Narrative:

I am writing to inform you of what I felt to be distinctly substandard performance which I encountered from the east at about 150 KTS in an small aircraft having flown from xxxxx at 2000' MSL. I had already indicated that I had begun letdown from that altitude after being told to expect a right turn into runway 35 when, about 3 mi from the airport at about 1400' MSL on a heading of about 240 degrees, or essentially an extended base leg for runway 36, I was told to turn to 010 degrees to avoid traffic. After proceeding northbound for a short time I heard conversation from approach control to an airliner which was about 7-9 mi out on approach to land on 32. After proceeding north for several mi I was directed back southbound--but to allow the the airline flight sufficient time to pass ahead of me, I was instructed to do one 360 degree turn, then was vectored across the jetwash of the arrival airline landing on runway 32. I proceeded on a right-hand pattern for runway 35 and was handed off to mob tower. In the meantime another air carrier flight was holding in takeoff position on runway 32. When I was about .5 mi from landing, with gear and flaps down, and airspeed about 90 KTS, to my astonishment, the air carrier flight Y was cleared for takeoff. He promptly spooled up and departed, and I was issued a warning to 'exercise caution, wake turbulence, departing mlc,' as if I had time to take any reasonable action. Fortunately, I had a few extra KTS of airspeed and was able to balloon up to the top of the resultant jetwash, though still encountering substantial turbulence, and land long on 36. After this episode and by phone I contacted the tower supervisor and was given mr. Xxxxxx. I described the landing episode (but not the approach handling) to him and was told that there was no deviation from their usual procedure. I suggested that there was a safety problem with such procedure that could have been avoided by waiting another 10-20 seconds before clearing the airliner for takeoff. I was astonished to hear him say that that wasn't their concern. When I suggested that perhaps I would discuss the matter with the GADO, since he didn't feel that safety was his job, he said that would be fine, but that 'they don't effect us,' which indicated to me that he felt that they were immune to outside criticism. The attitude was definitely one of indifference to the safety of GA aircraft, just as long as scheduled airline traffic was not delayed or inconvenienced. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter stated the first tower supervisor he had talked to was not really the tower chief. Reporter called AOPA and was advised to write a letter to tower chief, asking for an explanation, which he did. He received a letter stating that there was some confusion that day re: traffic priority and the tower chief apologized for the level of handling he had received that day. Reporter still feels generally that tracons and towers do give priority to air carrier aircraft over GA aircraft, but does feel that this event was one of varying judgement on traffic spacing by the controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT REPORTS OF POOR SAFETY POSTURE TAKEN BY CTLRS AT FAC WHEREIN THEY WERE PLACING ARR AND DEP TRAFFIC FLOW AHEAD OF SAFETY OF ARRIVING SMA. REPORTER ENCOUNTERED WAKE TURB ON VECTORING PRIOR TO FINAL APCH AND FURTHER WAKE TURB ON LNDG FROM DEP ACFT.

Narrative: I AM WRITING TO INFORM YOU OF WHAT I FELT TO BE DISTINCTLY SUBSTANDARD PERFORMANCE WHICH I ENCOUNTERED FROM THE E AT ABOUT 150 KTS IN AN SMA HAVING FLOWN FROM XXXXX AT 2000' MSL. I HAD ALREADY INDICATED THAT I HAD BEGUN LETDOWN FROM THAT ALT AFTER BEING TOLD TO EXPECT A RIGHT TURN INTO RWY 35 WHEN, ABOUT 3 MI FROM THE ARPT AT ABOUT 1400' MSL ON A HDG OF ABOUT 240 DEGS, OR ESSENTIALLY AN EXTENDED BASE LEG FOR RWY 36, I WAS TOLD TO TURN TO 010 DEGS TO AVOID TFC. AFTER PROCEEDING NBOUND FOR A SHORT TIME I HEARD CONVERSATION FROM APCH CTL TO AN AIRLINER WHICH WAS ABOUT 7-9 MI OUT ON APCH TO LAND ON 32. AFTER PROCEEDING N FOR SEVERAL MI I WAS DIRECTED BACK SBND--BUT TO ALLOW THE THE AIRLINE FLT SUFFICIENT TIME TO PASS AHEAD OF ME, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO DO ONE 360 DEG TURN, THEN WAS VECTORED ACROSS THE JETWASH OF THE ARR AIRLINE LNDG ON RWY 32. I PROCEEDED ON A RIGHT-HAND PATTERN FOR RWY 35 AND WAS HANDED OFF TO MOB TWR. IN THE MEANTIME ANOTHER ACR FLT WAS HOLDING IN TKOF POS ON RWY 32. WHEN I WAS ABOUT .5 MI FROM LNDG, WITH GEAR AND FLAPS DOWN, AND AIRSPD ABOUT 90 KTS, TO MY ASTONISHMENT, THE ACR FLT Y WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. HE PROMPTLY SPOOLED UP AND DEPARTED, AND I WAS ISSUED A WARNING TO 'EXERCISE CAUTION, WAKE TURB, DEPARTING MLC,' AS IF I HAD TIME TO TAKE ANY REASONABLE ACTION. FORTUNATELY, I HAD A FEW EXTRA KTS OF AIRSPD AND WAS ABLE TO BALLOON UP TO THE TOP OF THE RESULTANT JETWASH, THOUGH STILL ENCOUNTERING SUBSTANTIAL TURB, AND LAND LONG ON 36. AFTER THIS EPISODE AND BY PHONE I CONTACTED THE TWR SUPVR AND WAS GIVEN MR. XXXXXX. I DESCRIBED THE LNDG EPISODE (BUT NOT THE APCH HANDLING) TO HIM AND WAS TOLD THAT THERE WAS NO DEVIATION FROM THEIR USUAL PROC. I SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS A SAFETY PROB WITH SUCH PROC THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY WAITING ANOTHER 10-20 SECS BEFORE CLRING THE AIRLINER FOR TKOF. I WAS ASTONISHED TO HEAR HIM SAY THAT THAT WASN'T THEIR CONCERN. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS I WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE GADO, SINCE HE DIDN'T FEEL THAT SAFETY WAS HIS JOB, HE SAID THAT WOULD BE FINE, BUT THAT 'THEY DON'T EFFECT US,' WHICH INDICATED TO ME THAT HE FELT THAT THEY WERE IMMUNE TO OUTSIDE CRITICISM. THE ATTITUDE WAS DEFINITELY ONE OF INDIFFERENCE TO THE SAFETY OF GA ACFT, JUST AS LONG AS SCHEDULED AIRLINE TFC WAS NOT DELAYED OR INCONVENIENCED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATED THE FIRST TWR SUPVR HE HAD TALKED TO WAS NOT REALLY THE TWR CHIEF. RPTR CALLED AOPA AND WAS ADVISED TO WRITE A LETTER TO TWR CHIEF, ASKING FOR AN EXPLANATION, WHICH HE DID. HE RECEIVED A LETTER STATING THAT THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION THAT DAY RE: TFC PRIORITY AND THE TWR CHIEF APOLOGIZED FOR THE LEVEL OF HANDLING HE HAD RECEIVED THAT DAY. RPTR STILL FEELS GENERALLY THAT TRACONS AND TWRS DO GIVE PRIORITY TO ACR ACFT OVER GA ACFT, BUT DOES FEEL THAT THIS EVENT WAS ONE OF VARYING JUDGEMENT ON TFC SPACING BY THE CTLRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.