Narrative:

I was ferrying an aircraft back after purchase. Had been flying for 9+ hours before the incident occurred. After refueling; I began my flight towards rocky mountain metro bjc. Direct routing took me through what was indicated as an area of IFR weather to my south. After taking off I had a general idea concerning the weather to the south; however; weather forecasts and reports in the denver metro area were calling clear and I assumed I would just fly south and see how bad it really was. In hind sight; this was a poor choice; and upon taking off and noting that ceilings were much lower than reported and visibility was decreasing; I should have diverted to scotts bluff. It was at this point I acknowledged that I was scud running and probably needed to devise a backup plan if conditions worsened. Diverting to the west; I intended to escape from underneath the cloud layer and enter unrestricted VFR conditions; as reported at laramie; and indicated on satellite scans from foreflight. Upon reaching 35-40 miles north of cheyenne; I realized that weather conditions were deteriorating as the temperature dropped; and that clouds were forming at and beyond my position to the west. At this point I calculated the remaining sunlight to be close to a half hour; which began to concern me. Earlier in the flight I had learned that the transponder; turn and slip indicator; and nav radio were inoperative; and thus of no use. This became a problem as I neared cheyenne. Quickly realizing my peril; and considering the situation now one of urgency/ or emergency; I climbed to 8000 ft and called cheyenne approach. I declared pan pan status to approach and requested radar vectors to laramie; or the nearest VFR airport. Cheyenne was unable to provide radar services as my transponder was inoperative. Cheyenne approach then informed me that the field had gone IFR and ceiling were 800 ft overcast. At this point; I had three hours worth of flying left; but was concerned about the lack of VFR conditions and the decreasing daylight in an instrument crippled airplane. Cheyenne approach recommended I fly a heading of 180 to fly towards the airport. Clouds were lowering as I approached the airport; and I noted my AGL altitude to be close to 200-300 ft. As I neared the airport; I was approximately 10 miles north and actively scanning for obstacles and the airport. At the suggestion of the approach controller; I turned to the east and found the interstate. Following the interstate; I flew south for about 4 miles at 200-300 ft AGL and navigated to the airport. Upon reaching the airport; emergency services were standing by; and I was cleared to land. After exiting the runway; I was shaking and felt disoriented. Cheyenne ground provided progressive taxi to the FBO.at the time of the incident I had already been flying for 10 hours; more flying than I have ever completed in one day. Given my expectation of the flight; and check of the weather the night before; I think I had an expectation that the weather would be excellent for the entire ferry flight and that adverse conditions were not set to occur. I clearly suffered from expectation bias; and a moderate case of get there-itis. Beginning the trip; I acknowledged the expectation that I would be home for dinner; and sleeping in my own bed; and that according to the weather briefing I received the night prior; the conditions would be good enough to permit that. I also failed to recognize deteriorating conditions; and the compounding nature of risk components associated with the flight. Because my total trip time was affected by the length of each fuel stop on the way back; I tried to spend a minimum amount of time on the ground at each stop; this resulted in a shorter than normal weather check and less critical decision making concerning the weather than I normally make. I waited too long to make the decision to divert; wasting sunlight; better weather and at least one good alternate; promising myself that if I flewfar enough west; the clouds would clear and I could continue my flight south. In hindsight; a diversion to scotts bluff would have saved a good deal of trouble; and a lot of stress. I owe my life to the approach and tower controllers at cheyenne; who recognized the severity of my problem and offered assistance when it was most critical. I am disappointed in my own decision making as a flight instructor; but learned a good lesson and endeavor to incorporate my experience into further lessons for my students and myself. In particular; on this flight; I was reminded of many other similar reports found in this database that included different but similar enough cases of pilots waiting too long to declare an emergency and request assistance; leaving options limited; fuel reserves low; and alternate airports in short supply. I think part of my success that evening can be attributed to my prior research into aviation safety; and my knowledge of similar events and circumstances that led to situations very similar to my own.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Small aircraft Flight Instructor reported entering IMC while ferrying an aircraft on a VFR flight.

Narrative: I was ferrying an aircraft back after purchase. Had been flying for 9+ hours before the incident occurred. After refueling; I began my flight towards Rocky Mountain Metro BJC. Direct routing took me through what was indicated as an area of IFR weather to my south. After taking off I had a general idea concerning the weather to the south; however; weather forecasts and reports in the Denver metro area were calling clear and I assumed I would just fly south and see how bad it really was. In hind sight; this was a poor choice; and upon taking off and noting that ceilings were much lower than reported and visibility was decreasing; I should have diverted to Scotts Bluff. It was at this point I acknowledged that I was scud running and probably needed to devise a backup plan if conditions worsened. Diverting to the west; I intended to escape from underneath the cloud layer and enter unrestricted VFR conditions; as reported at Laramie; and indicated on satellite scans from ForeFlight. Upon reaching 35-40 miles north of Cheyenne; I realized that weather conditions were deteriorating as the temperature dropped; and that clouds were forming at and beyond my position to the west. At this point I calculated the remaining sunlight to be close to a half hour; which began to concern me. Earlier in the flight I had learned that the transponder; turn and slip indicator; and Nav radio were inoperative; and thus of no use. This became a problem as I neared Cheyenne. Quickly realizing my peril; and considering the situation now one of urgency/ or emergency; I climbed to 8000 ft and called Cheyenne approach. I declared PAN PAN status to approach and requested radar vectors to Laramie; or the nearest VFR airport. Cheyenne was unable to provide radar services as my transponder was inoperative. Cheyenne approach then informed me that the field had gone IFR and ceiling were 800 ft Overcast. At this point; I had three hours worth of flying left; but was concerned about the lack of VFR conditions and the decreasing daylight in an instrument crippled airplane. Cheyenne approach recommended I fly a heading of 180 to fly towards the airport. Clouds were lowering as I approached the airport; and I noted my AGL altitude to be close to 200-300 ft. As I neared the airport; I was approximately 10 miles north and actively scanning for obstacles and the airport. At the suggestion of the approach controller; I turned to the east and found the interstate. Following the interstate; I flew south for about 4 miles at 200-300 ft AGL and navigated to the airport. Upon reaching the airport; emergency services were standing by; and I was cleared to land. After exiting the runway; I was shaking and felt disoriented. Cheyenne ground provided progressive taxi to the FBO.At the time of the incident I had already been flying for 10 hours; more flying than I have ever completed in one day. Given my expectation of the flight; and check of the weather the night before; I think I had an expectation that the weather would be excellent for the entire ferry flight and that adverse conditions were not set to occur. I clearly suffered from expectation bias; and a moderate case of get there-itis. Beginning the trip; I acknowledged the expectation that I would be home for dinner; and sleeping in my own bed; and that according to the weather briefing I received the night prior; the conditions would be good enough to permit that. I also failed to recognize deteriorating conditions; and the compounding nature of risk components associated with the flight. Because my total trip time was affected by the length of each fuel stop on the way back; I tried to spend a minimum amount of time on the ground at each stop; this resulted in a shorter than normal weather check and less critical decision making concerning the weather than I normally make. I waited too long to make the decision to divert; wasting sunlight; better weather and at least one good alternate; promising myself that if I flewfar enough west; the clouds would clear and I could continue my flight south. In hindsight; a diversion to Scotts Bluff would have saved a good deal of trouble; and a lot of stress. I owe my life to the approach and tower controllers at Cheyenne; who recognized the severity of my problem and offered assistance when it was most critical. I am disappointed in my own decision making as a Flight Instructor; but learned a good lesson and endeavor to incorporate my experience into further lessons for my students and myself. In particular; on this flight; I was reminded of many other similar reports found in this database that included different but similar enough cases of pilots waiting too long to declare an emergency and request assistance; leaving options limited; fuel reserves low; and alternate airports in short supply. I think part of my success that evening can be attributed to my prior research into aviation safety; and my knowledge of similar events and circumstances that led to situations very similar to my own.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.