Narrative:

Apparently this was a scheduled exercise to practice for a tfr spill-out during the upcoming [event]. Additionally there were verbal face to face briefings originally being provided by a single point of contact. However; when it was realized that the point of contact (poc) was going to be going home for the day; a secondary management individual was doing those briefings. All of those briefings occurred while I was on my normal regular day off (rdo). Upon my arrival to the area I was given a printed packet referencing the 'intercept mission' by a controller in charge (controller in charge) who had no additional information beyond what was in the packet. I was advised that 2 of the 3 target aircraft were already completed and that the third was the only remaining situation and that they weren't even sure if it was going to happen. I read the packet briefly and signed off on it. I got into sector 08/09 on the right position and during the briefing was told that there was a 20 NM tfr around msp from 180b210 and that even though it was depicted as a 25 NM ring it was actually only 20 NM. I asked if we had to keep all aircraft clear from it and was told yes. There was no indication this was anything other than an actual live tfr. The above referenced packet indicated that the intercept was going to happen in high altitude. A newly certified d-side was on position and received a call from M98. She was confused over the information M98 was providing and turned to ask the incoming trainer for another d-side at 08/09 if he knew what they wanted. There was some discussion on their end which I was not part of. Aircraft Y checked on at FL200 which I did not have a full data block (fdb) and no information from the d-side regarding a position so I was caught off guard as well. Going back and forth with aircraft Y I was able to determine his position approximately on the msp 200/050 and started a primary only fdb. I called traffic to aircraft Y on aircraft X and he stated 'radar contact'. During this time I also had an inbound push to msp that needed some work as well as a couple departures in the same area as aircraft Y and aircraft X. I again called traffic to the aircraft Y and he stated ' target of interest (toi) intercepted' and requested a block altitude and 10NM maneuvering area. I approved a block from 200b230 and the 10 NM maneuvering area then asked if the 3000' block was enough. He requested a 4000' block. I had the d-side coordinate with high altitude sectors and assigned 200b240. When aircraft Y made his northbound turn the fdb separated from his target and went CST (coast). I was busy with the inbounds and did no notice exactly when this happened and now his proximity to aircraft X made it impossible to tag it up again. Aircraft Y requested a heading back into the tfr stating he was peeling off the toi. I assigned a 360 heading but no altitude. Their proximity to the tfr was imminent so I wanted to coordinate with M98 as to who was going to work them back into the tfr as our supervisor was unsure. M98 said they would work him back in and that he was radar but wanted to know if I had received identifying information on the toi. I asked what they needed then went to aircraft Y to get that info. Re-coordinated with M98 that information and shipped aircraft Y back to M98. Upon internal review afterwards I realized that I had not issued aircraft Y an altitude outside of the block to maintain and did not separate him from aircraft X. Aircraft X at 230 was above the tfr and not in conflict with it. First and foremost this was supposed to be a learning scenario where the controllers in area 3 would get to see a practice intercept. There were verbal briefings conducted however; there was no follow-up regarding if the individual who would be working the sector at the time of the scenario was verbally briefed with an opportunity to ask questions or get a refresher on intercepts. Only that they had at least had the packet briefing. Additionally; if would have beenextremely helpful if a poc with intimate knowledge of not only the scenario but the phraseology involved would have been present in the area monitoring the situation to make sure the scenario went as planned or as close to planned as possible. There was a controller in charge in charge at the time of my packet briefing with no specific information regarding the scenario other than the packet. The supervisor that relieved the controller in charge during the scenario wasn't in the area during the scenario and was in the center flm area which has been a problem since it's inception. Additionally; the flm was unsure about who was in charge of the tfr and the rules surrounding it when queried during an extremely time sensitive event.it would also have been helpful to have the sectors split during this scenario so an individual could have focused on the scenario and not be distracted by other time sensitive traffic situations. From the aircraft and pilot side; having an extremely high performance aircraft during tight maneuvers during what is supposed to be a training situation utilized without a transponder active makes tracking the aircraft nearly impossible with everything else going on. Specifically with it's proximity to msp and all of the other primary targets that in it's vicinity. Short breakdown would be:1) have an aircraft with a transponder2) have a poc in the area during the scenario for questions3) dismantle the centralized flm area and get the flm's back in the area where they are useful and needed.3) split the sectors so that during these training scenarios controllers can actually learn something from the scenario.4) upper management needs to follow through with it's plans and make sure the scenarios run as they should without large deviations and that all affected personnel are briefed and have an opportunity to ask questions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZMP ARTCC Controller reported problems with aircraft related to Temporary Flight Rules (TFR); aircraft intercept and losing a data tag on aircraft involved.

Narrative: Apparently this was a scheduled exercise to practice for a TFR Spill-out during the upcoming [event]. Additionally there were verbal face to face briefings originally being provided by a single Point of Contact. However; when it was realized that the Point of Contact (POC) was going to be going home for the day; a secondary Management individual was doing those briefings. All of those briefings occurred while I was on my normal Regular Day Off (RDO). Upon my arrival to the area I was given a printed packet referencing the 'Intercept Mission' by a Controller in Charge (CIC) who had no additional information beyond what was in the packet. I was advised that 2 of the 3 target aircraft were already completed and that the third was the only remaining situation and that they weren't even sure if it was going to happen. I read the packet briefly and signed off on it. I got into sector 08/09 on the R Position and during the briefing was told that there was a 20 NM TFR around MSP from 180B210 and that even though it was depicted as a 25 NM ring it was actually only 20 NM. I asked if we had to keep all aircraft clear from it and was told yes. There was no indication this was anything other than an actual live TFR. The above referenced packet indicated that the Intercept was going to happen in high altitude. A newly certified D-side was on position and received a call from M98. She was confused over the information M98 was providing and turned to ask the incoming trainer for another D-side at 08/09 if he knew what they wanted. There was some discussion on their end which I was not part of. Aircraft Y checked on at FL200 which I did not have a Full Data Block (FDB) and no information from the D-side regarding a position so I was caught off guard as well. Going back and forth with Aircraft Y I was able to determine his position approximately on the MSP 200/050 and started a primary only FDB. I called traffic to Aircraft Y on Aircraft X and he stated 'radar contact'. During this time I also had an inbound push to MSP that needed some work as well as a couple departures in the same area as Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. I again called traffic to the Aircraft Y and he stated ' Target of Interest (TOI) Intercepted' and requested a block altitude and 10NM maneuvering area. I approved a block from 200B230 and the 10 NM maneuvering area then asked if the 3000' block was enough. He requested a 4000' block. I had the D-side coordinate with high altitude sectors and assigned 200B240. When Aircraft Y made his northbound turn the FDB separated from his target and went CST (Coast). I was busy with the inbounds and did no notice exactly when this happened and now his proximity to Aircraft X made it impossible to tag it up again. Aircraft Y requested a HDG back into the TFR stating he was peeling off the TOI. I assigned a 360 HDG but no altitude. Their proximity to the TFR was imminent so I wanted to coordinate with M98 as to who was going to work them back into the TFR as our Supervisor was unsure. M98 said they would work him back in and that he was radar but wanted to know if I had received identifying information on the TOI. I asked what they needed then went to Aircraft Y to get that info. Re-coordinated with M98 that information and shipped Aircraft Y back to M98. Upon internal review afterwards I realized that I had not issued Aircraft Y an altitude outside of the block to maintain and did not separate him from Aircraft X. Aircraft X at 230 was above the TFR and not in conflict with it. First and foremost this was supposed to be a learning scenario where the controllers in Area 3 would get to see a practice intercept. There were verbal briefings conducted however; there was no follow-up regarding if the individual who would be working the sector at the time of the scenario was verbally briefed with an opportunity to ask questions or get a refresher on intercepts. Only that they had at least had the packet briefing. Additionally; if would have beenextremely helpful if a POC with intimate knowledge of not only the scenario but the phraseology involved would have been present in the area monitoring the situation to make sure the scenario went as planned or as close to planned as possible. There was a CIC in charge at the time of my packet briefing with no specific information regarding the scenario other than the packet. The supervisor that relieved the CIC during the scenario wasn't in the area during the scenario and was in the center FLM area which has been a problem since it's inception. Additionally; the FLM was unsure about who was in charge of the TFR and the rules surrounding it when queried during an extremely time sensitive event.It would also have been helpful to have the sectors split during this scenario so an individual could have focused on the scenario and not be distracted by other time sensitive traffic situations. From the aircraft and pilot side; having an extremely high performance aircraft during tight maneuvers during what is supposed to be a training situation utilized without a transponder active makes tracking the aircraft nearly impossible with everything else going on. Specifically with it's proximity to MSP and all of the other primary targets that in it's vicinity. Short breakdown would be:1) Have an aircraft with a transponder2) Have a POC in the area during the scenario for questions3) Dismantle the centralized FLM area and get the FLM's back in the area where they are useful and needed.3) Split the sectors so that during these training scenarios controllers can actually learn something from the scenario.4) Upper management needs to follow through with it's plans and make sure the scenarios run as they should without large deviations and that all affected personnel are briefed and have an opportunity to ask questions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.