Narrative:

We were cleared for takeoff runway 28 at bwi. Tower instructed 'runway heading, maintain 4000'.' takeoff was normal. At approximately 500' tower instructed, 'at 5 DME turn left heading 110 degrees, climb and maintain 5000'.' we responded and began the turn at 3 DME and contacted departure. Departure control asked, 'are you turning left?' we reread the clearance as we understood it and asked, 'do you want a left turn?' we had just begun the turn perhaps 20 degrees off runway heading. The response was unintelligible but sounded like 'yeah.' we continued the turn and climb and were issued a new altitude and heading for the arwy. The departure controller asked if tower had told us to contact him and we responded that we believe we had. We were then handed off to center with no further mention of the incident. Since the controller didn't give us any changes to the clearance or mention a problem, we assumed we did everything correctly. We weren't sure if we did something incorrectly or there was a miscom between the tower and departure control. The problem I see here occurs during all phases of flight in our ATC system. Too many instructions and #south at inopportune times such as 500' during the takeoff profile. These instructions should have been given prior to the takeoff roll. Many times in terminal areas we'll receive instructions such as 'descend to cross xxxxx at 9000' or below to maintain 7000', 210 on the speed altimeter 29.82 expect approach clearance at 1932.' this is often too much information with a confusing amount of #south to digest west/O having a pen and paper at the ready. These type of clrncs have become a very frequent occurrence, and the chances of transposing #south is very great. Controllers should use more discretion and break up complex instructions into 2 transmission so the information can be clearly understood and digested prior to additional information or changes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLT CREW RECEIVES MULTIPLE INSTRUCTIONS AT 500' AFTER TKOF. COMPLIES, BUT DEP CTLR QUESTIONS DIRECTION OF TURN.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF RWY 28 AT BWI. TWR INSTRUCTED 'RWY HDG, MAINTAIN 4000'.' TKOF WAS NORMAL. AT APPROX 500' TWR INSTRUCTED, 'AT 5 DME TURN LEFT HDG 110 DEGS, CLB AND MAINTAIN 5000'.' WE RESPONDED AND BEGAN THE TURN AT 3 DME AND CONTACTED DEP. DEP CTL ASKED, 'ARE YOU TURNING LEFT?' WE REREAD THE CLRNC AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT AND ASKED, 'DO YOU WANT A LEFT TURN?' WE HAD JUST BEGUN THE TURN PERHAPS 20 DEGS OFF RWY HDG. THE RESPONSE WAS UNINTELLIGIBLE BUT SOUNDED LIKE 'YEAH.' WE CONTINUED THE TURN AND CLB AND WERE ISSUED A NEW ALT AND HDG FOR THE ARWY. THE DEP CTLR ASKED IF TWR HAD TOLD US TO CONTACT HIM AND WE RESPONDED THAT WE BELIEVE WE HAD. WE WERE THEN HANDED OFF TO CENTER WITH NO FURTHER MENTION OF THE INCIDENT. SINCE THE CTLR DIDN'T GIVE US ANY CHANGES TO THE CLRNC OR MENTION A PROB, WE ASSUMED WE DID EVERYTHING CORRECTLY. WE WEREN'T SURE IF WE DID SOMETHING INCORRECTLY OR THERE WAS A MISCOM BTWN THE TWR AND DEP CTL. THE PROB I SEE HERE OCCURS DURING ALL PHASES OF FLT IN OUR ATC SYS. TOO MANY INSTRUCTIONS AND #S AT INOPPORTUNE TIMES SUCH AS 500' DURING THE TKOF PROFILE. THESE INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN PRIOR TO THE TKOF ROLL. MANY TIMES IN TERMINAL AREAS WE'LL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS SUCH AS 'DSND TO CROSS XXXXX AT 9000' OR BELOW TO MAINTAIN 7000', 210 ON THE SPD ALTIMETER 29.82 EXPECT APCH CLRNC AT 1932.' THIS IS OFTEN TOO MUCH INFO WITH A CONFUSING AMOUNT OF #S TO DIGEST W/O HAVING A PEN AND PAPER AT THE READY. THESE TYPE OF CLRNCS HAVE BECOME A VERY FREQUENT OCCURRENCE, AND THE CHANCES OF TRANSPOSING #S IS VERY GREAT. CTLRS SHOULD USE MORE DISCRETION AND BREAK UP COMPLEX INSTRUCTIONS INTO 2 XMISSION SO THE INFO CAN BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND DIGESTED PRIOR TO ADDITIONAL INFO OR CHANGES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.