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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1487122 |
Time | |
Date | 201710 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Dash 8-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Engine Air |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
I was assigned a trip to ferry the aircraft [that] was parked for a length of time as it had previously suffered an engine number 2 fire in flight. As a crew; we discussed the situation and although apprehensive; we decided we would take our time to ensure we were safe and legal before proceeding.I was surprised to find that there was no [company] maintenance personnel at the plane to meet us and to fly the aircraft back as the logbook indicated major repair work was performed on the aircraft. Further; due to the previous fire and structural damage to the aircraft we would be forced to respect the va speed of 177 KTS during the flight. There was no prior contact by the company to explain the situation to me.after several discussions with dispatch and maintenance; the first officer (first officer) and I agreed we were satisfied to perform the flight. After appropriate checklists and briefing; I started the number 2 engine. The engine appeared to start normally. After a short amount of time; less than a minute after starter cutout the first officer remarked; smoke. I took my eyes off the engine gauges and did in fact notice the flight deck was filling with smoke rapidly. I looked at the fire detection panel and there was no indication of fire. I did notice at this time the number 2 bleed was on along with the recirculation fans. We both agreed to evacuate the aircraft; and I executed the smoke before V1 immediate action items and the first officer and I evacuated the aircraft without further incident.the smoke was acrid and thick and caused me to cough due to irritation of my airway and also burning of my eyes. There was no evidence of smoke or fire outside of the aircraft. I immediately called dispatch and then a chief pilot. After several discussions with company; we were requested to trouble shoot the cause of the smoke as the company believed the cause of the smoke was due to operation of the bleed after engine start. Further; the chief pilot pointed out that 300 model has a 'limitation' of 60 seconds before putting the bleeds on. The text is confusing; as it is found in section 9.7 engine start procedures and [it] states the following: 'the re-circulation fan and engine bleed air switches may be selected on after the required verifications have been completed to meet cabin environmental demands. Engine bleed air for the -311 series aircraft should remain off for 60 seconds following the engine-start procedure to prevent fumes from entering the cabin.'my question on this procedure is when is 60 seconds following engine start procedure? Is it starter disengagement? As the aircraft are so hot; it is imperative that we get airflow as soon as possible in the aircraft. Both the first officer and I were positive this was not fumes from the engine start as we are both familiar with engine fumes ingestion. After multiple discussions with the company; the crew agreed to run the engine up with a contract maintenance personnel on board. The run up was successful this time. The aircraft was signed off and we were dispatched to destination without further incident.a [company] mechanic should have been with the aircraft for the ferry flight. After discussing with senior maintenance personnel at destination after we arrived; they believed it was residual oil somewhere in the bleed system and was atomized when the bleed was open. Maintenance did not know if the bleeds were exercised during the previous maintenance work. Potentially the first officer and I may have had an acute exposure to turbine engine oil. Turbine engine oil is known to be very toxic; especially when it is atomized and ingested though inhalation. Well established acute and chronic diseases have been manifested through such exposure.I am concerned that [our company] does not have any air quality guidelines or occupational exposure risk assessments that I am aware of. Has there ever been an air quality monitoring program ever been conducted? Many crewmembers are unaware of the possible chemical exposurefrom the bleed air system and what the permitted daily exposure (pde) of said potential contaminants in the aircraft are. Lastly; after any occupational exposure to smoke or mist there is no further health assessment required by the company. I have attached a published article 'the toxicity of commercial jet oils' from the journal of environmental research; volume 89; issue 2; june 2002; pages 146-164; on the potential toxicity of turbine oil.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: The Captain of a Bombardier DHC-8 reported that after engine start the cockpit started filling up with smoke.
Narrative: I was assigned a trip to ferry the aircraft [that] was parked for a length of time as it had previously suffered an engine number 2 fire in flight. As a crew; we discussed the situation and although apprehensive; we decided we would take our time to ensure we were safe and legal before proceeding.I was surprised to find that there was no [Company] Maintenance personnel at the plane to meet us and to fly the aircraft back as the logbook indicated major repair work was performed on the aircraft. Further; due to the previous fire and structural damage to the aircraft we would be forced to respect the Va speed of 177 KTS during the flight. There was no prior contact by the company to explain the situation to me.After several discussions with dispatch and maintenance; the FO (First Officer) and I agreed we were satisfied to perform the flight. After appropriate checklists and briefing; I started the number 2 engine. The engine appeared to start normally. After a short amount of time; less than a minute after starter cutout the FO remarked; Smoke. I took my eyes off the engine gauges and did in fact notice the flight deck was filling with smoke rapidly. I looked at the fire detection panel and there was no indication of fire. I did notice at this time the number 2 bleed was on along with the recirculation fans. We both agreed to evacuate the aircraft; and I executed the smoke before V1 immediate action items and the FO and I evacuated the aircraft without further incident.The smoke was acrid and thick and caused me to cough due to irritation of my airway and also burning of my eyes. There was no evidence of smoke or fire outside of the aircraft. I immediately called dispatch and then a Chief Pilot. After several discussions with company; we were requested to trouble shoot the cause of the smoke as the company believed the cause of the smoke was due to operation of the bleed after engine start. Further; the Chief Pilot pointed out that 300 model has a 'limitation' of 60 seconds before putting the bleeds on. The text is confusing; as it is found in section 9.7 Engine Start Procedures and [it] states the following: 'The re-circulation fan and engine bleed air switches may be selected on after the required verifications have been completed to meet cabin environmental demands. Engine bleed air for the -311 Series aircraft should remain OFF for 60 seconds following the engine-start procedure to prevent fumes from entering the cabin.'My question on this procedure is when is 60 seconds following engine start procedure? Is it starter disengagement? As the aircraft are so hot; it is imperative that we get airflow as soon as possible in the aircraft. Both the FO and I were positive this was not fumes from the engine start as we are both familiar with engine fumes ingestion. After multiple discussions with the company; the crew agreed to run the engine up with a contract maintenance personnel on board. The run up was successful this time. The aircraft was signed off and we were dispatched to destination without further incident.A [Company] mechanic should have been with the aircraft for the ferry flight. After discussing with senior maintenance personnel at destination after we arrived; they believed it was residual oil somewhere in the bleed system and was atomized when the bleed was open. Maintenance did not know if the Bleeds were exercised during the previous maintenance work. Potentially the FO and I may have had an acute exposure to turbine engine oil. Turbine engine oil is known to be very toxic; especially when it is atomized and ingested though inhalation. Well established acute and chronic diseases have been manifested through such exposure.I am concerned that [our Company] does not have any air quality guidelines or occupational exposure risk assessments that I am aware of. Has there ever been an air quality monitoring program ever been conducted? Many crewmembers are unaware of the possible chemical exposurefrom the bleed air system and what the permitted daily exposure (PDE) of said potential contaminants in the aircraft are. Lastly; after any occupational exposure to smoke or mist there is no further health assessment required by the company. I have attached a published article 'The Toxicity of Commercial Jet Oils' from the Journal of Environmental Research; Volume 89; Issue 2; June 2002; Pages 146-164; on the potential toxicity of turbine oil.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.