Narrative:

As part of my responsibilities under sms (safety management system) I feel it necessary to report an identified hazard that could lead to an accident or injury/harm to personnel. In this case the hazard relates to far 117.5(b) and the joint responsibility which requires that no certificate holder may assign and no flight crew member may accept an assignment to a fdp (flight duty period) if the flight crew member has reported for a fdp too fatigued to safely perform his or her assigned duties. [Company] delivered an unequivocal message to the pilot group to increase the acceptance rate of fdp extensions. Further operational pressure has also been reported to me monthly by pilots in the recurrent training classes I am responsible for teaching as well as line pilots I fly with. I have brought these concerns about operational pressure negatively impacting the fatigue program and operational safety to my supervisor in an effort to address them; but his response was to either toe the company line or remain silent when the company's operational pressuring tactics are raised by pilots in class. During the day and flight segment specific to this report; I witnessed firsthand the operational pressure exerted by the company when I was reassigned to operate a flight that would require me to extend my far 117 duty day. On this day I attempted to provide the company with sufficient time to address any operational issues associated with my inability to accept an fdp extension; and these were ignored or forgotten about. Over the course of the day [I] reported to several different company employees; several times that I would be unable to accept the flight assignment that would require an extension beyond my 117 limits and each time I did I received operational pressure from the crew scheduler and the duty pilot I spoke to. This included questioning my fit for duty assessment by characterizing me as 'unwilling'; implying that the length of time of the extension was not substantial; drawing attention to the lack of other crewmembers available for the flight segment in question; as well as consequences to the operation if I did not accept; re-iterating that it would only extend my duty period that 'everyone wins; we don't take a cancellation and you get to go on your days off and go on vacation.' under threat of disciplinary action I was forced to accept a flight segment I knew would result in the rolling of my day off. Once at the outstation in ZZZ I had to call crew scheduling again; telling them I would be unable to operate the flight back. Instead of immediately terminating the fdp there was further questioning of my fit for duty assessment thereby delaying the operational response and delaying my rest opportunity. By continuing the fdp after multiple notifications the company was in violation of 117.5 (2) 'immediately terminate a flight crew member's fdp if the flight crew member does not affirmatively state before beginning a flight segment that he/she is fit to safely perform the assigned duties.' in addition the operational pressure exerted on myself and other crewmembers by front line crew schedulers; supervisors; duty pilots; chief pilots; and senior management; runs contrary to the stated language of 117 ii 1. C. Ii whereby the FAA strongly encourages certificate holders to voluntarily terminate the fdps of flight crew members who are showing signs of fatigue. The operational pressure from the company by crew schedulers; supervisors; duty pilots; chief pilots; and senior management; that might have influenced my decision and many other pilot's decisions to accept a flight segment when they are not fit for duty; [could] lead to an incident or accident because of fatigue. Whenever a pilot reports they are unable to accept a 117 extension any questions or conversation from the company should only be related to the safety of the flight segment in question and whether or not the crewmember is fit for duty. Any other questioning or conversation can only be interpreted as coercion through operational pressure. At the first notification of an inability to extend the company should comply with 117 and reassign the flight segment to another crewmember rather than hope the pilot will go against his better judgement and fly in a fatigued state in order to solve operational problems caused by insufficient staffing by the company.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported receiving pressure from company personnel to accept FAR 117 flight duty period extensions despite reporting a desire not to extend due to fatigue.

Narrative: As part of my responsibilities under SMS (Safety Management System) I feel it necessary to report an identified hazard that could lead to an accident or injury/harm to personnel. In this case the hazard relates to FAR 117.5(b) and the joint responsibility which requires that no certificate holder may assign and no flight crew member may accept an assignment to a FDP (Flight Duty Period) if the flight crew member has reported for a FDP too fatigued to safely perform his or her assigned duties. [Company] delivered an unequivocal message to the pilot group to increase the acceptance rate of FDP extensions. Further operational pressure has also been reported to me monthly by pilots in the recurrent training classes I am responsible for teaching as well as line pilots I fly with. I have brought these concerns about operational pressure negatively impacting the fatigue program and operational safety to my supervisor in an effort to address them; but his response was to either toe the company line or remain silent when the company's operational pressuring tactics are raised by pilots in class. During the day and flight segment specific to this report; I witnessed firsthand the operational pressure exerted by the company when I was reassigned to operate a flight that would require me to extend my FAR 117 duty day. On this day I attempted to provide the company with sufficient time to address any operational issues associated with my inability to accept an FDP extension; and these were ignored or forgotten about. Over the course of the day [I] reported to several different company employees; several times that I would be unable to accept the flight assignment that would require an extension beyond my 117 limits and each time I did I received operational pressure from the crew scheduler and the duty pilot I spoke to. This included questioning my fit for duty assessment by characterizing me as 'unwilling'; implying that the length of time of the extension was not substantial; drawing attention to the lack of other crewmembers available for the flight segment in question; as well as consequences to the operation if I did not accept; re-iterating that it would only extend my duty period that 'everyone wins; we don't take a cancellation and you get to go on your days off and go on vacation.' Under threat of disciplinary action I was forced to accept a flight segment I knew would result in the rolling of my day off. Once at the outstation in ZZZ I had to call crew scheduling again; telling them I would be unable to operate the flight back. Instead of immediately terminating the FDP there was further questioning of my fit for duty assessment thereby delaying the operational response and delaying my rest opportunity. By continuing the FDP after multiple notifications the company was in violation of 117.5 (2) 'immediately terminate a flight crew member's FDP if the flight crew member does not affirmatively state before beginning a flight segment that he/she is fit to safely perform the assigned duties.' In addition the operational pressure exerted on myself and other crewmembers by front line crew schedulers; supervisors; duty pilots; chief pilots; and senior management; runs contrary to the stated language of 117 II 1. C. ii whereby the FAA strongly encourages certificate holders to voluntarily terminate the FDPs of flight crew members who are showing signs of fatigue. The operational pressure from the company by crew schedulers; supervisors; duty pilots; chief pilots; and senior management; that might have influenced my decision and many other pilot's decisions to accept a flight segment when they are not fit for duty; [could] lead to an incident or accident because of fatigue. Whenever a pilot reports they are unable to accept a 117 extension any questions or conversation from the company should only be related to the safety of the flight segment in question and whether or not the crewmember is fit for duty. Any other questioning or conversation can only be interpreted as coercion through operational pressure. At the first notification of an inability to extend the company should comply with 117 and reassign the flight segment to another crewmember rather than hope the pilot will go against his better judgement and fly in a fatigued state in order to solve operational problems caused by insufficient staffing by the company.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.