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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1457017 |
Time | |
Date | 201705 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | CVG.Tower |
State Reference | KY |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Trainee Local |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Developmental |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Ground Conflict Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Clearance Ground Incursion Runway Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
I was training with my primary trainer on lcc (local control center). The traffic flow was landing 18L/C/right and departing 27 initially. There were multiple heavy to severe areas of thunderstorms in the area and the departure runway was changed to 18C then back to 27 and at times both 18C and 27. Runway 18L was closed by airport management for an undisclosed reason. The big 'X''s were out there but at no time did I see a vehicle. Runway 18R is hardly ever used at all and I believe it was also closed for some reason. At approximately the time previously reported; aircraft X crossed the threshold and aircraft Z was on a 4-5 mile final. I opted to luaw (line up and wait) aircraft Y because the departure line was increasing and the arrivals were wanting to get down before the thunderstorms in the vicinity arrived. The main complexity was the fact; in my opinion; that 18L was not being used so all aircraft in the afternoon push were combined to only one runway; coupled with weather. When aircraft X landed; with aircraft Y in luaw; we reached out to aircraft Z as he hadn't yet checked in on a 4 mile final and his speed was higher than usual for an aircraft with that proximity to the runway and the window for this squeeze play to work was becoming exponentially reduced. Due to the fact that the west side of the ramp is closed due to construction; the taxiway closer to the approach end of 18C (J) was being used for outbound aircraft and arrivals were delegated to the second taxiway (K).when aircraft X landed; I initially told him to exit when able. My instructor informed me that this was not a good choice of verbiage as it didn't convey any sense of expediency that was applicable in this situation. I then told him to exit on taxiway K and to contract ground and he read that back. I looked and saw aircraft X start to turn his nose wheel onto J instead of K and looked at aircraft Y's position and saw that he still hadn't lined up. I discerned that to utilize anticipated separation that by the time aircraft Y had started his takeoff roll that aircraft X would be clear of the runway and aircraft Z would not have to be sent around. As soon I cleared aircraft Y for takeoff; I looked over to the ground controller to inform him that aircraft X had taken J and not K when my instructor told me to cancel his takeoff roll. I looked and realized that aircraft X had; in fact; turned briefly into the J exit; realized his mistake and turned back onto the runway to exit at K. I called aircraft Y and told him to cancel takeoff clearance and send aircraft Z around. After listening to the tape; it was brought to my attention that either the call sign was cutoff or not transmitted as aircraft Y did not cancel his roll and aircraft X was expedited off the runway. Aircraft X was on the runway approximately 5 seconds after aircraft Y started his roll.it was brought to my attention today; 3 weeks from the date of the incident; that this was considered a significant event. Perhaps not closing the majority of the runways during the busiest push of the busiest day of the week would have been a prudent decision?
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CVG Developmental Controller training on Local reported a runway incursion when the landing aircraft turned at the wrong intersection to exit then back onto the runway causing the departure to be canceled and another arrival sent around.
Narrative: I was training with my primary trainer on LCC (Local Control Center). The traffic flow was landing 18L/C/R and departing 27 initially. There were multiple heavy to severe areas of thunderstorms in the area and the departure runway was changed to 18C then back to 27 and at times both 18C and 27. RWY 18L was closed by airport management for an undisclosed reason. The big 'X''s were out there but at no time did I see a vehicle. RWY 18R is hardly ever used at all and I believe it was also closed for some reason. At approximately the time previously reported; Aircraft X crossed the threshold and Aircraft Z was on a 4-5 mile final. I opted to LUAW (Line Up and Wait) Aircraft Y because the departure line was increasing and the arrivals were wanting to get down before the thunderstorms in the vicinity arrived. The main complexity was the fact; in my opinion; that 18L was not being used so all aircraft in the afternoon push were combined to only one runway; coupled with weather. When Aircraft X landed; with Aircraft Y in LUAW; we reached out to Aircraft Z as he hadn't yet checked in on a 4 mile final and his speed was higher than usual for an aircraft with that proximity to the runway and the window for this squeeze play to work was becoming exponentially reduced. Due to the fact that the west side of the ramp is closed due to construction; the taxiway closer to the approach end of 18C (J) was being used for outbound aircraft and arrivals were delegated to the second taxiway (K).When Aircraft X landed; I initially told him to exit when able. My instructor informed me that this was not a good choice of verbiage as it didn't convey any sense of expediency that was applicable in this situation. I then told him to exit on taxiway K and to contract ground and he read that back. I looked and saw Aircraft X start to turn his nose wheel onto J instead of K and looked at Aircraft Y's position and saw that he still hadn't lined up. I discerned that to utilize anticipated separation that by the time Aircraft Y had started his takeoff roll that Aircraft X would be clear of the runway and Aircraft Z would not have to be sent around. As soon I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff; I looked over to the ground controller to inform him that Aircraft X had taken J and not K when my instructor told me to cancel his takeoff roll. I looked and realized that Aircraft X had; in fact; turned briefly into the J exit; realized his mistake and turned back onto the runway to exit at K. I called Aircraft Y and told him to cancel takeoff clearance and send Aircraft Z around. After listening to the tape; it was brought to my attention that either the call sign was cutoff or not transmitted as Aircraft Y did not cancel his roll and Aircraft X was expedited off the runway. Aircraft X was on the runway approximately 5 seconds after Aircraft Y started his roll.It was brought to my attention today; 3 weeks from the date of the incident; that this was considered a significant event. Perhaps not closing the majority of the runways during the busiest push of the busiest day of the week would have been a prudent decision?
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.