37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1454326 |
Time | |
Date | 201706 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | Direct |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Engine |
Person 1 | |
Function | Single Pilot |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Commercial |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135 Flight Crew Total 3710 Flight Crew Type 165 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue |
Narrative:
Approximately 15 minutes after leveling off at a cruising altitude of 4;500 MSL; the engine began to surge as it lost all power. Attempted restart - I immediately flipped on the fuel boost pump to the 'high' position (i.e. Pushed both red & yellow fuel pump switches). The engine increased RPM momentarily and surged a little and made a few popping noises - then went idle. The prop continued windmilling. Proceeded towards nearest airport - as the airplane began experiencing a partial loss of power; I pointed the airplane directly towards the [nearest] airport and began increasing pitch to climb and establish best glide airspeed. It soon became apparent that the airplane had lost all power and I was not able to make it to [the nearest airport]. Picked nearest suitable landing area - an open field.I switched to 121.5 and communicated 'total engine failure; anybody copy?' an airline pilot came on the frequency and requested more [details]. I recognized that this conversation was quickly turning into a distraction as I tried to process his request; and ceased communications. Prepared cabin for forced landing - I turned around and told passengers 'put your hands underneath your knees and lean forward into your seatbelts'. I reached for the fuel selector to turn it 'off' and it was at this point that I discovered the true nature of the problem - the fuel selector was already in the 'off' position. I was now passing through 2;000 MSL (about 1;000-1;500 AGL). I immediately switched to the right fuel tank; and; within moments; the engine came back to full power. Follow up communication on 121.5 - I reported on 121.5 that the engine was now back to life. The airline pilot (do not remember the call sign) came back with a request [from] center about the nature of the problem. I told him the fuel selector had been switched off and that switching back had restored power. As I reflect on this incident there are 2 basic questions which need to be addressed. 1) how did the fuel selector get switched to 'off'? I had reached for the fuel selector to select the opposite tank (which would have been the left tank in this case) shortly after level off which is a standard procedure I follow. I believe I selected 'off' without recognizing it. Pilot fatigue was one primary issue. The previous weeks leading up to this event had been extremely busy - I had very little time for rest. The flight was taking place at the end of a very long day. Throughout the flight; I was not as alert and did not respond as accurately to the situation as I normally train for - I overlooked the fuel selector during my initial restart which is normally the first lever that I reach for. Getting distracted from managing the airplane was another significant factor. I became engaged in conversations which were gradually consuming more and more of my attention. 2) why did I not immediately check the fuel selector during my initial restart? Resignation also crept in during this event. In my 3;700 hours of flying; I have not had one unexpected power loss in flight (other than occasional; mild carburetor ice issues in a cessna 150). The moment it started to happen; I felt myself resigning to the fact that the engine had suffered a catastrophic failure and I proceeded to handle the situation in that frame of mind.concluding remarks: what made ultimately made the difference in this event was altitude. The winds in this event favored a lower cruising altitude. However; as a rule; when I carry passengers I usually go as high as I comfortably can. It's how I was trained. One of my initial instructors would always say 'if there's one thing you can't use; it's the altitude above you.' that thought has always stuck with me; and I'm glad I didn't find myself flying low and 'enjoying the view' when this happened.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: C206 pilot reported he mistakenly positioned the fuel selector to 'off' resulting in a loss of power in flight until he repositioned the selector.
Narrative: Approximately 15 minutes after leveling off at a cruising altitude of 4;500 MSL; the engine began to surge as it lost all power. Attempted Restart - I immediately flipped on the fuel boost pump to the 'High' position (i.e. pushed both red & yellow fuel pump switches). The engine increased RPM momentarily and surged a little and made a few popping noises - then went idle. The prop continued windmilling. Proceeded towards nearest airport - As the airplane began experiencing a partial loss of power; I pointed the airplane directly towards the [nearest] airport and began increasing pitch to climb and establish best glide airspeed. It soon became apparent that the airplane had lost all power and I was not able to make it to [the nearest airport]. Picked nearest suitable landing area - an open field.I switched to 121.5 and communicated 'total engine failure; anybody copy?' An airline pilot came on the frequency and requested more [details]. I recognized that this conversation was quickly turning into a distraction as I tried to process his request; and ceased communications. Prepared cabin for forced landing - I turned around and told passengers 'Put your hands underneath your knees and lean forward into your seatbelts'. I reached for the fuel selector to turn it 'OFF' and it was at this point that I discovered the true nature of the problem - the fuel selector was already in the 'OFF' position. I was now passing through 2;000 MSL (about 1;000-1;500 AGL). I immediately switched to the Right Fuel tank; and; within moments; the engine came back to full power. Follow up communication on 121.5 - I reported on 121.5 that the engine was now back to life. The airline pilot (do not remember the call sign) came back with a request [from] Center about the nature of the problem. I told him the fuel selector had been switched off and that switching back had restored power. As I reflect on this incident there are 2 basic questions which need to be addressed. 1) How did the fuel selector get switched to 'off'? I had reached for the fuel selector to select the opposite tank (which would have been the LEFT tank in this case) shortly after level off which is a standard procedure I follow. I believe I selected 'OFF' without recognizing it. Pilot fatigue was one primary issue. The previous weeks leading up to this event had been extremely busy - I had very little time for rest. The flight was taking place at the end of a very long day. Throughout the flight; I was not as alert and did not respond as accurately to the situation as I normally train for - I overlooked the fuel selector during my initial restart which is normally the first lever that I reach for. Getting distracted from managing the airplane was another significant factor. I became engaged in conversations which were gradually consuming more and more of my attention. 2) Why did I not immediately check the fuel selector during my initial restart? Resignation also crept in during this event. In my 3;700 hours of flying; I have not had one unexpected power loss in flight (other than occasional; mild carburetor ice issues in a Cessna 150). The moment it started to happen; I felt myself resigning to the fact that the engine had suffered a catastrophic failure and I proceeded to handle the situation in that frame of mind.Concluding remarks: What made ultimately made the difference in this event was altitude. The winds in this event favored a lower cruising altitude. However; as a rule; when I carry passengers I usually go as high as I comfortably can. It's how I was trained. One of my initial instructors would always say 'if there's one thing you can't use; it's the altitude above you.' That thought has always stuck with me; and I'm glad I didn't find myself flying low and 'enjoying the view' when this happened.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.