Narrative:

Weather at lan was reporting reduced visibility and a broken layer so I was told by ATC to expect the ILS 10R and to proceed direct to petke which put me on an approximate heading of 180. The controller instructed me to turn to heading 130 to intercept the localizer when I was approximately 1 NM to the fix; which lead on an overshoot of the localizer (due to the fact that my ground speed was 200 kts and performing a standard rate turn resulted in a wide turning radius that lead to the overshoot). Once I corrected for the overshoot and turned to a heading to re-intercept the localizer I noticed at this time that I had a navigation flag on HSI 1 & 2. After a quick troubleshoot of swapping frequencies to standby and back the flag went away. It was around this time I was instructed to contact tower; and after the frequency change I saw a runway in the distance; which I thought was lan runway 10R. I told tower I was with them for the ILS 10R and that I had the runway in sight and I was then informed that I was cleared to land. I began to continue visually to the runway in sight; but quickly realized this was the incorrect airport/runway and at the time the tower controller told me to check altitude and that I was reported at being low. I then began a climb and transitioned back to the instruments thus realizing I was actually not lined up with the correct runway. I informed the tower that I was correcting and the controller told me that it was okay and it wasn't the first time someone had done the same thing by attempting to land at the wrong airport while on this approach and it happens all the time. After a safe landing I taxied in and shut down without any communication that there was a potential pilot deviation or else I would've completed a report right away. After being brought to my attention that there was a potential pilot deviation I have been able to reflect on the situation and have come up with a few conclusions. To begin with I had a bad vector to intercept the localizer; which I had even stated on the radio to the tower controller. The approach controller allowed me to get far too close to the petke waypoint without the understanding that the aircraft would require more time and distance to make the turn to be wings level prior to intercepting the localizer. Instead; I was given insufficient distance and time to complete the turn prior to overshooting the localizer. By the time I was wings level at the intercept heading he gave me I was already 1 dot past the localizer. In the future to prevent this I will not accept a bad vector. I will inform them that I am unable and will need to be vectored around with a better intercept heading. The next thing that went wrong was the fact that I got a navigation flag on both hsis and didn't immediately report the failure of navigation equipment; instead I troubleshot the issue (which seemed to correct itself since I originally had the correct frequency in the navigation radio to begin with). I believe the correct action if this happens in the future is to immediately execute a published missed approach procedure and ask for a heading and altitude if necessary to insure that everything is being done to aviate safely and without violation of fars. Next was the lack of communication/misunderstanding of ATC communications that occurred. After the handoff from approach to tower when I reported field in sight and was told that I was clear to land. I was under the impression that at this point it was considered a visual approach therefore when I continued visually (only to quickly realize that this was not my intended runway of landing) and I further disregarded my flight instruments. I believe; this was a lack of effective communication from the tower and myself and also a pilot error on my part. The communication portion I believe could have been solved when I called field in sight that the tower (knowing visibility and ceilings were reduced and not having me in sight on final approach) would have verified that I actually have the correct airport in sight and not cleared me to land unless they indeed had a visual on me as well. In terms of the pilot error portion; I failed to cross-check my flight instruments until I had already descended and only then did I realize there was a disagreement between what I saw in my windscreen and what the instruments were telling me.the last (and possibly most concerning) thing about this incident that I believe requires immediate action is the fact that the controller informed me that this exact situation happens quite often on a frequent basis. I asked another pilot if they had any issues and they informed me the same thing happened to them; but without any notification of an incident or any action brought forth against them. To me; this is a major safety issue that needs to be addressed. I believe that the local FAA agency needs to reevaluate this particular approach procedure and consider a revision. For starters; the approach requires radar services; therefore if I'm expected to execute this approach utilizing the radar services I need to have a controller who is on duty that is competent to effectively and safety vector me onto an appropriate intercept heading. Next; if there have been so many issues in the past perhaps changing this to a DME IAP procedure would be better; seeing as there is no way (other than using radar or GPS) to identify the petke intersection or even the distance to the OM/radar (famli) final approach fix. Lastly; there should be information readily available to any/all pilots landing lan on runway 10R airport about the close proximity of an airport with a runway that is only 6 miles to the west of the field that is aligned almost exactly on the approach path to the 10R runway. I believe that this type of communication can/will prevent this type of incident from happening in the future. Overall; this has been a learning experience for me and I believe with the proper education and communication this is something that could've been easily been prevented. I can only hope that this information will be used to further educate and prevent further incidents from happening in the future so that we; as aviators; can continue to operate safely; efficiently; and legally for years to come.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Taxi pilot reported that after overshooting the LAN Runway 10R LOC; lined up for the wrong airport.

Narrative: Weather at LAN was reporting reduced visibility and a broken layer so I was told by ATC to expect the ILS 10R and to proceed direct to PETKE which put me on an approximate heading of 180. The controller instructed me to turn to HDG 130 to intercept the localizer when I was approximately 1 NM to the fix; which lead on an overshoot of the LOC (due to the fact that my ground speed was 200 kts and performing a standard rate turn resulted in a wide turning radius that lead to the overshoot). Once I corrected for the overshoot and turned to a HDG to re-intercept the LOC I noticed at this time that I had a NAV FLAG on HSI 1 & 2. After a quick troubleshoot of swapping frequencies to standby and back the flag went away. It was around this time I was instructed to contact tower; and after the frequency change I saw a runway in the distance; which I thought was LAN RWY 10R. I told tower I was with them for the ILS 10R and that I had the runway in sight and I was then informed that I was cleared to land. I began to continue visually to the runway in sight; but quickly realized this was the incorrect airport/runway and at the time the tower controller told me to check altitude and that I was reported at being low. I then began a climb and transitioned back to the instruments thus realizing I was actually not lined up with the correct runway. I informed the tower that I was correcting and the controller told me that it was okay and it wasn't the first time someone had done the same thing by attempting to land at the wrong airport while on this approach and it happens all the time. After a safe landing I taxied in and shut down without any communication that there was a potential pilot deviation or else I would've completed a report right away. After being brought to my attention that there was a potential pilot deviation I have been able to reflect on the situation and have come up with a few conclusions. To begin with I had a bad vector to intercept the LOC; which I had even stated on the radio to the tower controller. The approach controller allowed me to get far too close to the PETKE waypoint without the understanding that the aircraft would require more time and distance to make the turn to be wings level prior to intercepting the LOC. Instead; I was given insufficient distance and time to complete the turn prior to overshooting the LOC. By the time I was wings level at the intercept HDG he gave me I was already 1 dot past the LOC. In the future to prevent this I will not accept a bad vector. I will inform them that I am unable and will need to be vectored around with a better intercept HDG. The next thing that went wrong was the fact that I got a NAV FLAG on both HSIs and didn't immediately report the failure of NAV equipment; instead I troubleshot the issue (which seemed to correct itself since I originally had the correct frequency in the NAV radio to begin with). I believe the correct action if this happens in the future is to immediately execute a published missed approach procedure and ask for a HDG and altitude if necessary to insure that everything is being done to aviate safely and without violation of FARs. Next was the lack of communication/misunderstanding of ATC communications that occurred. After the handoff from approach to tower when I reported field in sight and was told that I was clear to land. I was under the impression that at this point it was considered a visual approach therefore when I continued visually (only to quickly realize that this was NOT my intended runway of landing) and I further disregarded my flight instruments. I believe; this was a lack of effective communication from the tower and myself and also a pilot error on my part. The communication portion I believe could have been solved when I called field in sight that the tower (knowing visibility and ceilings were reduced and NOT having me in sight on final approach) would have verified that I actually have the correct airport in sight and not cleared me to land unless they indeed had a visual on me as well. In terms of the pilot error portion; I failed to cross-check my flight instruments until I had already descended and only then did I realize there was a disagreement between what I saw in my windscreen and what the instruments were telling me.The last (and possibly most concerning) thing about this incident that I believe requires immediate action is the fact that the controller informed me that this exact situation happens quite often on a frequent basis. I asked another pilot if they had any issues and they informed me the same thing happened to them; but without any notification of an incident or any action brought forth against them. To me; this is a major safety issue that needs to be addressed. I believe that the local FAA agency needs to reevaluate this particular approach procedure and consider a revision. For starters; the approach requires radar services; therefore if I'm expected to execute this approach utilizing the radar services I need to have a controller who is on duty that is competent to effectively and safety vector me onto an appropriate intercept HDG. Next; if there have been so many issues in the past perhaps changing this to a DME IAP procedure would be better; seeing as there is no way (other than using RADAR or GPS) to identify the PETKE intersection or even the distance to the OM/RADAR (FAMLI) final approach fix. Lastly; there should be information readily available to any/all pilots landing LAN on Runway 10R airport about the close proximity of an airport with a runway that is only 6 miles to the west of the field that is aligned almost exactly on the approach path to the 10R runway. I believe that this type of communication can/will prevent this type of incident from happening in the future. Overall; this has been a learning experience for me and I believe with the proper education and communication this is something that could've been easily been prevented. I can only hope that this information will be used to further educate and prevent further incidents from happening in the future so that we; as aviators; can continue to operate safely; efficiently; and legally for years to come.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.