Narrative:

While preparing the airplane for departure from ogg; I called clearance delivery to request our clearance and crossing altitude per ogg's gate hold procedure. We were flight-planned at FL370 and the crz page; after full performance initialization; indicated our maximum altitude would be FL375. Thus; I requested our primary altitude be FL370 and secondary FL360 as the next-best option as we were unable FL380. R465; our filed route; is a one-way airway and it is customary to fly 'wrong-way' altitudes in the interest of efficiency. When I completed my request; the captain asked me; 'what's 360?' I replied; 'our secondary altitude; in case 370 isn't available.' yesterday; the captain had told me he had been to ogg a few times but not that often; so I assumed his question indicated he hadn't previously observed the practice of requesting a secondary altitude; much less one that appeared incorrect at first glance. Instead; he stated; 'I don't want 360.' again misreading his intent; I stated; 'you know R465 is a one-way track; right?' he said; 'I don't care. You didn't ask me. I don't want 360; I want 350.' perplexed by the illogic of that position but submitting to his authority; without further discussion I called clearance to amend our secondary request to show FL350. The captain subsequently stated that I was not flying alone and needed to consult him on such matters. I did not and do not disagree with this statement. I had made an assumption about best practice regarding altitude without discussing it with him in the interest of time; but in doing so cut him out of the communication loop. He neglected to iterate why FL350 was preferable to him; but not wanting to appear to antagonize him; I did not ask. A few minutes later; the ground crew was ready to push but he had not yet initiated the departure briefing or called for the preflight checklist. I pulled out my briefing card and asked 'are you ready to talk about it?' he said; 'all my [stuff's] the same as yesterday; go for it.' I looked at him in disbelief. 'Really; you don't want to discuss your items? Fuel plan; anything?' I asked; since several of the briefing items listed in [the company guidance] were not; in fact; the 'same as yesterday.' 'is there something about the fuel you don't understand?' was his reply. I tried to wrap my head around the irony of having moments before been lectured about cutting him out of the loop regarding a secondary altitude request and then subsequently having to advocate for something as basic as a [company] mandated departure briefing. 'I mean; I know how much fuel we have. But a taxi plan; you don't want to talk about anything? You just talked about me not being single-pilot. How is this different? What about a shared mental-model?' he pulled out his phone and waved it at me. 'Are we going to have a problem here? One phone call and we spend another night.' the stark safety implications of a captain threatening to remove a first officer from duty for requesting a departure briefing didn't sink in until later. Instead; trying to de-escalate the situation; I said; 'no; captain; if that's how you want to run things.' but I was angry at this point; and this likely sounded sarcastic. We skipped the items normally briefed by a captain; and I briefed the pilot flying items. The flight continued without further incident; although no extraneous conversation between us transpired. I understand that captain's authority is a foundational tenet of airline safety because I have exercised it myself as a part 121 captain in my career; I have taught it as an indoc instructor; I have respected it working with captains on special assignment and most importantly flying the line. [The company manual] clarifies that while the captain is the final decision-making authority; it is the responsibility of all crewmembers to contribute to the decision-making process. Our safety-critical workplace demands that input from others be considered; but ultimate decision making must rest with a well-trained and capable leader. Those decisions have to be followed; as they were in this case. But in this case SOP was willfully disregarded; and captain's authority was wielded as a disciplinary weapon.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier First Officer reported a breakdown in CRM between himself and the Captain and operations not in compliance with Company Policy after he had not included the Captain in the selection of a pre-flight secondary altitude request.

Narrative: While preparing the airplane for departure from OGG; I called Clearance Delivery to request our clearance and crossing altitude per OGG's Gate Hold procedure. We were flight-planned at FL370 and the CRZ page; after full performance initialization; indicated our maximum altitude would be FL375. Thus; I requested our primary altitude be FL370 and secondary FL360 as the next-best option as we were unable FL380. R465; our filed route; is a one-way airway and it is customary to fly 'wrong-way' altitudes in the interest of efficiency. When I completed my request; the captain asked me; 'What's 360?' I replied; 'Our secondary altitude; in case 370 isn't available.' Yesterday; the captain had told me he had been to OGG a few times but not that often; so I assumed his question indicated he hadn't previously observed the practice of requesting a secondary altitude; much less one that appeared incorrect at first glance. Instead; he stated; 'I don't want 360.' Again misreading his intent; I stated; 'You know R465 is a one-way track; right?' He said; 'I don't care. You didn't ask me. I don't want 360; I want 350.' Perplexed by the illogic of that position but submitting to his authority; without further discussion I called Clearance to amend our secondary request to show FL350. The captain subsequently stated that I was not flying alone and needed to consult him on such matters. I did not and do not disagree with this statement. I had made an assumption about best practice regarding altitude without discussing it with him in the interest of time; but in doing so cut him out of the communication loop. He neglected to iterate why FL350 was preferable to him; but not wanting to appear to antagonize him; I did not ask. A few minutes later; the ground crew was ready to push but he had not yet initiated the departure briefing or called for the preflight checklist. I pulled out my briefing card and asked 'Are you ready to talk about it?' He said; 'All my [stuff's] the same as yesterday; go for it.' I looked at him in disbelief. 'Really; you don't want to discuss your items? Fuel plan; anything?' I asked; since several of the briefing items listed in [the company guidance] were not; in fact; the 'same as yesterday.' 'Is there something about the fuel you don't understand?' was his reply. I tried to wrap my head around the irony of having moments before been lectured about cutting him out of the loop regarding a secondary altitude request and then subsequently having to advocate for something as basic as a [company] mandated departure briefing. 'I mean; I know how much fuel we have. But a taxi plan; you don't want to talk about anything? You just talked about me not being single-pilot. How is this different? What about a shared mental-model?' He pulled out his phone and waved it at me. 'Are we going to have a problem here? One phone call and we spend another night.' The stark safety implications of a captain threatening to remove a first officer from duty for requesting a departure briefing didn't sink in until later. Instead; trying to de-escalate the situation; I said; 'No; captain; if that's how you want to run things.' But I was angry at this point; and this likely sounded sarcastic. We skipped the items normally briefed by a captain; and I briefed the Pilot Flying items. The flight continued without further incident; although no extraneous conversation between us transpired. I understand that Captain's Authority is a foundational tenet of airline safety because I have exercised it myself as a Part 121 captain in my career; I have taught it as an indoc instructor; I have respected it working with captains on special assignment and most importantly flying the line. [The company manual] clarifies that while the Captain is the final decision-making authority; it is the responsibility of all crewmembers to contribute to the decision-making process. Our safety-critical workplace demands that input from others be considered; but ultimate decision making must rest with a well-trained and capable leader. Those decisions have to be followed; as they were in this case. But in this case SOP was willfully disregarded; and Captain's Authority was wielded as a disciplinary weapon.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.