37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1446873 |
Time | |
Date | 201705 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | PCT.TRACON |
State Reference | VA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Fighting Falcon F16 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Fighting Falcon F16 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Approach |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.0 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
A formation flight requested breakup. I issued a beacon code to the second aircraft; issued holding instructions as requested 4000 feet and approved aircraft X go to initial as requested. I instructed aircraft X 'when able descend to 2500 feet'. I was informed I had an operational error because I didn't tell aircraft Y to instruct aircraft X to descend to 2500 feet when able. FAA 7110.65W paragraph 2-1-13 note 1 states' separation responsibility between aircraft within the formation during transition to individual control rests with the pilots concerned until approved separation has been approved.'a memorandum interprets this to mean we can only issue control instructions through the lead aircraft. How can this interpretation be construed from this note? It clearly states that separation responsibility rests with the pilots does it not? To add this extra requirement when it's obviously not the intent of this note is ridiculous. It's apparent that [the memorandum] is intending to complicate and infer a simple interpretation. This facility has had numerous operational errors attributed to this incorrect memorandum. Redact this memorandum and apply this note as it's obviously intended. Military flights know they are responsible for their separation until another form of separation is attained.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A TRACON Controller reported providing instructions for a military formation flight break up in accordance with FAA H 7110.65 but did not relay instructions through the flight lead.
Narrative: A formation flight requested breakup. I issued a beacon code to the second aircraft; issued holding instructions as requested 4000 feet and approved Aircraft X go to initial as requested. I instructed Aircraft X 'when able descend to 2500 feet'. I was informed I had an operational error because I didn't tell Aircraft Y to instruct Aircraft X to descend to 2500 feet when able. FAA 7110.65W paragraph 2-1-13 Note 1 states' Separation responsibility between aircraft within the formation during transition to individual control rests with the pilots concerned until approved separation has been approved.'A memorandum interprets this to mean we can only issue control instructions through the lead aircraft. How can this interpretation be construed from this note? It clearly states that separation responsibility rests with the pilots does it not? To add this extra requirement when it's obviously not the intent of this note is ridiculous. It's apparent that [the memorandum] is intending to complicate and infer a simple interpretation. This facility has had numerous operational errors attributed to this incorrect memorandum. Redact this memorandum and apply this note as it's obviously intended. Military flights know they are responsible for their separation until another form of separation is attained.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.