Narrative:

This incident occurred on my fourth trip off of IOE as a new captain. While flying a scheduled flight from den to durango, co, the low pressure engine driven fuel boost pump failed on the right side engine of my light transport. I turned on the standby electric fuel boost pump for that engine, had my first officer consult the MEL and then called maintenance control. I elected to continue the flight to durango and told the maintenance controller that I would recontact him when I reached durango to decide how to properly defer the inoperative pump. Upon arrival in durango I also experienced a momentary power steering failure. After deplaning the passenger I rechked the MEL, called the same maintenance controller that I talked to on the radio earlier and explained to him that I also had the power steering intermittently fail on top of the boost pump failure. He suggested that I could crew defer both the fuel pump and power steering pump even though the power steering required pulling the tie wrapping a circuit breaker. Both items were in the MEL and could be deferred. Being new I partly believed that I could defer the fuel pump, but I knew that I couldn't pull a circuit breaker intentionally so I didn't write up the power steering. Incidentally, the power steering worked fine on taxiout. At that moment I was a bit confused about the (M) item next to both deferring procedures in the MEL--I knew it meant that maintenance had to check the item to defer it, but I believed that possibly maintenance would be able to check it at the next maintenance base. In the heat of the moment I took the advice of the maintenance controller and crew deferred the engine driven low pressure fuel boost pump. We then boarded up the passenger and took off for den. About 20 mi out of durango I had a feeling that I wrongly deferred the fuel boost pump and reread the MEL. As soon as we landed in den I had maintenance come ot the aircraft and do the proper check on the engine (uneventful) and also do the proper sign off. I had the mechanic question the maintenance controller about the bad advice and his reply was, 'I thought the captain meant the electric standby boost pump had failed,' which would have meant that the crew could defer the inoperative pump. I believe I was perfecting clear on the 2 occasions that I discussed the failed pump to the maintenance controller. This doesn't explain why that same controller asked the crew to defer the power steering and pull the circuit breaker. I immediately notified the chief pilot's office of my wrongly deferred item and was told that that particular maintenance controller had a reputation of conveniently mixing up inoperative equipment. I, being a new captain, was persuaded into improperly deferring an inoperative item by the maintenance controller and lacked confidence in my knowledge of the MEL. What I should have done was write up both inoperative items in durango and had a local mechanic properly check and sign off the MEL'd items. Through this experienced I have studied the MEL procedure thoroughly and have come to the conclusion that maintenance control is not necessarily correct in their advice. I believe that the lack of experience due to rapid industry growth on the part of maintenance, pilots, dispatchers and other key airline employees is the cause of this type of incident.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLT WITH IMPROPERLY DEFERRED MAINTENANCE ITEMS.

Narrative: THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED ON MY FOURTH TRIP OFF OF IOE AS A NEW CAPT. WHILE FLYING A SCHEDULED FLT FROM DEN TO DURANGO, CO, THE LOW PRESSURE ENG DRIVEN FUEL BOOST PUMP FAILED ON THE RIGHT SIDE ENG OF MY LTT. I TURNED ON THE STANDBY ELECTRIC FUEL BOOST PUMP FOR THAT ENG, HAD MY F/O CONSULT THE MEL AND THEN CALLED MAINT CTL. I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE FLT TO DURANGO AND TOLD THE MAINT CTLR THAT I WOULD RECONTACT HIM WHEN I REACHED DURANGO TO DECIDE HOW TO PROPERLY DEFER THE INOP PUMP. UPON ARR IN DURANGO I ALSO EXPERIENCED A MOMENTARY PWR STEERING FAILURE. AFTER DEPLANING THE PAX I RECHKED THE MEL, CALLED THE SAME MAINT CTLR THAT I TALKED TO ON THE RADIO EARLIER AND EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT I ALSO HAD THE PWR STEERING INTERMITTENTLY FAIL ON TOP OF THE BOOST PUMP FAILURE. HE SUGGESTED THAT I COULD CREW DEFER BOTH THE FUEL PUMP AND PWR STEERING PUMP EVEN THOUGH THE PWR STEERING REQUIRED PULLING THE TIE WRAPPING A CB. BOTH ITEMS WERE IN THE MEL AND COULD BE DEFERRED. BEING NEW I PARTLY BELIEVED THAT I COULD DEFER THE FUEL PUMP, BUT I KNEW THAT I COULDN'T PULL A CB INTENTIONALLY SO I DIDN'T WRITE UP THE PWR STEERING. INCIDENTALLY, THE PWR STEERING WORKED FINE ON TAXIOUT. AT THAT MOMENT I WAS A BIT CONFUSED ABOUT THE (M) ITEM NEXT TO BOTH DEFERRING PROCS IN THE MEL--I KNEW IT MEANT THAT MAINT HAD TO CHK THE ITEM TO DEFER IT, BUT I BELIEVED THAT POSSIBLY MAINT WOULD BE ABLE TO CHK IT AT THE NEXT MAINT BASE. IN THE HEAT OF THE MOMENT I TOOK THE ADVICE OF THE MAINT CTLR AND CREW DEFERRED THE ENG DRIVEN LOW PRESSURE FUEL BOOST PUMP. WE THEN BOARDED UP THE PAX AND TOOK OFF FOR DEN. ABOUT 20 MI OUT OF DURANGO I HAD A FEELING THAT I WRONGLY DEFERRED THE FUEL BOOST PUMP AND REREAD THE MEL. AS SOON AS WE LANDED IN DEN I HAD MAINT COME OT THE ACFT AND DO THE PROPER CHK ON THE ENG (UNEVENTFUL) AND ALSO DO THE PROPER SIGN OFF. I HAD THE MECH QUESTION THE MAINT CTLR ABOUT THE BAD ADVICE AND HIS REPLY WAS, 'I THOUGHT THE CAPT MEANT THE ELECTRIC STANDBY BOOST PUMP HAD FAILED,' WHICH WOULD HAVE MEANT THAT THE CREW COULD DEFER THE INOP PUMP. I BELIEVE I WAS PERFECTING CLR ON THE 2 OCCASIONS THAT I DISCUSSED THE FAILED PUMP TO THE MAINT CTLR. THIS DOESN'T EXPLAIN WHY THAT SAME CTLR ASKED THE CREW TO DEFER THE PWR STEERING AND PULL THE CB. I IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE OF MY WRONGLY DEFERRED ITEM AND WAS TOLD THAT THAT PARTICULAR MAINT CTLR HAD A REPUTATION OF CONVENIENTLY MIXING UP INOP EQUIP. I, BEING A NEW CAPT, WAS PERSUADED INTO IMPROPERLY DEFERRING AN INOP ITEM BY THE MAINT CTLR AND LACKED CONFIDENCE IN MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE MEL. WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE WAS WRITE UP BOTH INOP ITEMS IN DURANGO AND HAD A LCL MECH PROPERLY CHK AND SIGN OFF THE MEL'D ITEMS. THROUGH THIS EXPERIENCED I HAVE STUDIED THE MEL PROC THOROUGHLY AND HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT MAINT CTL IS NOT NECESSARILY CORRECT IN THEIR ADVICE. I BELIEVE THAT THE LACK OF EXPERIENCE DUE TO RAPID INDUSTRY GROWTH ON THE PART OF MAINT, PLTS, DISPATCHERS AND OTHER KEY AIRLINE EMPLOYEES IS THE CAUSE OF THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.