lb jet. Zero mid-size aircraft experience; such as turboprops and similar aircraft. I also may have been doing a bit too much. I could have not been monitoring the radio and alleviate workload a bit. Airlines choices of pilots to hire new in the pipeline is diminishing; and as a result; experience is affected. Corrective action is to eliminate these descend via clearances. When you have one pilot who is responsible for being off radios; while one is inexperienced requiring precision; this will happen again.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: The Captain of a Bombardier CRJ-700 reported that the First Officer was flying and was 3000 ft lower than assigned altitude.
Narrative: [The flight] was on arrival CAVLR Three landing north into Washington Dulles. We were given [descent clearance] for the CAVLR three arrival. As I was the non-flying pilot getting the landing information; inputting the FMS; briefing the passengers; as well as monitoring the radio. While doing all of this I overheard my first officer [being] given the instruction to [descend] via the CAVLR three. I finished putting in the information into the FMS. As I looked up to and the landing speed I noticed my first officer was 3000 feet below the assigned altitude of 22;000 at the initial fix of the star. I immediately took action to regain the original altitude of 22;000 feet. At this point we were too close to the fix to regain the altitude. We continued with the descent into Dulles. No conflict happened. Finished flight as normal and nothing was ever said. I inquired to my First Officer why he did that; what made him descend; and his response was he was looking at the FMS while I was inputting information and misread it. This was completely and utterly unintentional. The contributing factor to this is that new hires at this airline are coming from flying Cessna aircraft to a 70;000 lb jet. Zero mid-size aircraft experience; such as turboprops and similar aircraft. I also may have been doing a bit too much. I could have not been monitoring the radio and alleviate workload a bit. Airlines choices of pilots to hire new in the pipeline is diminishing; and as a result; experience is affected. Corrective action is to eliminate these descend via clearances. When you have one pilot who is responsible for being off radios; while one is inexperienced requiring precision; this will happen again.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.