Narrative:

This was the third leg of the day. The first two legs I flew as the pilot monitoring from the right seat in the role of second in command (sic). On this the third leg; I switched seats and flew as the pilot flying in the role of sic from the left seat of aircraft X. The aircraft was a gulfstream gv; and I had never flown this actual gv aircraft previously. In addition; I had only flown with the pilot in command (PIC) on one other occasion several years earlier. It was a new plane; relatively unfamiliar crew; and a quick turn where we were behind schedule slightly. We departed from ZZZ at approximately XA38. The SID was [an] RNAV departure. The clearance was to climb via the SID with the exception of an altitude limit of 5000'. While the PIC was tending to other duties I set up the cockpit and put 5000' in the altitude selector window on the guidance panel. Prior to departure I briefed the other pilot about the clearance and we discussed the SID and how we would fly it. I briefed him of my intention to select LNAV upon taking the runway; but I failed to state that we would select VNAV after flap retraction. The takeoff went smoothly; and after passing 400 feet AGL I called for flaps up and flch. This was a mistake on my part; as I wanted VNAV and mistakenly called for flch out of habit. By selecting flch the aircraft was not going to level off at or below 3000' at zzzzz intersection; as mandated by the SID. Instead; it would continue to 5000' as selected in the guidance panel altitude selector. Neither of us caught the error initially (and I blame this mainly on the fact that I failed to state clearly during the brief to select VNAV after flap retraction). As the aircraft rapidly climbed we both realized it was going to go right through 3000' prior to zzzzz intersection; and the pilot monitoring verbalized it. The autopilot was not engaged (I was hand flying and following the flight director single cue); but the autothrottles were engaged. After a brief clarification of the altitude restriction I agreed with him the aircraft was going to bust the 3000' altitude restriction prior to reaching zzzzz intersection. I pushed the nose over; but it was too late and we were already going through 3000'. We rounded out of the climb several hundred feet above the 3000' foot restriction and began a descent back to 3000'. Because flch had been selected the autothrottles had commanded climb power; but they did not reduce power as we descended and the aircraft rapidly accelerated above the 250 knot speed restriction. The pilot monitoring called out 'speed'; and I disconnected the autothrottles; powered back manually; and then deployed the speed brakes to slow the aircraft back to 250 knots. Essentially; the poor briefing and subsequent poor use of the automation on my part resulted in us climbing through 3000' prior to zzzzz intersection; and accelerating above the speed restriction of 250 knots as we descended back to altitude and leveled off. I am fairly certain a radar track of our flight from just before zzzzz intersection to a few miles past zzzzz intersection is probably pretty ugly. I was able to get back onto speed; track; and altitude soon after and the remainder of the flight was uneventful.in hindsight; after debriefing the situation with the other pilot it became clear to me that going forward I will always discuss not only the points; altitudes; speeds; and details of any departure or arrival; but also exactly how I plan to use the automation to perform the task correctly. The pilot monitoring stated during our debrief that he questioned why I was selecting flch instead of VNAV; but it had not been addressed specifically during the departure briefing; and he thought I was simply going to hand fly at 3000' until after zzzzz intersection. I think several factors were involved including fatigue; rush to get off on time; lack of familiarity with both the airplane and the other pilot; and missed details during the departure briefing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Gulfstream flight crew reported that FLCH was selected during climb instead of VNAV causing the aircraft to overshoot the selected altitude.

Narrative: This was the third leg of the day. The first two legs I flew as the pilot monitoring from the right seat in the role of Second in Command (SIC). On this the third leg; I switched seats and flew as the pilot flying in the role of SIC from the left seat of Aircraft X. The aircraft was a Gulfstream GV; and I had never flown this actual GV aircraft previously. In addition; I had only flown with the Pilot in Command (PIC) on one other occasion several years earlier. It was a new plane; relatively unfamiliar crew; and a quick turn where we were behind schedule slightly. We departed from ZZZ at approximately XA38. The SID was [an] RNAV departure. The clearance was to climb via the SID with the exception of an altitude limit of 5000'. While the PIC was tending to other duties I set up the cockpit and put 5000' in the altitude selector window on the guidance panel. Prior to departure I briefed the other pilot about the clearance and we discussed the SID and how we would fly it. I briefed him of my intention to select LNAV upon taking the runway; but I failed to state that we would select VNAV after flap retraction. The takeoff went smoothly; and after passing 400 feet AGL I called for flaps up and FLCH. This was a mistake on my part; as I wanted VNAV and mistakenly called for FLCH out of habit. By selecting FLCH the aircraft was not going to level off at or below 3000' at ZZZZZ Intersection; as mandated by the SID. Instead; it would continue to 5000' as selected in the guidance panel altitude selector. Neither of us caught the error initially (and I blame this mainly on the fact that I failed to state clearly during the brief to select VNAV after flap retraction). As the aircraft rapidly climbed we both realized it was going to go right through 3000' prior to ZZZZZ Intersection; and the pilot monitoring verbalized it. The autopilot was not engaged (I was hand flying and following the flight director single cue); but the autothrottles were engaged. After a brief clarification of the altitude restriction I agreed with him the aircraft was going to bust the 3000' altitude restriction prior to reaching ZZZZZ Intersection. I pushed the nose over; but it was too late and we were already going through 3000'. We rounded out of the climb several hundred feet above the 3000' foot restriction and began a descent back to 3000'. Because FLCH had been selected the autothrottles had commanded climb power; but they did not reduce power as we descended and the aircraft rapidly accelerated above the 250 knot speed restriction. The pilot monitoring called out 'Speed'; and I disconnected the autothrottles; powered back manually; and then deployed the speed brakes to slow the aircraft back to 250 knots. Essentially; the poor briefing and subsequent poor use of the automation on my part resulted in us climbing through 3000' prior to ZZZZZ Intersection; and accelerating above the speed restriction of 250 knots as we descended back to altitude and leveled off. I am fairly certain a radar track of our flight from just before ZZZZZ Intersection to a few miles past ZZZZZ Intersection is probably pretty ugly. I was able to get back onto speed; track; and altitude soon after and the remainder of the flight was uneventful.In hindsight; after debriefing the situation with the other pilot it became clear to me that going forward I will always discuss not only the points; altitudes; speeds; and details of any departure or arrival; but also EXACTLY how I plan to use the automation to perform the task correctly. The pilot monitoring stated during our debrief that he questioned why I was selecting FLCH instead of VNAV; but it had not been addressed specifically during the departure briefing; and he thought I was simply going to hand fly at 3000' until after ZZZZZ Intersection. I think several factors were involved including fatigue; rush to get off on time; lack of familiarity with both the airplane and the other pilot; and missed details during the departure briefing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.