Narrative:

During a return to field maneuver following engine compressor stalls during takeoff; the landing gear was not extended until approximately 800 AGL on the approach. On the first leg of a scheduled 3 leg day; we performed a high speed rejected takeoff due to suspected main tire failure at approximately 105 knots. We felt a light 'thud'; and a minor initial yaw moment similar to what one would expect with increased friction from a deflated right main tire. After we returned to the gate; maintenance notified us that all tires and fuse plugs were intact; and the only discrepancy noted was the lavatory service panel door was open (right side of aircraft). Maintenance re-secured the panel; did not note any damage or other discrepancies; and returned the aircraft to service. On the subsequent takeoff; we experienced a similar light 'thud' at a slightly higher; but similar airspeed. I; the captain as pilot monitoring; elected to continue the takeoff with the assumption that the lavatory service panel door opened again and/or slammed shut. As we accelerated through rotation and liftoff; however; there were several more of these thuds; and I noted what felt like associated yawing moments each time it happened. I realized at this point we likely had a compressor stall; further evidenced by the left engine's apr (automatic power reserve) activating; and the itt (interstage turbine temperature) on the right engine climbing into the red. We continued with a two engine profile; as the compressor surges/stalls stopped after approximately 5-6 times. I briefed the first officer to be ready for the right engine to fail at any moment; and our plan of attack to proceed (fly the correct profile and pitch for V2 until acceleration altitude). We told tower we needed to return to the field for landing; and took a heading to set up for a downwind leg. Once we reduced thrust per the normal climb profile; the right engine's itt returned to normal indications and no damage was suspected. Therefore; we elected to not shut it down; but would still return to the field out of an abundance of caution. We completed all appropriate checklists; briefed our plan (an ILS to the longest runway transitioning to a visual approach at approximately 8 miles out; and briefed the flight attendants and passengers. As we slowed for the approach and began to get configured; I became fixated on watching the right engine's behavior as thrust was increased to overcome drag. The first officer flew the bugged reference speeds for the given initial configuration (flaps 20) on the downwind and base legs. We intercepted the localizer normally; approximately 2500 ft above the local terrain. As we were level and prior to the glideslope becoming 'alive'; the first officer called for gear down and flaps 30; and I became concerned that our attitude and angle of attack were becoming a bit steep for level flight. My thoughts were that if the right engine failed at this point; we would be in a nose high attitude with little visual reference and relatively close to the ground. I then told the first officer to fly a little faster; closer to our normal approach speed prior to the final approach fix; and delay her configuration changes until the glideslope indicated a dot and a half low; where we normally go gear down and flaps 30; then flaps 45 as we intercept the glideslope. Due to me focusing on radio calls to tower; coordinating emergency response at the tower handoff point; watching the engine instruments; and now coaching the first officer's flight path management; I did not select the gear down when the first officer called for it. I do recall pushing the flight attendant chime button and selecting flaps 30; but failed to actually extend the gear handle. The first officer called for flaps 45 upon glideslope intercept; I set them; and we continued inbound. At approximately 800 AGL; the gear horn began to sound; and I realized the gear was not down and locked; because the gear handle was never lowered to the extended position. I immediately lowered the landing gear and received three green lights within seconds. We were in visual conditions and otherwise stable; so I commanded the first officer to continue the approach and landing. Because of the unknown nature of our engine problems; I made the command decision that landing from a later than standard gear extension; was safer than executing a go-around procedure at high thrust settings. We were fully stable the entire approach; and touched down normally without further incident. Additionally; the landing was overweight and I confirmed our touchdown rate was less than 360 fpm. For me personally; I have not had a scenario with uncertain outcomes or procedures to follow in quite some time. Throughout the event; I found myself thinking about what I would do 'if'; and I think it began to cloud the basic roles of monitoring. Therefore I missed the very obvious task of extending the gear when the first officer called for it. I also feel that normally; the pilot flying would notice if the pilot monitoring did not actually select the gear down; but high levels of focus by both of us; along with adrenaline; contributed to some 'tunnel vision'. While we followed the CRM model fairly well; bought ourself time by extending downwind; etc; I think the stress of the day from two separate challenging events (high speed rejected takeoff; and unknown engine problems); deteriorated my mental performance to a point where I became too focused on watching the first officer perform; as well as the engine behavior. In the future; I may need to buy even more time (if possible) to allow our minds to settle down and fly our normal; abnormal or emergency profile as applicable. One should never have to rely on automation to remind you to extend the gear; but I am glad it was available and working for us that day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 Captain reported returning to the departure airport after a compressor stall; but delaying the landing gear extension until 800 feet above the ground.

Narrative: During a return to field maneuver following engine compressor stalls during takeoff; the landing gear was not extended until approximately 800 AGL on the approach. On the first leg of a scheduled 3 leg day; we performed a high speed rejected takeoff due to suspected main tire failure at approximately 105 knots. We felt a light 'thud'; and a minor initial yaw moment similar to what one would expect with increased friction from a deflated right main tire. After we returned to the gate; maintenance notified us that all tires and fuse plugs were intact; and the only discrepancy noted was the lavatory service panel door was open (right side of aircraft). Maintenance re-secured the panel; did not note any damage or other discrepancies; and returned the aircraft to service. On the subsequent takeoff; we experienced a similar light 'thud' at a slightly higher; but similar airspeed. I; the captain as Pilot Monitoring; elected to continue the takeoff with the assumption that the lavatory service panel door opened again and/or slammed shut. As we accelerated through rotation and liftoff; however; there were several more of these thuds; and I noted what felt like associated yawing moments each time it happened. I realized at this point we likely had a compressor stall; further evidenced by the left engine's APR (Automatic Power Reserve) activating; and the ITT (Interstage Turbine Temperature) on the right engine climbing into the red. We continued with a two engine profile; as the compressor surges/stalls stopped after approximately 5-6 times. I briefed the First Officer to be ready for the right engine to fail at any moment; and our plan of attack to proceed (fly the correct profile and pitch for V2 until acceleration altitude). We told tower we needed to return to the field for landing; and took a heading to set up for a downwind leg. Once we reduced thrust per the normal climb profile; the right engine's ITT returned to normal indications and no damage was suspected. Therefore; we elected to not shut it down; but would still return to the field out of an abundance of caution. We completed all appropriate checklists; briefed our plan (an ILS to the longest runway transitioning to a visual approach at approximately 8 miles out; and briefed the flight attendants and passengers. As we slowed for the approach and began to get configured; I became fixated on watching the right engine's behavior as thrust was increased to overcome drag. The First Officer flew the bugged reference speeds for the given initial configuration (Flaps 20) on the downwind and base legs. We intercepted the localizer normally; approximately 2500 ft above the local terrain. As we were level and prior to the glideslope becoming 'alive'; the First Officer called for gear down and flaps 30; and I became concerned that our attitude and angle of attack were becoming a bit steep for level flight. My thoughts were that if the right engine failed at this point; we would be in a nose high attitude with little visual reference and relatively close to the ground. I then told the FO to fly a little faster; closer to our normal approach speed prior to the final approach fix; and delay her configuration changes until the glideslope indicated a dot and a half low; where we normally go gear down and flaps 30; then flaps 45 as we intercept the glideslope. Due to me focusing on radio calls to tower; coordinating emergency response at the tower handoff point; watching the engine instruments; and now coaching the First Officer's Flight Path Management; I did not select the gear down when the FO called for it. I do recall pushing the flight attendant chime button and selecting flaps 30; but failed to actually extend the gear handle. The FO called for Flaps 45 upon glideslope intercept; I set them; and we continued inbound. At approximately 800 AGL; the gear horn began to sound; and I realized the gear was not down and locked; because the gear handle was never lowered to the extended position. I immediately lowered the landing gear and received three green lights within seconds. We were in visual conditions and otherwise stable; so I commanded the First Officer to continue the approach and landing. Because of the unknown nature of our engine problems; I made the command decision that landing from a later than standard gear extension; was safer than executing a go-around procedure at high thrust settings. We were fully stable the entire approach; and touched down normally without further incident. Additionally; the landing was overweight and I confirmed our touchdown rate was less than 360 fpm. For me personally; I have not had a scenario with uncertain outcomes or procedures to follow in quite some time. Throughout the event; I found myself thinking about what I would do 'if'; and I think it began to cloud the basic roles of monitoring. Therefore I missed the very obvious task of extending the gear when the First Officer called for it. I also feel that normally; the Pilot Flying would notice if the Pilot Monitoring did not actually select the gear down; but high levels of focus by both of us; along with adrenaline; contributed to some 'tunnel vision'. While we followed the CRM model fairly well; bought ourself time by extending downwind; etc; I think the stress of the day from two separate challenging events (high speed rejected takeoff; and unknown engine problems); deteriorated my mental performance to a point where I became too focused on watching the FO perform; as well as the engine behavior. In the future; I may need to buy even more time (if possible) to allow our minds to settle down and fly our normal; abnormal or emergency profile as applicable. One should never have to rely on automation to remind you to extend the gear; but I am glad it was available and working for us that day.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.