Narrative:

Followed imsafe guidelines. Was intended to familiarize myself with the G1000. I always try to add only one new thing at a time to a flight. A new plane; with a first-time passenger; to a new airport; etc sounds like a recipe for stress to me. So I stick to one new thing. This flight; the one new thing was the G1000. I planned to take a short trip to my school's practice area; fly around; and head back. This was my first time soloing with the G1000; after a bit of training in the redbird; one daytime flight; and one night flight. It was a beautiful day; so there were a lot of planes in the air. I took off from runway 29 at bed; and had an uneventful flight in the practice area. When I headed back; I heard bed's tower turning planes around from runway 29 to runway 11. I guessed (correctly; as it turned out) that bos made runway changes that forced bed to use runway 11; even though this had a 10 knot tailwind. I could also hear that it was a pretty busy day; with some people needing to do 360s on downwind. This is on the busy end for bed; but within normal. I'd flown in busy patterns many times before. I was given a straight-in landing. But I came in fast and high. This; in addition to the tailwind; made me opt for a go-around. I came in for my second landing; with one plane in front of me; and a planned departure waiting on the ground to go between us. We were in a right traffic pattern. Decision point (mistake): I turned base way too soon to allow that traffic to depart. I misjudged this distance. I think the tailwind was a contributing factor; because it pushed me closer to the runway. But nonetheless; this was my mistake. I was just starting to turn base to final; having tried to square my base. But I was coming in too close to allow the traffic to depart. The tower asked me to square my base; so I turned back to base; meaning I was slightly overshooting the runway. In turning back to base from final; I believe I pulled back to stop my descent; but I did not add power. This meant that my airspeed was dropping below 70 (my stall warner never went off; but I was too low and slow for comfort). I was getting antsy about turning base again; because otherwise I'd really overshoot the runway. But I noticed my airspeed was already getting low. I had a moment of indecision; but then decided that airspeed had to be my first priority and I'd figure out the rest later. I put in some power; but my airspeed was still going down (not as quickly; but still the wrong direction). At this point; I did a 'go around' on base. Full power; bringing my flaps up. At this point; the tower told me I could bring it in to final. At this point; the plane was stable; but I was still going a bit slow for comfort; had no flaps down; would have to backtrack with a very tight turn to get to the runway; and final would be very short. ATC had no way to see inside my cockpit; of course. But I felt like I should turn to final. Instead; I stumbled over my words saying I think I needed to make a left turn instead. ATC understood and got me on a left downwind. The rest of my flight was uneventful.that last decision point is the key decision point that is causing me to submit this report. I want to try to get you into my mindset. Things were happening quickly. I had a higher-than-normal workload due to adjusting to the G1000. The pattern was very busy. I was concerned about landing in a tailwind. I didn't want to mess up ATC's sequencing. So I wanted to make the default decision to comply with ATC. After all; what were the other options in that scenario? I didn't know. I had never done a 'go around' on base before. We talk about unstable finals and doing go-arounds then; but we never talk about unstable base turns (which seem to be a high killer of pilots). We say 'don't do that'; but we don't talk a lot about the other options. We don't talk about initiating a 'go around' at that point. We don't talk about trying to join the other downwind (I knew I needed to make a left; not a right - but it was ATC that translated that into 'join left downwind' and got me in a sensible place again). I am convinced that; had I tried to make that aggressive base-to-final turn; I could've ended up in a stall-spin. There's no way ATC could've known that. I used to wonder how base-to-final stall-spin accidents could be so common. I no longer wonder. I am certain that some people have died due to not knowing the other options while overloaded; so they went with the default. At the end of the day; I made mistakes. The tower handled them with grace. I didn't get a number or anything; so they presumably thought my corrections were reasonable. I don't think I caused too much trouble that day. But there was a split second where I could've easily outsourced my decision-making (to people who couldn't see my instruments) and ended up in a low-altitude spin for it.for me; this was a useful lesson in reinforcing that I am allowed to deviate from ATC when safety is at stake; and that ATC is genuinely there to help. At bed in particular; it amazes me that they can handle so much traffic - and different types of traffic; at different speeds - and somehow manage to keep us all spaced. Especially when pilots make mistakes; like I did that day! This reinforced to me that this is a team effort - I can ask their help; but I can't force my role onto them. My goal here was to maybe shed some light on how a stall-spin on base-to-final might happen. I hope I haven't wasted anyone's time. Thank you for the good work that you do; with collecting this data to make aviation safer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A general aviation pilot reported the challenge of approaching and landing at a busy airport particularly with unfavorable wind conditions.

Narrative: Followed IMSAFE guidelines. Was intended to familiarize myself with the G1000. I always try to add only one new thing at a time to a flight. A new plane; with a first-time passenger; to a new airport; etc sounds like a recipe for stress to me. So I stick to one new thing. This flight; the one new thing was the G1000. I planned to take a short trip to my school's practice area; fly around; and head back. This was my first time soloing with the G1000; after a bit of training in the Redbird; one daytime flight; and one night flight. It was a beautiful day; so there were a lot of planes in the air. I took off from Runway 29 at BED; and had an uneventful flight in the practice area. When I headed back; I heard BED's tower turning planes around from Runway 29 to Runway 11. I guessed (correctly; as it turned out) that BOS made runway changes that forced BED to use Runway 11; even though this had a 10 knot tailwind. I could also hear that it was a pretty busy day; with some people needing to do 360s on downwind. This is on the busy end for BED; but within normal. I'd flown in busy patterns many times before. I was given a straight-in landing. But I came in fast and high. This; in addition to the tailwind; made me opt for a go-around. I came in for my second landing; with one plane in front of me; and a planned departure waiting on the ground to go between us. We were in a right traffic pattern. Decision point (mistake): I turned base way too soon to allow that traffic to depart. I misjudged this distance. I think the tailwind was a contributing factor; because it pushed me closer to the runway. But nonetheless; this was my mistake. I was just starting to turn base to final; having tried to square my base. But I was coming in too close to allow the traffic to depart. The tower asked me to square my base; so I turned back to base; meaning I was slightly overshooting the runway. In turning back to base from final; I believe I pulled back to stop my descent; but I did not add power. This meant that my airspeed was dropping below 70 (My stall warner never went off; but I was too low and slow for comfort). I was getting antsy about turning base again; because otherwise I'd really overshoot the runway. But I noticed my airspeed was already getting low. I had a moment of indecision; but then decided that airspeed had to be my first priority and I'd figure out the rest later. I put in some power; but my airspeed was still going down (not as quickly; but still the wrong direction). At this point; I did a 'go around' on base. Full power; bringing my flaps up. At this point; the tower told me I could bring it in to final. At this point; the plane was stable; but I was still going a bit slow for comfort; had no flaps down; would have to backtrack with a very tight turn to get to the runway; and final would be very short. ATC had no way to see inside my cockpit; of course. But I felt like I should turn to final. Instead; I stumbled over my words saying I think I needed to make a left turn instead. ATC understood and got me on a left downwind. The rest of my flight was uneventful.That last decision point is the key decision point that is causing me to submit this report. I want to try to get you into my mindset. Things were happening quickly. I had a higher-than-normal workload due to adjusting to the G1000. The pattern was very busy. I was concerned about landing in a tailwind. I didn't want to mess up ATC's sequencing. So I wanted to make the default decision to comply with ATC. After all; what were the other options in that scenario? I didn't know. I had never done a 'go around' on base before. We talk about unstable finals and doing go-arounds then; but we never talk about unstable base turns (which seem to be a high killer of pilots). We say 'don't do that'; but we don't talk a lot about the other options. We don't talk about initiating a 'go around' at that point. We don't talk about trying to join the other downwind (I knew I needed to make a left; not a right - but it was ATC that translated that into 'join left downwind' and got me in a sensible place again). I am convinced that; had I tried to make that aggressive base-to-final turn; I could've ended up in a stall-spin. There's no way ATC could've known that. I used to wonder how base-to-final stall-spin accidents could be so common. I no longer wonder. I am certain that some people have died due to not knowing the other options while overloaded; so they went with the default. At the end of the day; I made mistakes. The tower handled them with grace. I didn't get a number or anything; so they presumably thought my corrections were reasonable. I don't think I caused too much trouble that day. But there was a split second where I could've easily outsourced my decision-making (to people who couldn't see my instruments) and ended up in a low-altitude spin for it.For me; this was a useful lesson in reinforcing that I am allowed to deviate from ATC when safety is at stake; and that ATC is genuinely there to help. At BED in particular; it amazes me that they can handle so much traffic - and different types of traffic; at different speeds - and somehow manage to keep us all spaced. Especially when pilots make mistakes; like I did that day! This reinforced to me that this is a team effort - I can ask their help; but I can't force my role onto them. My goal here was to maybe shed some light on how a stall-spin on base-to-final might happen. I hope I haven't wasted anyone's time. Thank you for the good work that you do; with collecting this data to make aviation safer.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.