Narrative:

Dispatched well to [the destination]; planned landing fuel 1:25. [Destination] VFR; smooth rides; and no enroute weather forecast. Early unforecast deviation around weather; eight minute vector around military airspace (there is a vague NOTAM about this requiring checking a web site to see if it is applicable) and another weather deviation left us with about 1:15 in landing fuel. The fuel topic was discussed at each crew changeover and we were all well aware of the issue and not concerned. There had been an ongoing cabin light issue in which rows of reading and call lights were turning on randomly and staying on. We contacted dispatch and [maintenance] about this and their suggestions failed to help. We also had a random cockpit PA issue in which we sometimes had to reset the cockpit handset to make a PA announcement. About two thirds of the way through the flight; I made a seat belt PA and everything reset (PA and cabin and reading lights) and worked the rest of the flight. I waited until the descent (after my break and after the approach briefing and approach descent checklist) to sort everything out and try to make a maintenance write up. The write up took three pages of log entries and they all came back as incorrect (I had put too many characters in the log item field). Instead of rewriting them (due to time constraints); I called dispatch and had him patch me through to [maintenance] and I described the situation to him. All of this was complete by around 15;000 feet; but I had been out of the loop for a while. [ATC] had started our descent early and we received an insufficient fuel EICAS. We reset the warning fuel on the performance page to 1 hour of fuel (13;300 lbs). We received another early descent and the insufficient fuel EICAS came back. We did the ecl (electronic checklist) for that EICAS. At that point someone in front of us received a holding clearance. We investigated weather and discussed diverting. We were given a holding clearance without an efc (expected further clearance) time. We queried [ATC] for an efc; they said the airport was changing runways and they did not have an efc. I have always been taught that a minimum fuel advisory was not understood at international destinations and therefore did not declare minimum fuel. We immediately requested a diversion. We were given a hold for [the diversion airport] also. I might add that the pm (pilot monitoring) was focused on flying the aircraft and did an excellent job. The two non-flying copilots were very much in the loop and focused on pitching in where they could. I stated that we were unable holding. Rather than waiting until we were at a landing fuel of 30 minutes or less; I decided it was better to [advise ATC] the [situation] early and continue towards a runway. After [advising]controllers handled the situation very well. We were vectored to and landed uneventfully with one hour of fuel remaining; 13;300 pounds.the entire event from 15;000 feet down to landing was extremely busy. We changed the destination in the FMC twice; we sent two diversion messages to dispatch. We did not have time to discuss anything with dispatch after calling about the maintenance issues. I did follow up with a call to dispatch from the hotel to explain. All checklists were completed and we handled the situation without any deviations from SOP. I am quite proud of the way the crew responded to everything that was thrown at us.there are several items that were learned throughout this event. First and foremost; the system works. I was asked if I would increase fuel loads from this point on and my answer is no. From now on; my plan is to take a reasonable fuel load and realize that I can (in spite of my previous understanding) declare minimum fuel when my landing fuel approaches one hour of fuel (several aircraft declared minimum fuel after we [advised ATC] and [ATC] understood and accommodated them); and as a last resort; I can [advise ATC] approaching 45 minutes of landing fuel and the path is cleared for us to make a safe; uneventful landing. I learned to postpone complex write ups and patches to [maintenance] until I am on the ground instead of in the descent. I knew to leave the adiru (air data inertial reference unit) on when we need ACARS on the ground; but did not realize that the ACARS would have made life easier on the ground.training center and most real life diversion scenarios include bad weather and therefore lots of hold fuel; many distant alternates and therefore lots of time to sit in a holding pattern and discuss options as a crew and with dispatch. I learned that this scenario; with VFR weather and minimum dispatched fuel can turn south very quickly. Actions need to be quick and decisive; CRM (cockpit resource management) needs to be quick as well. We do not get as much (or any) training for a diversion scenario without lots of time to discuss options. This is something everyone might want to think through on the ground; if they have not already.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Boeing 777 Captain reported a fuel critical situation during descent due to unforeseen deviations.

Narrative: Dispatched well to [the destination]; planned landing fuel 1:25. [Destination] VFR; smooth rides; and no enroute weather forecast. Early unforecast deviation around weather; eight minute vector around military airspace (there is a vague NOTAM about this requiring checking a web site to see if it is applicable) and another weather deviation left us with about 1:15 in landing fuel. The fuel topic was discussed at each crew changeover and we were all well aware of the issue and not concerned. There had been an ongoing cabin light issue in which rows of reading and call lights were turning on randomly and staying on. We contacted dispatch and [maintenance] about this and their suggestions failed to help. We also had a random cockpit PA issue in which we sometimes had to reset the cockpit handset to make a PA announcement. About two thirds of the way through the flight; I made a seat belt PA and everything reset (PA and cabin and reading lights) and worked the rest of the flight. I waited until the descent (after my break and after the approach briefing and approach descent checklist) to sort everything out and try to make a maintenance write up. The write up took three pages of log entries and they all came back as incorrect (I had put too many characters in the log item field). Instead of rewriting them (due to time constraints); I called dispatch and had him patch me through to [maintenance] and I described the situation to him. All of this was complete by around 15;000 feet; but I had been out of the loop for a while. [ATC] had started our descent early and we received an insufficient fuel EICAS. We reset the warning fuel on the performance page to 1 hour of fuel (13;300 lbs). We received another early descent and the insufficient fuel EICAS came back. We did the ECL (Electronic Checklist) for that EICAS. At that point someone in front of us received a holding clearance. We investigated weather and discussed diverting. We were given a holding clearance without an EFC (Expected Further Clearance) time. We queried [ATC] for an EFC; they said the airport was changing runways and they did not have an EFC. I have always been taught that a minimum fuel advisory was not understood at international destinations and therefore did not declare minimum fuel. We immediately requested a diversion. We were given a hold for [the diversion airport] also. I might add that the PM (Pilot Monitoring) was focused on flying the aircraft and did an excellent job. The two non-flying copilots were very much in the loop and focused on pitching in where they could. I stated that we were unable holding. Rather than waiting until we were at a landing fuel of 30 minutes or less; I decided it was better to [advise ATC] the [situation] early and continue towards a runway. After [advising]controllers handled the situation very well. We were vectored to and landed uneventfully with one hour of fuel remaining; 13;300 pounds.The entire event from 15;000 feet down to landing was extremely busy. We changed the destination in the FMC twice; we sent two diversion messages to dispatch. We did not have time to discuss anything with dispatch after calling about the maintenance issues. I did follow up with a call to dispatch from the hotel to explain. All checklists were completed and we handled the situation without any deviations from SOP. I am quite proud of the way the crew responded to everything that was thrown at us.There are several items that were learned throughout this event. First and foremost; the system works. I was asked if I would increase fuel loads from this point on and my answer is no. From now on; my plan is to take a reasonable fuel load and realize that I can (in spite of my previous understanding) declare minimum fuel when my landing fuel approaches one hour of fuel (several aircraft declared minimum fuel after we [advised ATC] and [ATC] understood and accommodated them); and as a last resort; I can [advise ATC] approaching 45 minutes of landing fuel and the path is cleared for us to make a safe; uneventful landing. I learned to postpone complex write ups and patches to [maintenance] until I am on the ground instead of in the descent. I knew to leave the ADIRU (Air Data Inertial Reference Unit) on when we need ACARS on the ground; but did not realize that the ACARS would have made life easier on the ground.Training center and most real life diversion scenarios include bad weather and therefore lots of hold fuel; many distant alternates and therefore lots of time to sit in a holding pattern and discuss options as a crew and with dispatch. I learned that this scenario; with VFR weather and minimum dispatched fuel can turn south very quickly. Actions need to be quick and decisive; CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) needs to be quick as well. We do not get as much (or any) training for a diversion scenario without lots of time to discuss options. This is something everyone might want to think through on the ground; if they have not already.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.