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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1451609 |
Time | |
Date | 201705 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZDC.ARTCC |
State Reference | VA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Marginal |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Flight Phase | Descent Cruise |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
[This] night was an overall failure across many levels. Coming on shift I was told that traffic volume was expected to be very light with no weather. The night was okay until around evening. Traffic was picking up and weather was building in the sector. At no time was the area ever briefed on a plan to re-route aircraft or about aircraft that were coming our way. It was just all dumped on us and we had to figure it out. At the super high sectors I had terrible rides; a very high volume of traffic (over a full page on the user request evaluation tool (uret)); and almost every aircraft I had was deviating. Our staffing was very low and there was no one to help except for my assist with his instructor. Once his instructor got pulled off training to go help someone else who was completely down the tubes; it was just me on the radar with an assist trainee that has 0 sectors under his belt. He was helping me search for traffic; pointing things out; etc. I sat there and felt like I was fighting for my life multiple times during that session.we have four main flows in those two sectors going south. North bound there are two flows. One on the west side that runs north one on the east side. The majority of flights going south were deviating far east. A few would try to pick their way through the weather area; but they would end up taking hard turns to avoid large pockets. A sector to the east had all their traffic re-routed into our airspace travelling northbound. An adjaent center was supposed to re-route all their metro traffic to us north bound; but only about half had the new routing. There was no spacing given to us; and as I was told; none requested from traffic management unit (tmu). Stacks of 2 and 3 going to the same airport happened over and over. I don't understand how that situation was allowed to transpire. I'll continue the rest of this in bullet statements to make it easier to follow along.why was that amount of aircraft allowed to come through those sectors when we're always preached at about supervisor's not wanting sectors to get 'red'? Why is the only recourse or fix action for me to shut off the sectors around me when I know they're working just as hard as I am? Is that really the way to solve the issue? Why is staffing so low; or planning so poor; that we're at the end of a weather night with no one to help?why did no one see that aircraft weren't staying on their routes? Where was the 'playbook' that should've rerouted them over another airway? Why are we told over and over and over that the command center is over riding what our weather and traffic management folks recommended? Why weren't any flights capped? Why didn't we have spacing requirements on the arrivals that we were taking? Why wasn't the adjacent center required to have the arrivals on proper routing?this is not how any ARTCC is supposed to be run. It was all completely reactionary and dangerous. Time after time during that session I felt like I and the aircraft under my control were in a dangerous situation. After asking for a journeyman assist I was provided one approximately 15 minutes later. Up until then; it was me and an assist trainee with zero sectors to his name.this center combines and de-combines sectors based on staffing and not on traffic volume. This exact scenario happens time after time after time. We're always told 'we're looking into it' or 'we're doing a system review' or 'just shut the other sectors off if you're too busy'. Is that really the answer? This needs to be fixed. It's a systematic failure of the national airspace system (NAS). The command center has a large roll in this and they need to be held accountable.there is going to be a serious aircraft accident if these systematic issues are not taken care of. I could not have handled an emergency or any other task added on during this session. I was working very hard and half way through the session I felt completely worn out. If there are going to be mass re-routes; require the aircraft to be on the routes they need to be on. Give us at least 5 miles in trail. Don't let a sector stay combined with 46-50 aircraft in the arrival list. If traffic management unit sees that every aircraft is deviating off their routes by 60-75 miles; then start changing routes. Cap aircraft altitudes. Use miles in trail restrictions to give us a fighting chance.have operation managers be engaged in what's happening in the center. Have the supervisors give us a heads up when they know we've got 10-15 aircraft heading our way that are all going to deviate opposite flow across all our traffic. Why is it that I have no idea we're getting offloads deviating until I get a mass of aircraft handed off to me? Pre-plan.the last thing I'd add is a statement that I made in the previous block. I feel like this center combines and splits sectors based on manning and not based on traffic. On heavy staffing days we're constantly required to split sectors when they're 'green' or 'projected to go yellow'. We're told by the supervisors that 'the operation managers watch their sectors like hawks' and 'they can't justify leaving them split'. [On this] night I worked those two sectors combined and I know they were 'red'. On top of that; no one liked their ride and they all wanted to deviate; along with route changed for multiple aircraft.I was set up for failure by all the people/groups that are supposed to be there as a back-stop for safety. My operations manager told me that the command center was mad that we weren't taking more aircraft and that he was having to do paperwork to explain what was going on. Why doesn't he have the ability to manage the center? Why isn't he looking at the flows and looking at the red sectors and calling the supervisor asking what is going on and what can they do to help?
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZDC Center Controller reported their shift was under staffed and overloaded with traffic due to weather deviations. The Controller reported the Traffic Management Units did not properly manage the traffic situation.
Narrative: [This] night was an overall failure across many levels. Coming on shift I was told that traffic volume was expected to be very light with no weather. The night was okay until around evening. Traffic was picking up and weather was building in the sector. At no time was the area ever briefed on a plan to re-route aircraft or about aircraft that were coming our way. It was just all dumped on us and we had to figure it out. At the super high sectors I had terrible rides; a very high volume of traffic (over a full page on the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET)); and almost every aircraft I had was deviating. Our staffing was very low and there was no one to help except for my Assist with his instructor. Once his instructor got pulled off training to go help someone else who was completely down the tubes; it was just me on the Radar with an Assist trainee that has 0 sectors under his belt. He was helping me search for traffic; pointing things out; etc. I sat there and felt like I was fighting for my life multiple times during that session.We have four main flows in those two sectors going south. North bound there are two flows. One on the west side that runs north one on the east side. The majority of flights going south were deviating far east. A few would try to pick their way through the weather area; but they would end up taking hard turns to avoid large pockets. A Sector to the east had all their traffic re-routed into our airspace travelling northbound. An adjaent Center was supposed to re-route all their metro traffic to us north bound; but only about half had the new routing. There was no spacing given to us; and as I was told; none requested from Traffic management Unit (TMU). Stacks of 2 and 3 going to the same airport happened over and over. I don't understand how that situation was allowed to transpire. I'll continue the rest of this in bullet statements to make it easier to follow along.Why was that amount of aircraft allowed to come through those sectors when we're always preached at about Supervisor's not wanting sectors to get 'RED'? Why is the only recourse or fix action for me to shut off the sectors around me when I know they're working just as hard as I am? Is that really the way to solve the issue? Why is staffing so low; or planning so poor; that we're at the end of a weather night with no one to help?Why did no one see that aircraft weren't staying on their routes? Where was the 'playbook' that should've rerouted them over another airway? Why are we told over and over and over that the Command Center is over riding what our weather and Traffic Management folks recommended? Why weren't any flights capped? Why didn't we have spacing requirements on the arrivals that we were taking? Why wasn't the adjacent Center required to have the arrivals on proper routing?This is not how any ARTCC is supposed to be run. It was all completely reactionary and dangerous. Time after time during that session I felt like I and the aircraft under my control were in a dangerous situation. After asking for a Journeyman Assist I was provided one approximately 15 minutes later. Up until then; it was me and an Assist trainee with zero sectors to his name.This center combines and de-combines sectors based on staffing and not on traffic volume. This exact scenario happens time after time after time. We're always told 'We're looking into it' or 'We're doing a system review' or 'just shut the other sectors off if you're too busy'. Is that really the answer? This needs to be fixed. It's a systematic failure of the National Airspace System (NAS). The Command Center has a large roll in this and they need to be held accountable.There is going to be a serious aircraft accident if these systematic issues are not taken care of. I could not have handled an emergency or any other task added on during this session. I was working very hard and half way through the session I felt completely worn out. If there are going to be mass re-routes; require the aircraft to be on the routes they need to be on. Give us at least 5 miles in trail. Don't let a sector stay combined with 46-50 aircraft in the arrival list. If Traffic Management Unit sees that every aircraft is deviating off their routes by 60-75 miles; then start changing routes. Cap aircraft altitudes. Use miles in trail restrictions to give us a fighting chance.Have Operation Managers be engaged in what's happening in the Center. Have the Supervisors give us a heads up when they know we've got 10-15 aircraft heading our way that are all going to deviate opposite flow across all our traffic. Why is it that I have no idea we're getting offloads deviating until I get a mass of aircraft handed off to me? Pre-plan.The last thing I'd add is a statement that I made in the previous block. I feel like this center combines and splits sectors based on manning and not based on traffic. On heavy staffing days we're constantly required to split sectors when they're 'green' or 'projected to go yellow'. We're told by the Supervisors that 'The Operation Managers watch their sectors like hawks' and 'They can't justify leaving them split'. [On this] night I worked those two sectors combined and I know they were 'red'. On top of that; no one liked their ride and they all wanted to deviate; along with route changed for multiple aircraft.I was set up for failure by all the people/groups that are supposed to be there as a back-stop for safety. My Operations Manager told me that the Command Center was mad that we weren't taking more aircraft and that he was having to do paperwork to explain what was going on. Why doesn't he have the ability to manage the Center? Why isn't he looking at the flows and looking at the red sectors and calling the Supervisor asking what is going on and what can they do to help?
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.