A300 first officer reported questioning the wisdom of a second takeoff attempt and reject due to a r...

Narrative:

Captain's takeoff. As soon as the captain pushed the toga levers and the throttles started to move forward the reverser unlocked light illuminated and the captain immediately performed a rejected takeoff. The light was only on momentarily and the aircraft had moved a short distance forward at a taxi speed. The captain rejected takeoff before I had called out any malfunction. Once the aircraft was stopped; I informed tower that we had rejected the takeoff and did not require assistance. I thought that I had seen the reverser unlocked light on the #2 engine; but I was not 100% certain which engine. The captain confirmed that it had been the #2 engine reverser unlocked light. I asked the captain if he had inadvertently engaged the thrust reverser lever during the attempted takeoff. The captain didn't think so but thought it might be possible. With the possibility that the crew induced the malfunction; we agreed to attempt another takeoff from our current position. The second takeoff attempt yielded the same indications and resulted in a second taxi speed rejected takeoff. We returned to the chocks. Maintenance locked the #2 reverser closed and we returned without further incident. Upon further reflection I think that we made a few poor decisions in this sequence of events. First; it was a poor decision to attempt a second takeoff with this malfunction. It was flawed thinking to suggest the captain could have engaged the thrust reversers while the throttles were advancing forward. And; even if the captain had been able to inadvertently engage the thrust reverser during takeoff; we should have known that this would be a malfunction that would require maintenance action before continuing our flight. Second; our subsequent takeoff attempt was performed utilizing full length runway performance data even though we were a short distance down the runway after our first takeoff attempt. I think that we would have made better decisions if we had exited the active runway and taken a few more minutes to consider our options.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 First Officer reported questioning the wisdom of a second takeoff attempt and reject due to a Reverser Unlocked Light after the first takeoff was rejected for the same reason.

Narrative: Captain's takeoff. As soon as the Captain pushed the TOGA levers and the throttles started to move forward the Reverser Unlocked Light illuminated and the Captain immediately performed a rejected takeoff. The light was only on momentarily and the aircraft had moved a short distance forward at a taxi speed. The Captain rejected takeoff before I had called out any malfunction. Once the aircraft was stopped; I informed tower that we had rejected the takeoff and did not require assistance. I thought that I had seen the Reverser Unlocked Light on the #2 engine; but I was not 100% certain which engine. The Captain confirmed that it had been the #2 engine Reverser Unlocked Light. I asked the Captain if he had inadvertently engaged the thrust reverser lever during the attempted takeoff. The Captain didn't think so but thought it might be possible. With the possibility that the crew induced the malfunction; we agreed to attempt another takeoff from our current position. The second takeoff attempt yielded the same indications and resulted in a second taxi speed rejected takeoff. We returned to the chocks. Maintenance locked the #2 reverser closed and we returned without further incident. Upon further reflection I think that we made a few poor decisions in this sequence of events. First; it was a poor decision to attempt a second takeoff with this malfunction. It was flawed thinking to suggest the Captain could have engaged the thrust reversers while the throttles were advancing forward. And; even if the Captain had been able to inadvertently engage the thrust reverser during takeoff; we should have known that this would be a malfunction that would require maintenance action before continuing our flight. Second; our subsequent takeoff attempt was performed utilizing full length runway performance data even though we were a short distance down the runway after our first takeoff attempt. I think that we would have made better decisions if we had exited the active runway and taken a few more minutes to consider our options.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1480544
Time
Date	201709
Local Time Of Day	0001-0600
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.Airport
State Reference	US
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	A300
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Takeoff
Route In Use	None
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	Thrust Reverser Control
Person 1
Function	Pilot Not Flying First Officer
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125 Flight Crew Total 5500 Flight Crew Type 873
Events
Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A300 first officer reported questioning the wisdom of a second takeoff attempt and reject due to a reverser unlocked light after the first takeoff was rejected for the same reason.