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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 147385 |
Time | |
Date | 199005 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : cle |
State Reference | OH |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zny |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff ground other : taxi other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 275 flight time total : 2200 |
ASRS Report | 147385 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 250 flight time total : 3650 |
ASRS Report | 147383 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : rejected takeoff |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
As captain of my aircraft, I was taxiing to the active runway for takeoff while my first officer did the taxi checklist. It was a very busy day on the ground with runway closures due to construction, unfamiliar taxi instructions were being given. I normally try to somewhat follow what my first officer is doing while he reads the checklist, but not always, especially when it is busy outside. The taxi checklist was called complete, and we were cleared for takeoff. As the first officer advanced the power levers for takeoff, at a speed below 60 KTS, we heard an aural warning saying the autofeather system was not armed. We aborted the takeoff and pulled off the runway without incident. We then noticed the autofeather switch was in the off position, when the taxi checklist calls for it to be on. We could only assume that the first officer did an incomplete flow pattern taxi checklist, then out of habit, read through the checklist and called 'autofeather and propeller sync on,' when in fact autofeather was off. This would not have been a dangerous situation unless we were to lose an engine on takeoff, but nevertheless that is the purpose of our aural warning system anyway to alert us to an abnormal takeoff confign. Supplemental information from acn 147383: once clear, it was discovered that the autofeather system had not been turned on--a missed item on the taxi checklist. The taxi had been a rather long taxi (approximately 20 mins) due to construction on runway 5R-23L and its associated results on ground operations. In trying to recall why the item was missed we believe that there may have been a distraction associated with the construction. However, better switch confirmation would have solved the problem during the taxi check. Part of the blame must be complacency and the need for increased vigilance during unusual operations is clear to this crew member (the first officer).
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR LTT ABORTS TKOF AS AURAL WARNING ALERTS CREW TO THE FACT THAT THE AUTOFEATHER SYSTEM WAS NOT ARMED.
Narrative: As CAPT OF MY ACFT, I WAS TAXIING TO THE ACTIVE RWY FOR TKOF WHILE MY FO DID THE TAXI CHKLIST. IT WAS A VERY BUSY DAY ON THE GND WITH RWY CLOSURES DUE TO CONSTRUCTION, UNFAMILIAR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE BEING GIVEN. I NORMALLY TRY TO SOMEWHAT FOLLOW WHAT MY FO IS DOING WHILE HE READS THE CHKLIST, BUT NOT ALWAYS, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT IS BUSY OUTSIDE. THE TAXI CHKLIST WAS CALLED COMPLETE, AND WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. AS THE FO ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS FOR TKOF, AT A SPD BELOW 60 KTS, WE HEARD AN AURAL WARNING SAYING THE AUTOFEATHER SYS WAS NOT ARMED. WE ABORTED THE TKOF AND PULLED OFF THE RWY WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE THEN NOTICED THE AUTOFEATHER SWITCH WAS IN THE OFF POS, WHEN THE TAXI CHKLIST CALLS FOR IT TO BE ON. WE COULD ONLY ASSUME THAT THE FO DID AN INCOMPLETE FLOW PATTERN TAXI CHKLIST, THEN OUT OF HABIT, READ THROUGH THE CHKLIST AND CALLED 'AUTOFEATHER AND PROP SYNC ON,' WHEN IN FACT AUTOFEATHER WAS OFF. THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A DANGEROUS SITUATION UNLESS WE WERE TO LOSE AN ENG ON TKOF, BUT NEVERTHELESS THAT IS THE PURPOSE OF OUR AURAL WARNING SYS ANYWAY TO ALERT US TO AN ABNORMAL TKOF CONFIGN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 147383: ONCE CLR, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE AUTOFEATHER SYS HAD NOT BEEN TURNED ON--A MISSED ITEM ON THE TAXI CHKLIST. THE TAXI HAD BEEN A RATHER LONG TAXI (APPROX 20 MINS) DUE TO CONSTRUCTION ON RWY 5R-23L AND ITS ASSOCIATED RESULTS ON GND OPS. IN TRYING TO RECALL WHY THE ITEM WAS MISSED WE BELIEVE THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A DISTR ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONSTRUCTION. HOWEVER, BETTER SWITCH CONFIRMATION WOULD HAVE SOLVED THE PROB DURING THE TAXI CHK. PART OF THE BLAME MUST BE COMPLACENCY AND THE NEED FOR INCREASED VIGILANCE DURING UNUSUAL OPS IS CLR TO THIS CREW MEMBER (THE FO).
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.