Narrative:

Prior to take off from ZZZ we experienced a long delay due to heavy bank of departures. I asked the first officer (first officer) to shut down the right engine to save fuel. We were to follow [another aircraft] to the runway and we were advised by the ground controller that we should stay with him. When we asked about our sequence we were told that we were number 20.as we moved closer to departure runway it appeared to me that we would be taking off soon; but the controller had not switched us to the tower. I asked the first officer to restart the right engine at this time. Meanwhile; the ground control frequency had been busy the whole time and it was hard to get a word in. We finally asked the ground controller if he needed us to switch to tower. He replied in the affirmative and did not say that he had asked us to do that earlier; as I was concerned we had missed his call.as we switched to tower the [preceding aircraft] that we were following was turning onto the runway. First officer started to run the before takeoff checklist below the line as the tower was giving us instructions to get on the runway. I was observing EICAS indications relating to the right engine; and I said something like 'that's not right' as I observed no N1 on the right engine. All other indications except N1 appeared normal. I advised the tower that we had an engine issue and that we would not be ready to take off. Tower then gave us instructions to turn right on xyr; turn left on yankee and left on papa. We acknowledged the clearance and started to taxi. As we taxied; a couple of aircraft started mentioning that the right engine was on fire; however; we had no cockpit fire or overheat indications other than the mentioned abnormal start indications. I continued to taxi and as I turned onto taxiway papa I stopped the airplane and set the brakes. Other aircraft kept advising us that the fire was still going. Since we had no indications in the cockpit; I was thinking 'engine torching' vs. The correct term tailpipe fire. I was about to call for that checklist when to me; it sounded like someone said over the radio that we should do an evacuation.since we had several reports of a fire; at this time I advised the tower that we were starting an evacuation and asked the first officer to run the evacuation check list. Again; we had no cockpit indications of a fire. As a caution and because time was of essence I wanted to tell the flight attendants to prepare for possible evacuation. Since the last [aircraft] we flew [had] a different flight inter-phone; I was not immediately sure which button was for talking to the back. So; I decided to make a PA announcement to the flight attendants to 'prepare for evacuation'. My intent was to have them prepare and assess the situation from their vantage point. By this time; I believed; because the first officer was running the evacuation checklist; that she had actuated the evacuation signal. I then started hearing the sounds of the evacuation going on and made a PA announcement to 'evacuate on the left side only'. As I put my attention back in the cockpit the first officer was at the point on checklist where we needed to pull the fire handles. I said something to the effect that we needed to pull them; but she pointed me to a statement that said 'illuminated fire handle'. We both decided that there was no illuminated handle and elected not to pull them. I now realize that was procedurally incorrect. However; in the rush of the moment we thought we did the correct procedure; and by this time the evacuation was almost complete. We proceeded to do a sweep; and verify that all passengers and flight attendants had evacuated the airplane. And then we used the slides to exit the airplane. Thankfully; the evacuation went smoothly except for a few minor injuries. Our inflight crew did an excellent job of herding all passengers away from the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier flight crew reported being advised of an engine fire while lining up for takeoff; resulting in an evacuation.

Narrative: Prior to take off from ZZZ we experienced a long delay due to heavy bank of departures. I asked the First Officer (FO) to shut down the right engine to save fuel. We were to follow [another aircraft] to the runway and we were advised by the ground controller that we should stay with him. When we asked about our sequence we were told that we were number 20.As we moved closer to departure runway it appeared to me that we would be taking off soon; but the controller had not switched us to the tower. I asked the First Officer to restart the right engine at this time. Meanwhile; the ground control frequency had been busy the whole time and it was hard to get a word in. We finally asked the ground controller if he needed us to switch to tower. He replied in the affirmative and DID NOT say that he had asked us to do that earlier; as I was concerned we had missed his call.As we switched to tower the [preceding aircraft] that we were following was turning onto the runway. First Officer started to run the before takeoff checklist below the line as the tower was giving us instructions to get on the runway. I was observing EICAS indications relating to the right engine; and I said something like 'that's not right' as I observed no N1 on the right engine. All other indications except N1 appeared normal. I advised the tower that we had an engine issue and that we would not be ready to take off. Tower then gave us instructions to turn right on XYR; turn left on Yankee and left on Papa. We acknowledged the clearance and started to taxi. As we taxied; a couple of aircraft started mentioning that the right engine was on fire; however; we had no cockpit fire or overheat indications other than the mentioned abnormal start indications. I continued to taxi and as I turned onto taxiway Papa I stopped the airplane and set the brakes. Other aircraft kept advising us that the fire was still going. Since we had no indications in the cockpit; I was thinking 'Engine Torching' vs. the correct term Tailpipe fire. I was about to call for that checklist when to me; it sounded like someone said over the radio that we should do an evacuation.Since we had several reports of a fire; at this time I advised the tower that we were starting an Evacuation and asked the First Officer to run the Evacuation check list. Again; we had no cockpit indications of a fire. As a caution and because time was of essence I wanted to tell the Flight Attendants to prepare for possible evacuation. Since the last [aircraft] we flew [had] a different flight inter-phone; I was not immediately sure which button was for talking to the back. So; I decided to make a PA announcement to the flight attendants to 'Prepare for Evacuation'. My intent was to have them prepare and assess the situation from their vantage point. By this time; I believed; because the FO was running the Evacuation checklist; that she had actuated the evacuation signal. I then started hearing the sounds of the evacuation going on and made a PA announcement to 'evacuate on the left side only'. As I put my attention back in the cockpit the FO was at the point on checklist where we needed to pull the fire handles. I said something to the effect that we needed to pull them; but she pointed me to a statement that said 'illuminated fire handle'. We both decided that there was no illuminated handle and elected not to pull them. I now realize that was procedurally incorrect. However; in the rush of the moment we thought we did the correct procedure; and by this time the Evacuation was almost complete. We proceeded to do a sweep; and verify that all passengers and Flight Attendants had evacuated the airplane. And then we used the slides to exit the airplane. Thankfully; the evacuation went smoothly except for a few minor injuries. Our inflight crew did an excellent job of herding all passengers away from the aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.