Narrative:

In cruise at FL200 we received EICAS advisory message 'hyd sys 2 lo qty'. We checked the hydraulics system page to find the system 2 qty at the upper edge of the amber range; referenced the qrc and continued to monitor the system and qty as we prepared for our descent. After a few minutes it became apparent that we were losing hydraulic fluid fairly rapidly from system 2. I immediately referenced the 'hyd system (2) fail' qrc and began to brief the nfp (non flying pilot) on what to expect if we did experience a complete system failure. Shortly after; we received 'eng (2) hyd pump fail' and the electric pump kicked on. We [advised ATC] and got priority handling. I estimate we were 15-20 minutes from landing at this point. At this time the system 2 qty indicator was showing empty but the electric pump continued to function normally and we had no other failures. We requested [the] longest available [runway] and planned the landing data with the penalty in anticipation of a complete system 2 failure. As previously stated; we had discussed what we would lose in the event of system 2 failure and how it was relevant to our approach and landing but that we would continue the approach in the event of complete failure. The approach and landing were completely normal but we briefly received a 'hyd sys 2 fail' upon exiting the runway which quickly cleared. I had initially briefed the flight attendant when we realized we had a hydraulic leak and told her she could expect a normal approach and landing and if we had any other instructions we would call back. I didn't further brief the flight attendant as we expected a mostly normal landing and didn't feel it was relevant to brace or prepare for an evacuation at the time.the major threat was that I was focused on monitoring the status of the hydraulic system as well as being the PF.in hindsight I wish I had [advised ATC] a few minutes sooner when we initially realized we had a hydraulic leak. Even though were headed toward the airport at the time we could have been on the ground a little sooner which could have proved to be crucial with no hydraulic fluid left in system 2. I also wish I had briefed the flight attendant one more time to give her more information and let her know we would be met by fire trucks as she stated afterward that she wasn't expecting that.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145LR Captain reported continuing to the nearby destination after experiencing loss of hydraulic system #2.

Narrative: In cruise at FL200 we received EICAS advisory message 'hyd sys 2 lo qty'. We checked the hydraulics system page to find the system 2 qty at the upper edge of the amber range; referenced the QRC and continued to monitor the system and qty as we prepared for our descent. After a few minutes it became apparent that we were losing hydraulic fluid fairly rapidly from system 2. I immediately referenced the 'hyd system (2) fail' QRC and began to brief the NFP (Non Flying Pilot) on what to expect if we did experience a complete system failure. Shortly after; we received 'eng (2) hyd pump fail' and the electric pump kicked on. We [advised ATC] and got priority handling. I estimate we were 15-20 minutes from landing at this point. At this time the system 2 qty indicator was showing empty but the electric pump continued to function normally and we had no other failures. We requested [the] longest available [runway] and planned the landing data with the penalty in anticipation of a complete system 2 failure. As previously stated; we had discussed what we would lose in the event of system 2 failure and how it was relevant to our approach and landing but that we would continue the approach in the event of complete failure. The approach and landing were completely normal but we briefly received a 'hyd sys 2 fail' upon exiting the runway which quickly cleared. I had initially briefed the FA when we realized we had a hydraulic leak and told her she could expect a normal approach and landing and if we had any other instructions we would call back. I didn't further brief the FA as we expected a mostly normal landing and didn't feel it was relevant to brace or prepare for an evacuation at the time.The major threat was that I was focused on monitoring the status of the hydraulic system as well as being the PF.In hindsight I wish I had [advised ATC] a few minutes sooner when we initially realized we had a hydraulic leak. Even though were headed toward the airport at the time we could have been on the ground a little sooner which could have proved to be crucial with no hydraulic fluid left in system 2. I also wish I had briefed the FA one more time to give her more information and let her know we would be met by fire trucks as she stated afterward that she wasn't expecting that.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.