Narrative:

We had decided the night prior to conduct the VFR los angeles low level route; beginning at queen mary's and terminating at the western side of santa monica pier before transiting west outside lax class B airspace before exiting the area. I utilized one of our pre-mission computers for inputting GPS user waypoints that coincided with the los angeles tac chart. We briefly went over the route and the plan of action the night prior; and the morning of the flight during pre-flight briefing. I led our operation brief and crew brief the following morning. We conducted all preflight; takeoff; post-takeoff checks without incident enroute to lax. We contacted socal approach on 125.35; with request at 25 miles south. We were switched over to long beach tower on 119.4; where we again made the request for the specified route. Long beach (lgb) assigned our aircraft a discrete squawk; and cleared us along the route beginning at queen mary's VFR checkpoint. Upon visually identifying queen mary; we began the route to our next set of checkpoints; at 90 knots groundspeed; which were following the los angeles river northbound to dodger stadium. It was at this time that we recognized we were outside of long beach's airspace; and called requesting a frequency change; which was approved. As the non-flying pilot; I was responsible for navigating the route while my junior co-pilot would fly the visual checkpoints. I tuned in lax tower frequency of 120.95 and made one courtesy call along the route; with no response since I was outside the airspace. We continued northbound; and it was at this point where problems began to arise. I was sitting left seat; and was not able to visually identify dodger stadium. I instructed my co-pilot to continue north along I-5 where we were expecting to see the stadium. I let this task saturate me; and lost situational awareness to where we were along the route at this time. Instead of fessing up; orbiting; or calling any available tower frequency along the route; I decided to continue since we were still along the GPS route on the mission displays. We then transited west along ventura freeway into bur class C airspace; both without switching to their assigned tower frequency or aware that we were flying inside their airspace westbound. The next VFR checkpoint along the route was hollywood hills; southeast of the I-405 south and ventura freeway to the west. We transited along the western side of hollywood hills; still without being on bob hope tower frequency or aware of the airspace infraction at this point in time. Upon following the I-405 southbound; we were contacted over lax tower frequency by smo; requesting military helicopter come in and identify. I immediately responded; and was informed of the airspace violation. Due to my loss of situational awareness; overconfidence in GPS systems; and failure to ensure my flying pilot vocalized and identified visual checkpoints along the route; we were completely in inadvertent disoriented flight at this time. Due to these factors and oversaturation in a congested environment; I allowed our aircraft to deviate from the assigned flight path and jeopardize the safety of the FAA and airspaces in the area. As I spoke with the santa monica tower controller; I realized our severe mistake. I noticed our position and guided the pilot to continue transiting west to santa monica pier; our final checkpoint; so we could immediately egress the area before causing further infractions. At the same time; I briefly tried to explain our situation to the controller; and was given a phone number to call upon landing; which I received. We flew the helicopter west over the water outside lax airspace; then proceeded to exit south over the water at 200 AGL. I believe several human errors occurred both during preflight and mission execution that led to this incident; as listed below:human causal factors -poor preflight planning of the route; specifically what frequencies were going to be input into our radios and systems.-a lack of sound judgment when not able to identify checkpoints early in the route.-loss of situational awareness; leading to oversaturation in a congested environment; ultimately leading to airspace incursion.-late corrective actions due to disorientation.-overconfidence in GPS systems.multiple; if not all; of these contributing factors are founded in poor crew resource management; from preflight planning to execution of the mission. -Poor communication; specifically that to express lack of visual checkpoint identification and the lack of crew communication to express concern. -Severe lack of decision making skills to turn around; or contact a previous frequency to get re-established along the proper route leg.-overall lack of assertiveness by any of the crewmembers in verbalizing their lack of visual cues and certainty along the route.-leadership deficiency by aircraft commander to discontinue; or to be aware of the airspace/frequency switches needed before bob hope burbank's airspace. -Overall crew situational awareness degraded to be able to think ahead of the aircraft and route in order to keep within the rules of FAA airspace and communication requirements.-misperception that tower or control would contact us on frequency or guard frequencies upon seeing aircraft inbound/outbound.inactions-inaction to positively switch over to bob hope burbank tower's frequency when arriving for hollywood hills checkpoint.-inaction to ask long beach what frequency to expect next when unsure.-inaction to properly check GPS waypoints with chart when visual checkpoints weren't identified.-inaction to speak up concern as a crew when disoriented.actions-admitted fault when santa monica called us for aircraft identification over lax tower frequency.overall; multiple lessons learned were obtained from this event. Military aviators are extremely well trained; and there is no excuse for operations in congested airspaces without knowing exactly where the aircraft needs to be and when; who to talk to and when; and what navigational aids need to be monitored at all times. One of my biggest safety takeaways from this event is that I was not completely confident in the route I was taking; and I therefore lost the unspoken trust that exists between the FAA and military pilots during this time. I should have relied on the expertise of the aircraft handlers; and fessed up to when I thought I wasn't seeing a direct visual representation of my GPS waypoints. I could have used any tower frequencies in the area; simply asked the question; or utilized my crew more to back my navigational decisions up. I placed multiple aircraft at risk in not doing so; and I want to make it crystal clear that constant communication between aircraft and handlers is vital to safety; particularly when there is any doubt of aircraft location. There must be a respect of the procedures and airspace restrictions that have been put in place; which are there for the safety of all personnel. In that respect; I must ensure none of those safety measures are broken; as well as remain infinitely flexible in coordination with controller agencies to ensure safety compliance. One stand-out lesson learned from this incident is 'if there is a question; then there is no question.' this means if there is any grain of doubt in airspace restrictions; clearances; or operations that I speak up and clarify in order to regain situational awareness and confidence to safely transit the route. Another extremely important lesson to be learned is to know your comfort level; which I clearly did not. I was over-reliant on GPS systems on the aircraft; not the printed charts and the handling professionals in the airspace. Using systems as a navigational aid is a great idea; but only as a backup to the printed charts. Part of being a professional pilot is admitting when you're wrong; and making an approach to learning what you did incorrect and growing from it. Post mission analysis is yet another lesson learned; for the increased communication and experiences that can be passed in order for a safer flying environment to be fostered. I've also learned how to evaluate operational risk management; in its most basic form to not accept unnecessary risks; or to allow costs to outweigh the benefits. If I wasn't completely experienced and confident in this route; I shouldn't have opted to continue. The benefits for executing this route were airspace training; communication training; and local area familiarity. However; the costs were much higher. Unsafe transit through airspace without 2 way communications could have led to unnecessary wave-offs of civilian traffic; inadvertent same altitude fly-bys; and questionable radar returns leading to maneuvering of traffic due to one misplaced aircraft. Some mechanisms that could have prevented this incident are as follows: calling all air controllers well outside their designated airspace; making pilot calls over operation tower frequencies if not heard the first time; or checking its backup frequency to ensure; not assuming air traffic control will see you with a discrete squawk and reach out to you first when getting near; discontinuing route when unsure of location; checking in with any of the local frequencies to obtain clarity and confidence; ultimately for situational awareness and safety.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A military helicopter pilot reported a flying low altitude VFR flight in the LAX basin which inadvertently entered BUR airspace.

Narrative: We had decided the night prior to conduct the VFR Los Angeles low level route; beginning at Queen Mary's and terminating at the western side of Santa Monica pier before transiting west outside LAX Class B Airspace before exiting the area. I utilized one of our pre-mission computers for inputting GPS user waypoints that coincided with the Los Angeles TAC chart. We briefly went over the route and the plan of action the night prior; and the morning of the flight during pre-flight briefing. I led our operation brief and crew brief the following morning. We conducted all preflight; takeoff; post-takeoff checks without incident enroute to LAX. We contacted SoCal Approach on 125.35; with request at 25 miles south. We were switched over to Long Beach Tower on 119.4; where we again made the request for the specified route. Long Beach (LGB) assigned our aircraft a discrete squawk; and cleared us along the route beginning at Queen Mary's VFR checkpoint. Upon visually identifying Queen Mary; we began the route to our next set of checkpoints; at 90 knots Groundspeed; which were following the Los Angeles River northbound to Dodger Stadium. It was at this time that we recognized we were outside of Long Beach's airspace; and called requesting a frequency change; which was approved. As the non-flying pilot; I was responsible for navigating the route while my junior co-pilot would fly the visual checkpoints. I tuned in LAX tower frequency of 120.95 and made one courtesy call along the route; with no response since I was outside the airspace. We continued northbound; and it was at this point where problems began to arise. I was sitting left seat; and was not able to visually identify Dodger Stadium. I instructed my co-pilot to continue north along I-5 where we were expecting to see the stadium. I let this task saturate me; and lost situational awareness to where we were along the route at this time. Instead of fessing up; orbiting; or calling any available tower frequency along the route; I decided to continue since we were still along the GPS route on the mission displays. We then transited west along Ventura freeway into BUR Class C airspace; both without switching to their assigned tower frequency or aware that we were flying inside their airspace westbound. The next VFR checkpoint along the route was Hollywood Hills; southeast of the I-405 south and Ventura Freeway to the west. We transited along the western side of Hollywood Hills; still without being on Bob Hope tower frequency or aware of the airspace infraction at this point in time. Upon following the I-405 southbound; we were contacted over LAX tower frequency by SMO; requesting military helicopter come in and identify. I immediately responded; and was informed of the airspace violation. Due to my loss of situational awareness; overconfidence in GPS systems; and failure to ensure my flying pilot vocalized and identified visual checkpoints along the route; we were completely in inadvertent disoriented flight at this time. Due to these factors and oversaturation in a congested environment; I allowed our aircraft to deviate from the assigned flight path and jeopardize the safety of the FAA and airspaces in the area. As I spoke with the Santa Monica tower controller; I realized our severe mistake. I noticed our position and guided the pilot to continue transiting west to Santa Monica pier; our final checkpoint; so we could immediately egress the area before causing further infractions. At the same time; I briefly tried to explain our situation to the controller; and was given a phone number to call upon landing; which I received. We flew the helicopter west over the water outside LAX airspace; then proceeded to exit south over the water at 200 AGL. I believe several human errors occurred both during preflight and mission execution that led to this incident; as listed below:Human Causal Factors -Poor preflight planning of the route; specifically what frequencies were going to be input into our radios and systems.-A lack of sound judgment when not able to identify checkpoints early in the route.-Loss of situational awareness; leading to oversaturation in a congested environment; ultimately leading to airspace incursion.-Late corrective actions due to disorientation.-Overconfidence in GPS systems.Multiple; if not all; of these contributing factors are founded in poor Crew Resource Management; from preflight planning to execution of the mission. -Poor communication; specifically that to express lack of visual checkpoint identification and the lack of crew communication to express concern. -Severe lack of decision making skills to turn around; or contact a previous frequency to get re-established along the proper route leg.-Overall lack of assertiveness by any of the crewmembers in verbalizing their lack of visual cues and certainty along the route.-Leadership deficiency by aircraft commander to discontinue; or to be aware of the airspace/frequency switches needed before Bob Hope Burbank's airspace. -Overall crew situational awareness degraded to be able to think ahead of the aircraft and route in order to keep within the rules of FAA airspace and communication requirements.-Misperception that tower or control would contact us on frequency or guard frequencies upon seeing aircraft inbound/outbound.Inactions-Inaction to positively switch over to Bob Hope Burbank Tower's frequency when arriving for Hollywood Hills checkpoint.-Inaction to ask Long Beach what frequency to expect next when unsure.-Inaction to properly check GPS waypoints with chart when visual checkpoints weren't identified.-Inaction to speak up concern as a crew when disoriented.Actions-Admitted fault when Santa Monica called us for aircraft identification over LAX tower frequency.Overall; multiple lessons learned were obtained from this event. Military aviators are extremely well trained; and there is no excuse for operations in congested airspaces without knowing exactly where the aircraft needs to be and when; who to talk to and when; and what navigational aids need to be monitored at all times. One of my biggest safety takeaways from this event is that I was not completely confident in the route I was taking; and I therefore lost the unspoken trust that exists between the FAA and military pilots during this time. I should have relied on the expertise of the aircraft handlers; and fessed up to when I thought I wasn't seeing a direct visual representation of my GPS waypoints. I could have used any tower frequencies in the area; simply asked the question; or utilized my crew more to back my navigational decisions up. I placed multiple aircraft at risk in not doing so; and I want to make it crystal clear that constant communication between aircraft and handlers is vital to safety; particularly when there is any doubt of aircraft location. There must be a respect of the procedures and airspace restrictions that have been put in place; which are there for the safety of all personnel. In that respect; I must ensure none of those safety measures are broken; as well as remain infinitely flexible in coordination with controller agencies to ensure safety compliance. One stand-out lesson learned from this incident is 'if there is a question; then there is no question.' This means if there is any grain of doubt in airspace restrictions; clearances; or operations that I speak up and clarify in order to regain situational awareness and confidence to safely transit the route. Another extremely important lesson to be learned is to know your comfort level; which I clearly did not. I was over-reliant on GPS systems on the aircraft; not the printed charts and the handling professionals in the airspace. Using systems as a navigational aid is a great idea; but only as a backup to the printed charts. Part of being a professional pilot is admitting when you're wrong; and making an approach to learning what you did incorrect and growing from it. Post mission analysis is yet another lesson learned; for the increased communication and experiences that can be passed in order for a safer flying environment to be fostered. I've also learned how to evaluate operational risk management; in its most basic form to not accept unnecessary risks; or to allow costs to outweigh the benefits. If I wasn't completely experienced and confident in this route; I shouldn't have opted to continue. The benefits for executing this route were airspace training; communication training; and local area familiarity. However; the costs were much higher. Unsafe transit through airspace without 2 way communications could have led to unnecessary wave-offs of civilian traffic; inadvertent same altitude fly-bys; and questionable radar returns leading to maneuvering of traffic due to one misplaced aircraft. Some mechanisms that could have prevented this incident are as follows: calling all air controllers well outside their designated airspace; making pilot calls over operation tower frequencies if not heard the first time; or checking its backup frequency to ensure; not assuming air traffic control will see you with a discrete squawk and reach out to you first when getting near; discontinuing route when unsure of location; checking in with any of the local frequencies to obtain clarity and confidence; ultimately for situational awareness and safety.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.