Narrative:

The aircraft was on a test flight; operating with VFR flight following from center; and conducting numerous symmetric and asymmetric thrust test points at V2min and vac. When the incident occurred the aircraft was stabilized in a test point with flaps 20 gear up at 123 kcas with left engine at 85.3%N1 and the right engine at idle. After just under 5 minutes of stable flight; climbing at approx 500 fpm; there were a series of loud bangs from the left engine and a smell of oil entered the cockpit. Engine indications in the cockpit showed a rapid decay of N1; N2 and itt. The engine was fully instrumented for performance flight test and an [aerospace company] engineer on board was able to confirm a significant engine stall event and that the engine was shutting down.the aircraft was turned direct [to the nearest airport]; leveled at 7;000 ft MSL; accelerated to 200 kcas with flaps up; and the engine fail left checklist was executed to completion. A pan pan pan call was made on the current frequency. During the transit to [the airport] the trailing cone static system was retracted and water ballast moved to adjust cg to approximately 10%. Communication was established with company dispatch using a satellite phone. The one-engine inoperative landing checklist was used and the aircraft landed from a visual approach.during the landing roll brake degrade right advisory message appeared momentarily and braking action was poor from the right side. During taxi to the FBO brake temperatures peaked around 550 C on the left side; 200 C on the right (both well below expected fuse plug release). Thrust reverser was not used for the landing as it had been inhibited due to the instrumentation suite installed in both engines.preliminary inspection post-flight indicated probable contained blade failure in the hp (high pressure) compressor section and possibly some damage in the lp (low pressure) compressor too.one learning point from the event was with the electronic checklist that was used on an ipad. A hard copy QRH was available on the flight deck; but it was in the PF (left seat) cockpit side bin and the pm (right seat) was in the habit of using a pdf reader app on an ipad for normal checklists so forgot to ask for the hard copy. The index of cas (crew alerting system) messages in the ipad QRH was not hot-linked to the corresponding pages in the QRH so the pm resorted to using the word search function to skip as quickly as possible to the appropriate procedures. It would have been much more convenient in a high stress & high workload situation if hot-links were available in the index; and to jump quickly from the engine fail procedure to the landing procedure.a CRM learning point was that both pilots were unaware that the current aircraft configuration meant that auto ground spoiler would not deploy on landing. There was no mention of this in the QRH landing procedure. Normal cockpit procedures; with the pm watching for ground spoiler deployment on touchdown; identified the issue immediately and the spoilers were manually deployed using the speed brake handle. In post-flight discussions it was found that the flight test engineers on board were aware of the functionality; but assumed the pilots knew it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A First Officer reported that during testing they heard a series of loud bangs and an oil smell in the cockpit; then an engine flamed out so they landed at the nearest airport.

Narrative: The aircraft was on a test flight; operating with VFR Flight Following from Center; and conducting numerous symmetric and asymmetric thrust test points at V2min and Vac. When the incident occurred the aircraft was stabilized in a test point with Flaps 20 Gear Up at 123 KCAS with left engine at 85.3%N1 and the right engine at idle. After just under 5 minutes of stable flight; climbing at approx 500 fpm; there were a series of loud bangs from the left engine and a smell of oil entered the cockpit. Engine indications in the cockpit showed a rapid decay of N1; N2 and ITT. The engine was fully instrumented for performance flight test and an [aerospace company] engineer on board was able to confirm a significant engine stall event and that the engine was shutting down.The aircraft was turned direct [to the nearest airport]; leveled at 7;000 ft MSL; accelerated to 200 KCAS with Flaps Up; and the ENG FAIL L checklist was executed to completion. A PAN PAN PAN call was made on the current frequency. During the transit to [the airport] the trailing cone static system was retracted and water ballast moved to adjust CG to approximately 10%. Communication was established with Company Dispatch using a satellite phone. The One-Engine Inoperative Landing checklist was used and the aircraft landed from a visual approach.During the landing roll BRAKE DEGRADE R advisory message appeared momentarily and braking action was poor from the right side. During taxi to the FBO brake temperatures peaked around 550 C on the left side; 200 C on the right (both well below expected fuse plug release). Thrust reverser was not used for the landing as it had been inhibited due to the instrumentation suite installed in both engines.Preliminary inspection post-flight indicated probable contained blade failure in the HP (High Pressure) compressor section and possibly some damage in the LP (Low Pressure) compressor too.One learning point from the event was with the electronic checklist that was used on an iPad. A hard copy QRH was available on the flight deck; but it was in the PF (left seat) cockpit side bin and the PM (right seat) was in the habit of using a pdf reader app on an iPad for Normal checklists so forgot to ask for the hard copy. The Index of CAS (Crew Alerting System) messages in the iPad QRH was not hot-linked to the corresponding pages in the QRH so the PM resorted to using the word search function to skip as quickly as possible to the appropriate procedures. It would have been much more convenient in a high stress & high workload situation if hot-links were available in the index; and to jump quickly from the ENG FAIL procedure to the Landing procedure.A CRM learning point was that both pilots were unaware that the current aircraft configuration meant that auto ground spoiler would not deploy on landing. There was no mention of this in the QRH Landing procedure. Normal cockpit procedures; with the PM watching for ground spoiler deployment on touchdown; identified the issue immediately and the spoilers were manually deployed using the speed brake handle. In post-flight discussions it was found that the Flight Test Engineers on board were aware of the functionality; but assumed the pilots knew it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.