Narrative:

It's a long read; hang in there. Lots of lessons learned. Flight from ZZZ; (139 souls) forecasted; VMC fos (my) leg pushed back from gate with normal engine start on both engines. Checklists ran with flaps 5 setting and max thrust purposely selected in the performance computer (while at the gate the planned zero and takeoff weight with reduced thrust rendered a 514 ft stopping margin on runway xxl and when I pointed that out to the captain; he elected to select a max thrust takeoff. I concurred with his assessment but then when the load sheet arrived I pointed out that we were approximately 4000 pounds lighter than planned (rendering a 1500 ft plus stopping margin) and perhaps we could consider a reduced thrust takeoff. The captain decided to stay with the max thrust takeoff decision due to gusty takeoff wind conditions and the added safety margin in the event of an rejected takeoff. I concurred with his reasoning and we stayed with the max thrust takeoff plan. With the before taxi checklist completed ground cleared us to 'taxi to xxl via taxiway a; hold short taxiway B;' which I read back verbatim. (Quick lesson learned not associated with the engine failure later: the clearance should have been 'taxi to xxl via taxiway C; hold short taxiway B' but neither one of us caught this until we were on C; short of B).within approximately 30 seconds; company traffic we were holding short for cleared out and we received instructions to 'continue taxi to xxl via taxiway a'; read back and complied. Before takeoff checklist completed and as we approached the xxl hold short; tower cleared us for takeoff with a departure heading: left turn 140. Proper transfer of controls to me and we took off uneventfully with max thrust takeoff (95.6 percent N1 I believe). Heading select at 1300 ft MSL and in the turn at 1620 ft MSL I commanded 'set speed; flaps 1; climb thrust.' within approximately five seconds there was a big boom on the right side of the aircraft and the airframe shuddered slightly as the number 2 engine wound down and you could hear grinding noises. I assessed that the captain was most likely in the red; based on his comments at the moment and his breathing hard in the intercom. I assessed that I was personally in the yellow. I observed N1 winding down rapidly through 30 percent and egt flashed red but then also came down in temperature. I had just been through training 2 weeks prior and at that moment I was really appreciating my single engine practice I had on the simulator. I felt like I was in full control of the aircraft and our rate of climb decreased but we were still climbing slowly to 3000 MSL. Once I was satisfied that we still had one good engine I felt myself coming back into the green. In reality; I honestly think I vacillated back and forth between green and yellow throughout the entire 13 minute divert as we handled threats (some; if not many; self-induced). I am pretty sure we were still on tower and the captain calmly [advised ATC] and said; 'we lost an engine; we are going to ZZZ1.' we had briefed on the ground that if we lost an engine that we would proceed to ZZZ1. Big lesson learned: the distance from ZZZ to ZZZ1 is obviously small and in hindsight it would have been far easier if we had ZZZ1 selected as an alternate (takeoff a) in the efb for rapid selection during the situation; more on that later. The captain pulled the QRH and said 'I think we have an engine seizure.' between the captain's calm ATC transmission and his immediate grab of the QRH I assessed (lesson learned: I as the PF should have called for something but the captain beat me to it; easily I might add; as I was 90 percent task saturated with trying to smoothly fly the single engine plane) that the captain was out of the red and at least at yellow if not in the green. I said to him there was still approximately 11 percent N1 and holding and the egt 'looked ok' (I believe in the range of approximately 300 to 400 degrees) and that I thought we had an engine failure and not a seizure. Neither one of us noted vibrations. Captain noted zero percent N2 (to himself - I learned this after) but I don't recall him verbalizing it. He asked me if I 'was ok to continue to fly.' I said yes and retained control of the aircraft. He asked me two to three more times during our 11-12 minute divert over to ZZZ1 and each time I replied 'I'm good.' he seemed appreciative of that during the event so he could run the show. He told me after how much it helped him during the situation to not have to worry at all about the flying part. Everything was happening fast and to the best of my recollection the following happened but the exact order of which might be faulty: 1) we were switched to departure and given a heading of further left heading. 2) we were stabilizing at level 3000 ft; flaps up; autopilot engaged (verbalized); and speed 210 knots (verbalized). 3) the bank angle was set at 30 degrees which was excessive at the time as we were coming left so I dialed it down to 20 degrees bank (not verbalized). 4) the captain ran the QRH for engine failure while I guarded the appropriate controls on the good engine (challenge-response-response). 5) I switched the transponder. 6) I remember ATC having to call us twice at various times and I answered when the captain was too busy. Captain as pm ended up handling more than 60 to 70 percent of the overall comms start to finish but there were times I stepped in and helped him. In hindsight a definitive delineation or delegation of comms to me as PF with autopilot engaged would have been better. 7) when the APU gen was placed 'on' the autopilot B kicked off but was immediately reengaged by the captain. Arm chair quarterbacking this whole event reminded us yet again it would be best to verbalize clearly what is about to happen and the known consequences through knowledge of aircraft systems. 8) ATC gave us a further left heading.9) I dialed the airspeed to 230 KIAS (verbalized; I think). In hindsight this was a foolish move on my part as we were rushed anyway and faster didn't help! 10) the captain said 'I need to make a PA.' to his credit; he visibly slowed down; took a deep breath; recollected his thoughts for a second or two and calmly made an excellent PA to the passenger. I do not recall if he talked to the flight attendants first but I don't think so. Later we learned just how much many of the passengers were calmed down and reassured by the captain's awesome PA. The flight attendants told us after the fact that they felt properly communicated to and appreciated all our (their words) 'great comms.' 11) flight attendants dinged us twice and asked if they needed to 'prepare the cabin' to which the captain said 'no' and gave a bit more amplifying information to the fas. 12) I suggested to the captain that we should make a quick call on VHF-2 'ops frequency' to let the company know 'had an engine failure - going to ZZZ1.' he readily agreed and tried twice; but no answer and we moved on. Lesson learned: on the ground we had called ZZZ maintenance for an efb cable replacement. We never put ops back in VHF-2. Therefore both attempted calls were on ZZZ maintenance! Always check VHF-1 and VHF-2 active and standby windows set properly prior to push!13) ATC gave us a climb to 4000. I dialed 4000 and selected vertical speed (verbalized) at approximately 900 fpm. 14) captain seemed to be wrestling with himself if engine failure or engine seizure was truly the right call; but stuck with engine failure and briefly considered the possibility of relight. We both quickly concluded no and both agreed 'let's concentrate on getting this aircraft safely on the ground at ZZZ1.' 15) ATC asked again for information. Captain read off the napkin and was punching a few buttons on the FMC. I pulled up the progress page. Lesson learned: throughout my 20 years of flying I had always armchair flew emergencies with the intent that I would be smooth on ATC with already having done the mental math of adding souls on board and crew members together. Don't! This captain's way is a no brainer: 'sob and number crew members.' done; finished; easy. Maybe this is obvious to others but not to me until now. 16) leveled off at 4000 and got fast. We were doing 255 knots (my fault - did I mention yet that everything for 13 minutes seemed fast and furious?) I recognized it and slowed back down to 210 KIAS. Lesson learned: 'slow is smooth; and smooth is fast' (credit for that saying goes to company instructor at the training center during my recent taining.) in accordance with - slow down; slow down; and slow down. Not just in airspeed alone but asking for extended vectors; box pattern; etc. While your heart is racing in your throat and you are trying mightily to get back to the green; will yourself to slow down and try to methodically think through stuff. 17) the captain was still trying to wrap up the QRH. 18) ATC asked which runway we wanted to which the captain replied 'the longest.'19) I dialed 3000 and V/south in the MCP (verbalized; I think) and called 'flaps 1' and I set speed 180 in the speed window (not verbalized). Captain selected flaps 1. 20) somewhere about now the captain pulled out the performance computer to run the landing numbers for xxr. 21) the captain said to ATC 'what is the ILS frequency?' ATC responded but I did not process what they said. The captain dialed the frequency in his side and I thought I saw his hand flash over to my side. I assumed he dialed it in but I did not verify. I engaged VOR/localizer on the MCP (verbalized). Long story longer: the captain got distracted and did not dial in my navigation box. Neither one of us had ZZZ1 up on our efbs. We both fumbled hurriedly to try to get the proper pages up but with the adrenaline pumping the efb was not responding very well to my rapid (shaky) finger touches on the screen. 22) I did not know exactly which one of the runways was xxr at ZZZ1. I did not have ZZZ1 up on my efb and no localizer frequency. I flew through the final approach course and ATC said 'you are a little right of course for xxr; come left' which I complied. 23) by now I realized the localizer frequency was not in my side and I asked the captain to put it on my side. He said to ATC 'what is that ILS frequency again?' this time was put in my side but by now I was slightly left of final approach course. 24) kicked off the autopilot and began a visual; hand flown; approach to xxr. 25) commanded 'landing gear down; flaps 15' but then looked at my airspeed and we were doing 200 KIAS so I yelled 'leave the flaps for now.' the captain lowered the gear and did not move the flaps. Slowed to 180 KIAS and called 'flaps 15.' not sure in all this if we ever did flaps 5 or not. 26) somewhere in here I verbalized to the captain that company policy for the single engine landing was the captain pt's. He said something to the effect of 'keep control of the aircraft for now; and I will take it later.' 27) got VOR/localizer capture by 2000 ft and glideslope capture by 1500 ft. 28) somewhere in here we were switched to tower. I asked the captain if we had landing clearance and I think he called to get it. I did not hear the landing clearance. 29) I don't recall if I asked for the landing checklist but I can admit I definitely did not call for the 'south/east deferred landing checklist.' I made a mental note that I saw 3 down and locked but I am fairly certain we never verbally ran the deferred before landing checklist. 30) 1000 ft call was made at 850; something along the lines of '1000 now 800; airspeed 150 correcting; sink rate 850 fpm.' 31) I asked if we had landing clearance and the captain said something along the lines of 'getting it now.' 32) I asked the captain if he now wanted to take the aircraft for the landing. He said something along the lines of 'you are looking good and stable; you keep

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reported an engine failure shortly after takeoff with a successful diversion to a nearby airport.

Narrative: It's a long read; hang in there. Lots of lessons learned. Flight from ZZZ; (139 Souls) forecasted; VMC FOs (my) leg pushed back from Gate with normal engine start on both engines. Checklists ran with flaps 5 setting and Max Thrust purposely selected in the performance computer (While at the gate the planned zero and takeoff weight with reduced thrust rendered a 514 ft stopping margin on Runway XXL and when I pointed that out to the Captain; he elected to select a Max Thrust Takeoff. I concurred with his assessment but then when the load sheet arrived I pointed out that we were approximately 4000 pounds lighter than planned (rendering a 1500 ft plus stopping margin) and perhaps we could consider a reduced thrust takeoff. The Captain decided to stay with the Max thrust Takeoff decision due to gusty takeoff wind conditions and the added Safety margin in the event of an RTO. I concurred with his reasoning and we stayed with the Max Thrust takeoff plan. With the Before Taxi Checklist completed Ground cleared us to 'taxi to XXL via Taxiway A; hold short Taxiway B;' which I read back verbatim. (Quick lesson learned not associated with the Engine Failure later: The clearance should have been 'taxi to XXL via Taxiway C; hold short Taxiway B' but neither one of us caught this until we were on C; short of B).Within approximately 30 seconds; Company traffic we were holding short for cleared out and we received instructions to 'continue taxi to XXL via Taxiway A'; read back and complied. Before Takeoff Checklist completed and as we approached the XXL hold short; Tower cleared us for takeoff with a departure heading: left turn 140. Proper transfer of controls to me and we took off uneventfully with Max Thrust takeoff (95.6 percent N1 I believe). HDG Select at 1300 ft MSL and in the turn at 1620 ft MSL I commanded 'set speed; flaps 1; climb thrust.' Within approximately five seconds there was a big boom on the right side of the aircraft and the airframe shuddered slightly as the number 2 Engine wound down and you could hear grinding noises. I assessed that the Captain was most likely in the Red; based on his comments at the moment and his breathing hard in the intercom. I assessed that I was personally in the Yellow. I observed N1 winding down rapidly through 30 percent and EGT flashed red but then also came down in temperature. I had just been through training 2 weeks prior and at that moment I was really appreciating my single engine practice I had on the simulator. I felt like I was in full control of the aircraft and our rate of climb decreased but we were still climbing slowly to 3000 MSL. Once I was satisfied that we still had one good engine I felt myself coming back into the Green. In reality; I honestly think I vacillated back and forth between Green and Yellow throughout the entire 13 minute divert as we handled threats (some; if not many; self-induced). I am pretty sure we were still on Tower and the Captain calmly [advised ATC] and said; 'We lost an engine; we are going to ZZZ1.' We had briefed on the ground that if we lost an engine that we would proceed to ZZZ1. BIG Lesson Learned: the distance from ZZZ to ZZZ1 is obviously small and in hindsight it would have been far easier if we had ZZZ1 selected as an alternate (takeoff A) in the EFB for rapid selection during the situation; more on that later. The Captain pulled the QRH and said 'I think we have an engine seizure.' Between the Captain's calm ATC transmission and his immediate grab of the QRH I assessed (lesson learned: I as the PF should have called for something but the Captain beat me to it; easily I might add; as I was 90 percent task saturated with trying to smoothly fly the single engine plane) that the Captain was out of the Red and at least at Yellow if not in the Green. I said to him there was still approximately 11 percent N1 and holding and the EGT 'looked ok' (I believe in the range of approximately 300 to 400 degrees) and that I thought we had an engine failure and not a Seizure. Neither one of us noted vibrations. Captain noted zero percent N2 (to himself - I learned this after) but I don't recall him verbalizing it. He asked me if I 'was ok to continue to fly.' I said yes and retained control of the aircraft. He asked me two to three more times during our 11-12 minute divert over to ZZZ1 and each time I replied 'I'm good.' He seemed appreciative of that during the event so he could run the show. He told me after how much it helped him during the situation to not have to worry at all about the flying part. Everything was happening fast and to the best of my recollection the following happened but the exact order of which might be faulty: 1) We were switched to Departure and given a heading of further left heading. 2) We were stabilizing at level 3000 ft; flaps up; autopilot engaged (verbalized); and speed 210 knots (verbalized). 3) The bank angle was set at 30 degrees which was excessive at the time as we were coming left so I dialed it down to 20 degrees bank (not verbalized). 4) The Captain ran the QRH for Engine Failure while I guarded the appropriate controls on the good engine (challenge-response-response). 5) I switched the Transponder. 6) I remember ATC having to call us twice at various times and I answered when the Captain was too busy. Captain as PM ended up handling more than 60 to 70 percent of the overall COMMS start to finish but there were times I stepped in and helped him. In hindsight a definitive delineation or delegation of COMMS to me as PF with Autopilot engaged would have been better. 7) When the APU Gen was placed 'ON' the Autopilot B kicked off but was immediately reengaged by the Captain. Arm chair quarterbacking this whole event reminded us yet again it would be best to verbalize clearly what is about to happen and the known consequences through knowledge of aircraft systems. 8) ATC gave us a further left heading.9) I dialed the airspeed to 230 KIAS (verbalized; I think). In hindsight this was a foolish move on my part as we were rushed anyway and faster didn't help! 10) The Captain said 'I need to make a PA.' To his credit; he visibly slowed down; took a deep breath; recollected his thoughts for a second or two and calmly made an excellent PA to the Passenger. I do not recall if he talked to the Flight Attendants first but I don't think so. Later we learned just how much many of the Passengers were calmed down and reassured by the Captain's awesome PA. The Flight Attendants told us after the fact that they felt properly communicated to and appreciated all our (their words) 'great COMMS.' 11) Flight Attendants dinged us twice and asked if they needed to 'prepare the Cabin' to which the Captain said 'no' and gave a bit more amplifying information to the FAs. 12) I suggested to the Captain that we should make a quick call on VHF-2 'Ops Frequency' to let the Company know 'had an engine failure - going to ZZZ1.' He readily agreed and tried twice; but no answer and we moved on. Lesson Learned: On the ground we had called ZZZ Maintenance for an EFB cable replacement. We never put Ops back in VHF-2. Therefore both attempted calls were on ZZZ Maintenance! Always check VHF-1 and VHF-2 Active and Standby windows set properly prior to push!13) ATC gave us a climb to 4000. I dialed 4000 and selected vertical speed (verbalized) at approximately 900 fpm. 14) Captain seemed to be wrestling with himself if Engine Failure or Engine Seizure was truly the right call; but stuck with Engine Failure and briefly considered the possibility of relight. We both quickly concluded NO and both agreed 'let's concentrate on getting this aircraft safely on the ground at ZZZ1.' 15) ATC asked again for information. Captain read off the napkin and was punching a few buttons on the FMC. I pulled up the Progress page. Lesson Learned: throughout my 20 years of flying I had always armchair flew emergencies with the intent that I would be smooth on ATC with already having done the mental math of adding Souls on board and Crew members together. DON'T! This Captain's way is a no brainer: 'SOB and number Crew members.' Done; finished; easy. Maybe this is obvious to others but not to me until now. 16) Leveled off at 4000 and got fast. We were doing 255 knots (my fault - did I mention yet that everything for 13 minutes seemed fast and furious?) I recognized it and slowed back down to 210 KIAS. Lesson Learned: 'SLOW IS SMOOTH; AND SMOOTH IS FAST' (credit for that saying goes to Company Instructor at the Training Center during my recent taining.) In accordance with - slow down; slow down; and slow down. Not just in Airspeed alone but asking for extended vectors; box pattern; etc. While your heart is racing in your throat and you are trying mightily to get back to the Green; will yourself to slow down and try to methodically think through stuff. 17) The Captain was still trying to wrap up the QRH. 18) ATC asked which runway we wanted to which the Captain replied 'the longest.'19) I dialed 3000 and V/S in the MCP (verbalized; I think) and called 'flaps 1' and I set speed 180 in the speed window (not verbalized). Captain selected flaps 1. 20) Somewhere about now the Captain pulled out the performance computer to run the landing numbers for XXR. 21) The Captain said to ATC 'what is the ILS Frequency?' ATC responded but I did not process what they said. The Captain dialed the frequency in his side and I thought I saw his hand flash over to my side. I assumed he dialed it in but I did not verify. I engaged VOR/LOC on the MCP (verbalized). Long story longer: the Captain got distracted and did NOT dial in my NAV box. Neither one of us had ZZZ1 up on our EFBs. We both fumbled hurriedly to try to get the proper pages up but with the adrenaline pumping the EFB was not responding very well to my rapid (shaky) finger touches on the screen. 22) I did not know exactly which one of the Runways was XXR at ZZZ1. I did not have ZZZ1 up on my EFB and no LOC frequency. I flew through the final approach course and ATC said 'you are a little right of course for XXR; come left' which I complied. 23) By now I realized the LOC frequency was not in my side and I asked the Captain to put it on my side. He said to ATC 'what is that ILS frequency again?' This time was put in my side but by now I was slightly left of final approach course. 24) Kicked off the Autopilot and began a visual; hand flown; approach to XXR. 25) Commanded 'landing Gear down; flaps 15' but then looked at my airspeed and we were doing 200 KIAS so I yelled 'leave the flaps for now.' The Captain lowered the gear and did not move the flaps. Slowed to 180 KIAS and called 'flaps 15.' Not sure in all this if we ever did flaps 5 or not. 26) Somewhere in here I verbalized to the Captain that Company policy for the single engine landing was the Captain PT's. He said something to the effect of 'keep control of the aircraft for now; and I will take it later.' 27) Got VOR/LOC Capture by 2000 ft and glideslope capture by 1500 ft. 28) Somewhere in here we were switched to Tower. I asked the Captain if we had landing clearance and I think he called to get it. I did not hear the landing clearance. 29) I don't recall if I asked for the Landing Checklist but I can admit I definitely did not call for the 'S/E Deferred Landing Checklist.' I made a mental note that I saw 3 down and locked but I am fairly certain we never verbally ran the deferred before Landing Checklist. 30) 1000 ft call was made at 850; something along the lines of '1000 now 800; airspeed 150 correcting; sink rate 850 fpm.' 31) I asked if we had landing clearance and the Captain said something along the lines of 'getting it now.' 32) I asked the Captain if he now wanted to take the aircraft for the landing. He said something along the lines of 'you are looking good and stable; you keep

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.