Narrative:

During flight planning the NOTAMS at cle indicated that runway 5R-23L were closed, and the F/south was OTS on 5R. I had briefed my crew for a non-precision localizer approach to 5R with a side-step to 5L. As we approached the localizer on the intercept heading, the controller cleared us for an 'ILS to 5R, side-step to 5L.' the controller did not state that the G/south was OTS, which created a question as to whether the G/south was available for the approach. My company requires the use of precision approach aids when available. I directed my copilot to query the controller as to whether the G/south was still OTS, and we were informed that it was still out. This generated an unnecessary diversion of the flight crew's attention during a critical phase of flight, as I had intercepted the localizer and initiated descent to the initial approach altitude. The LOM (harri) had been tuned, idented and selected during the approach, and I was prepared to initiate descent to the side-step minimums at harri. At approximately 3100' MSL in the descent, we received a transmission from the approach controller which the flight crew interpreted as an advisory that we were 'over harri.' since there is no DME on the 5R ILS, my initial response was to accept the controller's position advisory, which would have placed the aircraft approximately 300' high on profile at harri. I continued the descent through the initial approach altitude in order to arrive at the side-step minimum altitude in a timely manner. X-chking my INS a few seconds later, I noticed the double-barred needle on my RMI was pointing toward the nose of the aircraft, indicating that we were southwest of harri. (Using the #2 VOR on dryer, I estimated approximately 3-4 NM southwest of harri.) we then received an advisory from the approach controller 'check your altitude,' and a subsequent controller instruction to 'climb immediatley to 2700',' which I had already initiated at approximately 2100-2200' we crossed harri at the assigned altitude. If the approach controller had stated that the G/south was OTS, or had cleared me for a localizer approach to 5R, side-step to 5L, there would have been no doubt as to the status of the approach facility. I recommend a comprehensive review of controller phraseology in issuing clrncs to avoid this type of situation. A clearance for the localizer approach to 5R would be more definitive and appropriate. Realistically miscoms resulting from substandard equipment/maintenance, partially blocked xmissions, or flight crew/controller misinterp are virtually impossible to avoid in our present operating environment. However, there are ways to mitigate the effects of these inherent weaknesses in the system. Specifically, I do not believe that this incident would have occurred if the air crew's flight INS data had included a DME readout in order to instantly and accurately monitor position on the localizer. In an air navigation system where virtually all VOR facs have DME for us in non-critical phases of flight, I have difficulty understanding why all ILS facs do not have DME capability for aircrew use during critical phases of flight. A re-examination of priorities is overdue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT ALT DEVIATION EXCURSION FROM CLRNC ALT NON ADHERENCE TO IAP LOCALIZER APCH INTO CLE.

Narrative: DURING FLT PLANNING THE NOTAMS AT CLE INDICATED THAT RWY 5R-23L WERE CLOSED, AND THE F/S WAS OTS ON 5R. I HAD BRIEFED MY CREW FOR A NON-PRECISION LOC APCH TO 5R WITH A SIDE-STEP TO 5L. AS WE APCHED THE LOC ON THE INTERCEPT HDG, THE CTLR CLRED US FOR AN 'ILS TO 5R, SIDE-STEP TO 5L.' THE CTLR DID NOT STATE THAT THE G/S WAS OTS, WHICH CREATED A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE G/S WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE APCH. MY COMPANY REQUIRES THE USE OF PRECISION APCH AIDS WHEN AVAILABLE. I DIRECTED MY COPLT TO QUERY THE CTLR AS TO WHETHER THE G/S WAS STILL OTS, AND WE WERE INFORMED THAT IT WAS STILL OUT. THIS GENERATED AN UNNECESSARY DIVERSION OF THE FLT CREW'S ATTN DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT, AS I HAD INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND INITIATED DSNT TO THE INITIAL APCH ALT. THE LOM (HARRI) HAD BEEN TUNED, IDENTED AND SELECTED DURING THE APCH, AND I WAS PREPARED TO INITIATE DSNT TO THE SIDE-STEP MINIMUMS AT HARRI. AT APPROX 3100' MSL IN THE DSNT, WE RECEIVED A XMISSION FROM THE APCH CTLR WHICH THE FLT CREW INTERPRETED AS AN ADVISORY THAT WE WERE 'OVER HARRI.' SINCE THERE IS NO DME ON THE 5R ILS, MY INITIAL RESPONSE WAS TO ACCEPT THE CTLR'S POS ADVISORY, WHICH WOULD HAVE PLACED THE ACFT APPROX 300' HIGH ON PROFILE AT HARRI. I CONTINUED THE DSNT THROUGH THE INITIAL APCH ALT IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT THE SIDE-STEP MINIMUM ALT IN A TIMELY MANNER. X-CHKING MY INS A FEW SECS LATER, I NOTICED THE DOUBLE-BARRED NEEDLE ON MY RMI WAS POINTING TOWARD THE NOSE OF THE ACFT, INDICATING THAT WE WERE SW OF HARRI. (USING THE #2 VOR ON DRYER, I ESTIMATED APPROX 3-4 NM SW OF HARRI.) WE THEN RECEIVED AN ADVISORY FROM THE APCH CTLR 'CHK YOUR ALT,' AND A SUBSEQUENT CTLR INSTRUCTION TO 'CLB IMMEDIATLEY TO 2700',' WHICH I HAD ALREADY INITIATED AT APPROX 2100-2200' WE CROSSED HARRI AT THE ASSIGNED ALT. IF THE APCH CTLR HAD STATED THAT THE G/S WAS OTS, OR HAD CLRED ME FOR A LOC APCH TO 5R, SIDE-STEP TO 5L, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO DOUBT AS TO THE STATUS OF THE APCH FAC. I RECOMMEND A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF CTLR PHRASEOLOGY IN ISSUING CLRNCS TO AVOID THIS TYPE OF SITUATION. A CLRNC FOR THE LOC APCH TO 5R WOULD BE MORE DEFINITIVE AND APPROPRIATE. REALISTICALLY MISCOMS RESULTING FROM SUBSTANDARD EQUIP/MAINT, PARTIALLY BLOCKED XMISSIONS, OR FLT CREW/CTLR MISINTERP ARE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO AVOID IN OUR PRESENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE WAYS TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF THESE INHERENT WEAKNESSES IN THE SYS. SPECIFICALLY, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS INCIDENT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED IF THE AIR CREW'S FLT INS DATA HAD INCLUDED A DME READOUT IN ORDER TO INSTANTLY AND ACCURATELY MONITOR POS ON THE LOC. IN AN AIR NAV SYS WHERE VIRTUALLY ALL VOR FACS HAVE DME FOR US IN NON-CRITICAL PHASES OF FLT, I HAVE DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING WHY ALL ILS FACS DO NOT HAVE DME CAPABILITY FOR AIRCREW USE DURING CRITICAL PHASES OF FLT. A RE-EXAMINATION OF PRIORITIES IS OVERDUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.