Narrative:

Weather was forecasted to have convective activity [across the east coast]. When a reliable route structure cannot be constructed to go around convective activity; traffic management unit (tmu) will often use a tool called an airspace flow programs (afp) to slow traffic to a manageable safe level. Command center is the only one that can institute an afp and agreed to their use given the forecast. There are two major afps that steady the flow of traffic through ZOB. One for the western boundary of ZOB that catches all traffic landing ZBW; ZNY; and ZDC. One drawn on our eastern boundary of ZOB that catches all traffic landing ZBW; ZNY; and ZDC. The biggest difference is one catches all the traffic of the other and all traffic going to ZBW; ZNY; and ZDC from ZOB and czyz.the forecast called for the major weather impact to be on the eastern side of ZOB; meaning that all the departures from ZOB and the over flights would be going into the forecasted weather. ZOB requested the use of the western plan several times; but was overruled by command center and the other plan was put in place. It was put out at a 90 rate; meaning that 90 aircraft could cross the western ZOB boundary going to ZBW; ZNY; and ZDC per hour. This is a rate for what would be considered a 'low weather impact.' in review of the above mentioned tcf panel; it was highly aggressive to call this a 'low weather impact.'the afp was running a little high at about 98. At this point; I would suggest that you request a copy of the national planning from command center to hear the complete and accurate answer presented by ZOB on 'how things were going.' I advised them that the plan was looking pretty close to what they had hoped; but it was the 'wrong tool for the job' and that drastic steps that would have to take place to ensure safety in ZOB. A low weather impact for the plan calls for the slowing of traffic to 100-110 rate. A high weather impact would be 80-90. An fea drawn by ZOB to reflect the traffic that would be caught by the ZOB showed 172 aircraft flying into severe weather. The plan modeled by command center reflected 160 aircraft for the same period. Regardless of which way you looked at it; we were way over capacity.command center will often argue for one plan over the use of the other plan stating that 'ZOB can manage their own departures' (the vast majority of the traffic difference between the two tools.) however; a historical replay from that evening; 40 aircraft in a one hour timeframe were ZOB departures. This means even going into a complete ground stop for all of ZOB to ZDC; ZNY; and ZDC would still have only brought the rate to 132; still well over the 100-110 rate for a 'low weather impact.' then still over the rate for the next hour; what do you do with those 40 aircraft and the additional departures that wanted to go that hour? Of those 40 departures; 16 were dtw; 7 were pit; then 2 or less from 10 other miscellaneous airports. How do you manage that effectively? When dealing with the all the major flows of traffic through ZOB (ewr; jfk; lga; ewr; phl; ord; mdw; dtw; cle; dca; iad; bwi and others tactically on a night like this); our tmcs would not have time to try to manage 2 or less departures from smaller airports. Please contact me for any clarifications or more information. I give you permission to share this with anyone. A review of the above mentioned scenario for the employees of command center that are responsible for the decision and implementation of the sequencing strategies. Education for command center from ZOB perspective on the two tools and why one would be requested over the other.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOB ARTCC Traffic Management Supervisor reported that significant weather traffic flow strategy implemented by the FAA Command Center was insufficient to control the amount of traffic allowed into their airspace.

Narrative: Weather was forecasted to have convective activity [across the East Coast]. When a reliable route structure cannot be constructed to go around convective activity; Traffic Management Unit (TMU) will often use a tool called an Airspace Flow Programs (AFP) to slow traffic to a manageable safe level. Command Center is the only one that can institute an AFP and agreed to their use given the forecast. There are two major AFPs that steady the flow of traffic through ZOB. One for the western boundary of ZOB that catches all traffic landing ZBW; ZNY; and ZDC. One drawn on our eastern boundary of ZOB that catches all traffic landing ZBW; ZNY; and ZDC. The biggest difference is one catches all the traffic of the other and all traffic going to ZBW; ZNY; and ZDC from ZOB and CZYZ.The forecast called for the major weather impact to be on the eastern side of ZOB; meaning that all the departures from ZOB and the over flights would be going into the forecasted weather. ZOB requested the use of the western plan several times; but was overruled by Command Center and the other plan was put in place. It was put out at a 90 rate; meaning that 90 aircraft could cross the western ZOB boundary going to ZBW; ZNY; and ZDC per hour. This is a rate for what would be considered a 'low weather impact.' In review of the above mentioned TCF panel; it was highly aggressive to call this a 'low weather impact.'The AFP was running a little high at about 98. At this point; I would suggest that you request a copy of the national planning from Command Center to hear the complete and accurate answer presented by ZOB on 'how things were going.' I advised them that the plan was looking pretty close to what they had hoped; but it was the 'wrong tool for the job' and that drastic steps that would have to take place to ensure safety in ZOB. A low weather impact for the plan calls for the slowing of traffic to 100-110 rate. A high weather impact would be 80-90. An FEA drawn by ZOB to reflect the traffic that would be caught by the ZOB showed 172 aircraft flying into severe weather. The plan modeled by Command Center reflected 160 aircraft for the same period. Regardless of which way you looked at it; we were way over capacity.Command Center will often argue for one plan over the use of the other plan stating that 'ZOB can manage their own departures' (the vast majority of the traffic difference between the two tools.) However; a historical replay from that evening; 40 aircraft in a one hour timeframe were ZOB departures. This means even going into a complete ground stop for all of ZOB to ZDC; ZNY; and ZDC would still have only brought the rate to 132; still well over the 100-110 rate for a 'low weather impact.' Then still over the rate for the next hour; what do you do with those 40 aircraft and the additional departures that wanted to go that hour? Of those 40 departures; 16 were DTW; 7 were PIT; then 2 or less from 10 other miscellaneous airports. How do you manage that effectively? When dealing with the all the major flows of traffic through ZOB (EWR; JFK; LGA; EWR; PHL; ORD; MDW; DTW; CLE; DCA; IAD; BWI and others tactically on a night like this); our TMCs would not have time to try to manage 2 or less departures from smaller airports. Please contact me for any clarifications or more information. I give you permission to share this with anyone. A review of the above mentioned scenario for the employees of Command Center that are responsible for the decision and implementation of the sequencing strategies. Education for Command Center from ZOB perspective on the two tools and why one would be requested over the other.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.