Narrative:

Split departure radar sectors--I was working south and west departure sectors. Traffic at this point was light, with tops reported 095-115. 3 aircraft on frequency. Second aircraft air carrier X, medium large transport, reported on frequency 1 mi east out of airport. I radar idented air carrier X and instructed him to climb to FL200 and turn right heading 210 degrees vector for climb. Second transmission, 'traffic in the turn 11 O'clock, 6 mi, small transport Y at 110.' air carrier X failed to make standard rate turn, about 3 or 4 mi. I reissued traffic at 10 O'clock, 3 mi, 110. Air carrier X replied in the clouds, mode C indicated 095. I immediately replied, 'maintain 100.' I failed to use air carrier X call sign. He then asked if that transmission was for him, as he was climbing through 10200'. I stated call sign and said, 'descend and maintain 100.' the C/a had already been activated and the opposing arrival 1 radar had called to verify my intentions with air carrier X. Major contributing factors: my poor use of 'look and go' climb instructions re: air carrier X and small transport Y. Air carrier X failure to keep the picture with regards to a good standard turn for the climb with the issuance of traffic. Human performance: my poor attention to situation. My intuition had alerted me prior to the aircraft becoming a conflict (about 090 MSL) and my failure to listen to the little voice ('stop 'em at 100'). Inattn could be traced to recent family problems re: an earlier request by myself for a hardship transfer about 8 weeks prior to this event. It's imperative for a controller or a member of a flight crew to totally leave these thoughts outside the door to the facility or cockpit. It should also be noted the importance of the employer (in this case the FAA) to be aware of the stresses an employee is under if made aware of them, regardless if they are work related. Facility management did a poor job of keeping me informed of the details re: said request. Fault of the incident is my own!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X HAD LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION FROM SMT Y. SYSTEM ERROR.

Narrative: SPLIT DEP RADAR SECTORS--I WAS WORKING S AND W DEP SECTORS. TFC AT THIS POINT WAS LIGHT, WITH TOPS RPTED 095-115. 3 ACFT ON FREQ. SECOND ACFT ACR X, MLG, RPTED ON FREQ 1 MI E OUT OF ARPT. I RADAR IDENTED ACR X AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO CLB TO FL200 AND TURN RIGHT HDG 210 DEGS VECTOR FOR CLB. SECOND XMISSION, 'TFC IN THE TURN 11 O'CLOCK, 6 MI, SMT Y AT 110.' ACR X FAILED TO MAKE STANDARD RATE TURN, ABOUT 3 OR 4 MI. I REISSUED TFC AT 10 O'CLOCK, 3 MI, 110. ACR X REPLIED IN THE CLOUDS, MODE C INDICATED 095. I IMMEDIATELY REPLIED, 'MAINTAIN 100.' I FAILED TO USE ACR X CALL SIGN. HE THEN ASKED IF THAT XMISSION WAS FOR HIM, AS HE WAS CLBING THROUGH 10200'. I STATED CALL SIGN AND SAID, 'DSND AND MAINTAIN 100.' THE C/A HAD ALREADY BEEN ACTIVATED AND THE OPPOSING ARR 1 RADAR HAD CALLED TO VERIFY MY INTENTIONS WITH ACR X. MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: MY POOR USE OF 'LOOK AND GO' CLB INSTRUCTIONS RE: ACR X AND SMT Y. ACR X FAILURE TO KEEP THE PICTURE WITH REGARDS TO A GOOD STANDARD TURN FOR THE CLB WITH THE ISSUANCE OF TFC. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: MY POOR ATTN TO SITUATION. MY INTUITION HAD ALERTED ME PRIOR TO THE ACFT BECOMING A CONFLICT (ABOUT 090 MSL) AND MY FAILURE TO LISTEN TO THE LITTLE VOICE ('STOP 'EM AT 100'). INATTN COULD BE TRACED TO RECENT FAMILY PROBS RE: AN EARLIER REQUEST BY MYSELF FOR A HARDSHIP TRANSFER ABOUT 8 WKS PRIOR TO THIS EVENT. IT'S IMPERATIVE FOR A CTLR OR A MEMBER OF A FLT CREW TO TOTALLY LEAVE THESE THOUGHTS OUTSIDE THE DOOR TO THE FAC OR COCKPIT. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EMPLOYER (IN THIS CASE THE FAA) TO BE AWARE OF THE STRESSES AN EMPLOYEE IS UNDER IF MADE AWARE OF THEM, REGARDLESS IF THEY ARE WORK RELATED. FAC MGMNT DID A POOR JOB OF KEEPING ME INFORMED OF THE DETAILS RE: SAID REQUEST. FAULT OF THE INCIDENT IS MY OWN!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.