Narrative:

Upon arriving at the gate the captain initiated the parking checklist by calling out in precise checklist verbage, and doing, 'brakes...parked, seat belt signs...off, pneu xfeed valves...open, APU...established, fuel levers...off, checklist please.' since he had said each item aloud in precise format I assumed he wanted me to start the checklist with the next item (anti-collision lights...off) rather than begin again at the top of the checklist. The captain said 'fuel levers...off', as he cut the right fuel lever, then he said 'checklist please' while he checked to see that the APU had assumed the right engine generator's load. I started reading the next item on the checklist (anti-collision lights...off) and the captain was momentarily distraction because I did not start back at the beginning of the checklist as he expected, yet he did not correct me or request that I start over. Thus distract, the captain never did cut the left engine fuel lever to the off position. We completed the checklist and both departed the aircraft after all passengers had deplaned west/O realizing the left engine was still running. There were other aircraft near us on the ramp with engines running so we did not notice the noise. The ground crew had properly chocked all wheels and the parking brakes were set. Leaving an engine running longer than usual after parking is supposed to be an automatic signal to the ground crew that either APU electric or external electric power is not being received and an additional source of external electric power is required. We were never questioned about this by the ground crew during the several mins it took to deplane our passengers. We passed the oncoming crew in the jetbridge. The outbnd first officer discovered the engine running mins later during his cockpit preflight check of the takeoff warning system when he ran the throttles up. Precise adherence to checklist procedures would have prevented this incident. Also, visly confirming that complete shutdown of both engines has occurred before turning off the anti-collision light will be part of my standard routine.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG FLT CREW FAILED TO SHUT DOWN THE LEFT ENGINEBEFORE LEAVING THE ACFT. ERROR WAS DISCOVERED BY OUTBOUND FO WHEN HE PUSHED THE THRUST LEVERS FOREWARD TO CHECK THE TKOF WARNING.

Narrative: UPON ARRIVING AT THE GATE THE CAPT INITIATED THE PARKING CHKLIST BY CALLING OUT IN PRECISE CHKLIST VERBAGE, AND DOING, 'BRAKES...PARKED, SEAT BELT SIGNS...OFF, PNEU XFEED VALVES...OPEN, APU...ESTABLISHED, FUEL LEVERS...OFF, CHKLIST PLEASE.' SINCE HE HAD SAID EACH ITEM ALOUD IN PRECISE FORMAT I ASSUMED HE WANTED ME TO START THE CHKLIST WITH THE NEXT ITEM (ANTI-COLLISION LIGHTS...OFF) RATHER THAN BEGIN AGAIN AT THE TOP OF THE CHKLIST. THE CAPT SAID 'FUEL LEVERS...OFF', AS HE CUT THE R FUEL LEVER, THEN HE SAID 'CHKLIST PLEASE' WHILE HE CHKED TO SEE THAT THE APU HAD ASSUMED THE R ENG GENERATOR'S LOAD. I STARTED READING THE NEXT ITEM ON THE CHKLIST (ANTI-COLLISION LIGHTS...OFF) AND THE CAPT WAS MOMENTARILY DISTR BECAUSE I DID NOT START BACK AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CHKLIST AS HE EXPECTED, YET HE DID NOT CORRECT ME OR REQUEST THAT I START OVER. THUS DISTRACT, THE CAPT NEVER DID CUT THE L ENG FUEL LEVER TO THE OFF POS. WE COMPLETED THE CHKLIST AND BOTH DEPARTED THE ACFT AFTER ALL PAXS HAD DEPLANED W/O REALIZING THE L ENG WAS STILL RUNNING. THERE WERE OTHER ACFT NEAR US ON THE RAMP WITH ENGS RUNNING SO WE DID NOT NOTICE THE NOISE. THE GND CREW HAD PROPERLY CHOCKED ALL WHEELS AND THE PARKING BRAKES WERE SET. LEAVING AN ENG RUNNING LONGER THAN USUAL AFTER PARKING IS SUPPOSED TO BE AN AUTOMATIC SIGNAL TO THE GND CREW THAT EITHER APU ELECTRIC OR EXTERNAL ELECTRIC PWR IS NOT BEING RECEIVED AND AN ADDITIONAL SOURCE OF EXTERNAL ELECTRIC PWR IS REQUIRED. WE WERE NEVER QUESTIONED ABOUT THIS BY THE GND CREW DURING THE SEVERAL MINS IT TOOK TO DEPLANE OUR PAXS. WE PASSED THE ONCOMING CREW IN THE JETBRIDGE. THE OUTBND F/O DISCOVERED THE ENG RUNNING MINS LATER DURING HIS COCKPIT PREFLT CHK OF THE TKOF WARNING SYS WHEN HE RAN THE THROTTLES UP. PRECISE ADHERENCE TO CHKLIST PROCS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT. ALSO, VISLY CONFIRMING THAT COMPLETE SHUTDOWN OF BOTH ENGS HAS OCCURRED BEFORE TURNING OFF THE ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT WILL BE PART OF MY STANDARD ROUTINE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.