Narrative:

Early in our taxi we were interrupted with a sudden change in our taxi instructions. This change involved identing several other aircraft. This was followed by a long delay (ATC forgot us). This distraction occurred at the point we normally complete the before takeoff checklist. After our delay both crew members thought we had completed the checklist. The remainder of the taxi went normally. On our takeoff roll we received an aural autofeather (not armed) warning. The takeoff was aborted. Upon noting the autofeather switch in the off position, I assumed none of the check was completed. The check was rerun and we departed west/O further incident. I am the central air safety chairman for our airline. I had just read an article by the NTSB on the human factors aspect of the crash of air carrier X. This incident was set up almost identically to that situation. The flaps are set during the missed checklist. Fortunately we had set the flaps and our takeoff warning system worked. An additional distraction (probably contributory) was a minor heading comparator problem. I had recently (see attached report) had a hassle with maintenance and didn't want to get stuck where there was no maintenance. We were therefore especially concerned with the heading problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED BY PIC OF LTT AS COCKPIT SURAL WARNING SOUNDED REGARDING AUTOFEATHER NOT BEING ARMED FOR TKOF. REPORTER CITED AN INTERRUPTED CHECKLIST READING AS THE REASON FOR NOT ARMING AUTOFEATHER SYSTEM.

Narrative: EARLY IN OUR TAXI WE WERE INTERRUPTED WITH A SUDDEN CHANGE IN OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. THIS CHANGE INVOLVED IDENTING SEVERAL OTHER ACFT. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A LONG DELAY (ATC FORGOT US). THIS DISTR OCCURRED AT THE POINT WE NORMALLY COMPLETE THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. AFTER OUR DELAY BOTH CREW MEMBERS THOUGHT WE HAD COMPLETED THE CHKLIST. THE REMAINDER OF THE TAXI WENT NORMALLY. ON OUR TKOF ROLL WE RECEIVED AN AURAL AUTOFEATHER (NOT ARMED) WARNING. THE TKOF WAS ABORTED. UPON NOTING THE AUTOFEATHER SWITCH IN THE OFF POS, I ASSUMED NONE OF THE CHK WAS COMPLETED. THE CHK WAS RERUN AND WE DEPARTED W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. I AM THE CENTRAL AIR SAFETY CHAIRMAN FOR OUR AIRLINE. I HAD JUST READ AN ARTICLE BY THE NTSB ON THE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECT OF THE CRASH OF ACR X. THIS INCIDENT WAS SET UP ALMOST IDENTICALLY TO THAT SITUATION. THE FLAPS ARE SET DURING THE MISSED CHKLIST. FORTUNATELY WE HAD SET THE FLAPS AND OUR TKOF WARNING SYS WORKED. AN ADDITIONAL DISTR (PROBABLY CONTRIBUTORY) WAS A MINOR HDG COMPARATOR PROB. I HAD RECENTLY (SEE ATTACHED RPT) HAD A HASSLE WITH MAINT AND DIDN'T WANT TO GET STUCK WHERE THERE WAS NO MAINT. WE WERE THEREFORE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH THE HDG PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.