Narrative:

This event occurred during a training session. The winds were reported out of 210 at 60kts at 3000 feet causing the northbound base leg to carry a lot of speed and slop the north turn from the downwind wide. My trainee recognized that the compression on the base leg was too great and aircraft X would need to be vectored off the approach and issued a turn north through the final approach course at 3000. It was my understanding that he intended to resequence aircraft X. I did not hear the trainee turn aircraft X back to the west and issue a descent to 2500 in an attempt to save his sequence. When I observed aircraft X start a turn to the northwest I asked my trainee what aircraft X was doing and to make sure he was turning east. My trainee then informed me of his plan to save his sequence; however this turn placed aircraft X in an MVA of 3300 at 2500ft at a heading that did not allow for a legal RNAV approach. I instructed the trainee to turn aircraft X south out of the MVA and climb. While this got aircraft X out of the MVA I believe it resulted in less than standard wake turbulence separation with the succeeding aircraft.I believed my trainee to be far enough along that I would not have thought that he would have considered a turn into a prominent MVA. It was this assumption that allowed me to focus on other issues occurring during this training session and ultimately led to the oversight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Chicago TRACON Instructor reported that an aircraft was turned off final; into a lower Minimum Vectoring Altitude area. Aircraft was then instructed to a different heading in order to exit the lower MVA area.

Narrative: This event occurred during a training session. The winds were reported out of 210 at 60kts at 3000 feet causing the northbound base leg to carry a lot of speed and slop the north turn from the downwind wide. My trainee recognized that the compression on the base leg was too great and Aircraft X would need to be vectored off the approach and issued a turn north through the final approach course at 3000. It was my understanding that he intended to resequence Aircraft X. I did not hear the trainee turn Aircraft X back to the west and issue a descent to 2500 in an attempt to save his sequence. When I observed Aircraft X start a turn to the northwest I asked my trainee what Aircraft X was doing and to make sure he was turning east. My trainee then informed me of his plan to save his sequence; however this turn placed Aircraft X in an MVA of 3300 at 2500ft at a heading that did not allow for a legal RNAV approach. I instructed the trainee to turn Aircraft X south out of the MVA and climb. While this got Aircraft X out of the MVA I believe it resulted in less than standard wake turbulence separation with the succeeding aircraft.I believed my trainee to be far enough along that I would not have thought that he would have considered a turn into a prominent MVA. It was this assumption that allowed me to focus on other issues occurring during this training session and ultimately led to the oversight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.