Narrative:

Approximately 1:45 hours after takeoff; while cruising enroute we received an EICAS message of 'bleed off eng left'. At the time we were about 40 minutes from entering ETOPS airspace. As a side consideration; our APU was meled as inop. Because of this; we were now down to a single available source of bleed air for the remainder of the flight.after consulting the ecl (electronic checklist); we found there is no abnormal procedure for the bleed off eng left advisory message; but only a condition statement. We also consulted the MEL for a bleed off issue; and determined it is acceptable to dispatch with only one engine bleed source as long as the APU is available. Considering how unique our situation was; we initiated a satcom call with [operations] and got patched through to [maintenance control] to help us determine the best course of action.our main concern was in the event of a loss of our right engine bleed; we would be unable to maintain pressurization as well as utilize any other components requiring a pneumatic source. We also consulted the duty officer (who in turn got in touch with the [legal] manager) to determine if there were any legality issues in continuing into ETOPS airspace given our present configuration. After multiple satcom calls; we came to the conclusion we were legal to continue into ETOPS airspace. We also consulted the dispatch release to determine what our fuel burn would be at 10;000 feet assuming the loss of our remaining bleed source at one of the two etps (equal time points) listed for the flight. After referring to the documentation we determined that we were projected to have at least 60;000 lbs more fuel at the etps than what would be required in the event of a divert to the etp alternate at 10;000 feet. With the concurrence of the rest of the flight crew; [operations]; [maintenance control]; the duty officer; and the [legal] manager; as well as having the most current weather at all of our etp alternates; I determined our best course of action was to continue as filed with a plan in place in case we needed to divert at any point along our flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 First Officer reported a Bleed Off Eng L EICAS message and an APU that was deferred. Pilot reported after consultation with dispatch; crew decided flight could legally continue into ETOPS airspace and proceed to destination.

Narrative: Approximately 1:45 hours after takeoff; while cruising enroute we received an EICAS message of 'Bleed Off Eng L'. At the time we were about 40 minutes from entering ETOPS airspace. As a side consideration; our APU was MELed as inop. Because of this; we were now down to a single available source of bleed air for the remainder of the flight.After consulting the ECL (Electronic Checklist); we found there is no abnormal procedure for the Bleed Off Eng L advisory message; but only a condition statement. We also consulted the MEL for a Bleed Off issue; and determined it is acceptable to dispatch with only one engine bleed source as long as the APU is available. Considering how unique our situation was; we initiated a SATCOM call with [operations] and got patched through to [maintenance control] to help us determine the best course of action.Our main concern was in the event of a loss of our right engine bleed; we would be unable to maintain pressurization as well as utilize any other components requiring a pneumatic source. We also consulted the duty officer (who in turn got in touch with the [legal] manager) to determine if there were any legality issues in continuing into ETOPS airspace given our present configuration. After multiple SATCOM calls; we came to the conclusion we were legal to continue into ETOPS airspace. We also consulted the dispatch release to determine what our fuel burn would be at 10;000 feet assuming the loss of our remaining bleed source at one of the two ETPs (Equal Time Points) listed for the flight. After referring to the documentation we determined that we were projected to have at least 60;000 lbs more fuel at the ETPs than what would be required in the event of a divert to the ETP alternate at 10;000 feet. With the concurrence of the rest of the flight crew; [operations]; [maintenance control]; the duty officer; and the [legal] manager; as well as having the most current weather at all of our ETP alternates; I determined our best course of action was to continue as filed with a plan in place in case we needed to divert at any point along our flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.