Narrative:

We had diverted to stp due to long delays and congestion for arrs at msp. Upon contacting minneapolis approach we received an altitude assignment and heading for radar vectors for the ILS runway 32 at stp. The frequency was very congested and the controller failed to acknowledge most readbacks including ours. At this point, as PNF, I tuned and set the navigation equipment for the ILS to runway 32 and announced that the approach check was complete. Consistent with normal operating procedures the PF had slowed the aircraft to the maximum speed for reconfiguring for the approach. When flying with the gear up at this speed virtually any movement of the power levers activates the gear warning horn which then has to be muted. When the horn activates it covers all other audio output in the headsets and makes us incapable of receiving ATC for the seconds it is on. I am uncertain if the gear horn covered further clearance to us, if we just missed it or if it was given at all. However, our position and heading relative to the localizer was looking like an extremely tight turn on or an overshoot, so I requested our current heading and altitude assignment from approach. What we received was a turn and clearance for the NDB approach runway 30 circle to land runway 32 at stp and to contact st paul tower. While hurrying to get the navigation equipment retuned and idented and reconfiguring the aircraft I went right by the NDB runway 30 chart and took the data from the NDB runway 3 st paul, mn, lake elmo. As we went by the NDB and started to turn to the inbound heading, some 70 degree from our current heading, we knew something was wrong. A quick check of the chart confirmed the error I had made. We were in VMC with forward visibilities of about 4 mi in rain. We had leveled off at about 1000' AGL and started a turn back toward the inbound bearing to stp just as the tower called and said approach showed us northeast of course. At this point we didn't see the airport and declared a missed approach and asked for vectors to shoot the approach again. As the tower was giving us the missed approach instructions, he ask us our position and said he had us in sight. We confirmed out position and he asked if we had the airport in sight at 12 O'clock and 2 mi. We did have the airport in sight so we were cleared for the visibility approach and cleared to land on runway 32. We landed and taxied in west/O incident. In retrospect I believe any one of the following could have prevented this situation from developing: I do not believe that aural warnings in the headset should completely cover all other audio. However, this is not a problem if the controller listens to and acknowledges the readback of all clrncs. Clearing an aircraft to use an approach, other than the one they have been advised to expect, should be given allowing the flight crew sufficient time to set up for the new approach. We, as a flight crew, should not have accepted the clearance for an approach to a runway different from the one we were set up for, unless we were sure we had time to set up and configure for the approach to the new runway. Although minor, I feel that approach charts for different airports in the same city could be titled in a way to highlight the airport as well as the city. (Perhaps with the airport identifier near the heading). When in a hurry and pulling the approach charts for a new city you get the ones you want and as well as the ones for other airports in that city that you do not need. As demonstrated here these extraneous charts can contribute to situations like this one.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATX Y LTT FLC RE-CONFIGURING FOR LAST MINUTE CHANGE IN RWY ASSIGNMENT, GRABS WRONG APCH PLATE AND MAKES GROSS HEADING ERROR BEFORE CATCHING MISTAKE.

Narrative: WE HAD DIVERTED TO STP DUE TO LONG DELAYS AND CONGESTION FOR ARRS AT MSP. UPON CONTACTING MINNEAPOLIS APCH WE RECEIVED AN ALT ASSIGNMENT AND HDG FOR RADAR VECTORS FOR THE ILS RWY 32 AT STP. THE FREQ WAS VERY CONGESTED AND THE CTLR FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE MOST READBACKS INCLUDING OURS. AT THIS POINT, AS PNF, I TUNED AND SET THE NAV EQUIP FOR THE ILS TO RWY 32 AND ANNOUNCED THAT THE APCH CHK WAS COMPLETE. CONSISTENT WITH NORMAL OPERATING PROCS THE PF HAD SLOWED THE ACFT TO THE MAX SPD FOR RECONFIGURING FOR THE APCH. WHEN FLYING WITH THE GEAR UP AT THIS SPD VIRTUALLY ANY MOVEMENT OF THE PWR LEVERS ACTIVATES THE GEAR WARNING HORN WHICH THEN HAS TO BE MUTED. WHEN THE HORN ACTIVATES IT COVERS ALL OTHER AUDIO OUTPUT IN THE HEADSETS AND MAKES US INCAPABLE OF RECEIVING ATC FOR THE SECS IT IS ON. I AM UNCERTAIN IF THE GEAR HORN COVERED FURTHER CLRNC TO US, IF WE JUST MISSED IT OR IF IT WAS GIVEN AT ALL. HOWEVER, OUR POS AND HDG RELATIVE TO THE LOC WAS LOOKING LIKE AN EXTREMELY TIGHT TURN ON OR AN OVERSHOOT, SO I REQUESTED OUR CURRENT HDG AND ALT ASSIGNMENT FROM APCH. WHAT WE RECEIVED WAS A TURN AND CLRNC FOR THE NDB APCH RWY 30 CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 32 AT STP AND TO CONTACT ST PAUL TWR. WHILE HURRYING TO GET THE NAV EQUIP RETUNED AND IDENTED AND RECONFIGURING THE ACFT I WENT RIGHT BY THE NDB RWY 30 CHART AND TOOK THE DATA FROM THE NDB RWY 3 ST PAUL, MN, LAKE ELMO. AS WE WENT BY THE NDB AND STARTED TO TURN TO THE INBND HDG, SOME 70 DEG FROM OUR CURRENT HDG, WE KNEW SOMETHING WAS WRONG. A QUICK CHK OF THE CHART CONFIRMED THE ERROR I HAD MADE. WE WERE IN VMC WITH FORWARD VISIBILITIES OF ABOUT 4 MI IN RAIN. WE HAD LEVELED OFF AT ABOUT 1000' AGL AND STARTED A TURN BACK TOWARD THE INBND BEARING TO STP JUST AS THE TWR CALLED AND SAID APCH SHOWED US NE OF COURSE. AT THIS POINT WE DIDN'T SEE THE ARPT AND DECLARED A MISSED APCH AND ASKED FOR VECTORS TO SHOOT THE APCH AGAIN. AS THE TWR WAS GIVING US THE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS, HE ASK US OUR POS AND SAID HE HAD US IN SIGHT. WE CONFIRMED OUT POS AND HE ASKED IF WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AT 12 O'CLOCK AND 2 MI. WE DID HAVE THE ARPT IN SIGHT SO WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VIS APCH AND CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 32. WE LANDED AND TAXIED IN W/O INCIDENT. IN RETROSPECT I BELIEVE ANY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS SITUATION FROM DEVELOPING: I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AURAL WARNINGS IN THE HEADSET SHOULD COMPLETELY COVER ALL OTHER AUDIO. HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT A PROB IF THE CTLR LISTENS TO AND ACKNOWLEDGES THE READBACK OF ALL CLRNCS. CLRING AN ACFT TO USE AN APCH, OTHER THAN THE ONE THEY HAVE BEEN ADVISED TO EXPECT, SHOULD BE GIVEN ALLOWING THE FLT CREW SUFFICIENT TIME TO SET UP FOR THE NEW APCH. WE, AS A FLT CREW, SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THE CLRNC FOR AN APCH TO A RWY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE WE WERE SET UP FOR, UNLESS WE WERE SURE WE HAD TIME TO SET UP AND CONFIGURE FOR THE APCH TO THE NEW RWY. ALTHOUGH MINOR, I FEEL THAT APCH CHARTS FOR DIFFERENT ARPTS IN THE SAME CITY COULD BE TITLED IN A WAY TO HIGHLIGHT THE ARPT AS WELL AS THE CITY. (PERHAPS WITH THE ARPT IDENTIFIER NEAR THE HDG). WHEN IN A HURRY AND PULLING THE APCH CHARTS FOR A NEW CITY YOU GET THE ONES YOU WANT AND AS WELL AS THE ONES FOR OTHER ARPTS IN THAT CITY THAT YOU DO NOT NEED. AS DEMONSTRATED HERE THESE EXTRANEOUS CHARTS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO SITUATIONS LIKE THIS ONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.